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SUMMARY

In this thesis I assess Susan George's proposed solution to the
Third World

debt crisis in the light of two contemporary

competing theories of justice which have international

and

application.

The two theories against which George's proposal is assessed are
Onora O'Neill's Kantian-inspired theory of justice and R.M. Hare's
preference
amongst

utilitarianism.
various

ethical

These
traditions

theories
that

are

have

firstly
been

located

applied

to

international relations and are selected as significant contenders in
their relevance to an issue such as the Third World debt crisis.
After outlining George's account of the importance and origins of
the Third World debt crisis, I set out the details of her solution to
that crisis.

This proposed solution is then assessed in the light of

the two theories of justice selected.

In the final chapter I conclude

that most aspects of George's proposal meet the requirements of
justice according to both competing theories of justice.

However, I

argue that her insistence on démocratisation is problematic on both
theories.
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PREFACE

One basic way of dividing up ethical traditions that apply to
international

relations

is into traditions

which

oriented and traditions which are rule-oriented.

are

consequence-

In this thesis, I

consider one concrete proposal to solve the Third World debt crisis.
This is the proposal put forward by Susan George in A Fate
Than

Debt.

theories

I consider this proposal in the light of two ethical

that

clearly

apply

to

issues

of

international

especially in relation to extensive distributive inequalities.
theories

Worse

on

which

utilitarianism

and

I concentrate
Onora O'NeiU's

theory.

Hare's

theory

tradition,

while

O'Neill's

falls

are

R.

Hare's

Kantian-inspired,

within

theory

M.

the

falls

justice,
The two

preference

deontological

consequence-oriented

within

the

rule-oriented

tradition.
I have set myself
examine

how

a

a limited, applied project.

well-known,

well-respected,

I wish

to

anti-establishment

proposal for solving the Third World debt crisis fares in the light of
two significant, competing, contemporary ethical theories.
World

debt

is

a major

contributor

to

widespread

hunger

destitution among ordinary people in the Third World.

Third
and

It is also a

significant cause of deprivation among ordinary people in the First
World.

Susan George offers a considered, practicable solution to the

debt crisis in an attempt to alleviate the suffering caused, in part,
by that crisis.
solution is.

It is therefore important to judge how just George's

The present inquiry contributes to that task.

I develop my thesis in the following way.
present

In Chapter 1, I

a survey of some major ethical traditions

international relations.
secondary sources.

that apply

to

The survey largely, but not wholly, relies on
I am not especially concerned with assessing

these various ethical traditions as theories of ethics.

The main point

of the survey is to locate the two contemporary

applied

ethical

theories that are in focus in the thesis among some of the chief
ethical

traditions

that

have

been

opposed to only domestic, affairs.

applied

to

international,

as

As part of this contextualising

task, I review what I take to be the salient, generic advantages and
disadvantages

of

these

ethical

traditions

in their

application

as

theories of international ethics.
In Chapter 2, I concentrate on George's book A Fate
Than Debt.

Worse

I outline her analysis of why Third World debt is such a

problem for various groups of people in both the Third and First
Worlds, give her account of how Third World debt came about, and
detail her proposed solution.
George, The Debt

I also refer to a more recent book by

Boomerang,

in which she amplifies her account of

the effects of Third World debt on both the Third and First Worlds.
I shall not be challenging George's account of how the Third World
debt crisis came about and of what effects it has had.

Along with

many others, I take her account to be incisive and authoritive.
In Chapter 3, I provide an account of Hare's theory of justice,
both formal and substantial, and relate it to his theory of e t h i c s preference utilitarianism.

My principal aim in this chapter is to

establish the background for assessing George's proposed solution to
the

Third World

debt

crisis in the light

of Hare's

account

of

Ill
distributive justice, as this has international application. In Chapter
4, I assess how just George's solution is in the light of Hare's account
of justice. I argue that, while George's solution to the Third World
debt crisis looks good on several counts, from a preferenceutilitarian perspective on justice like Hare's, there is a problem
about how genuinely sensitive her solution is to the actual
preferences of all the affected parties, given her insistence on
democratic values.
In Chapter 5, I characterise Onora O'Neill's Kantian-inspired
theory of justice and identify the essential features of that theory
against which to assess George's proposal. In Chapter 6, I then
proceed to assess George's proposal in the light of O'Neill's theory of
justice. I argue that this proposal has many virtues, under O'Neill's
theory; but again, George's insistence on democracy is morally
problematic—in this case because it is arguably coercive in a
fundamental way. I conclude the thesis with a brief summary in
Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 1
A SURVEY OF SOME MAJOR ETHICAL TRADITIONS AS APPLIED TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the present chapter, I characterise some of the main ethical
theories

that

apply

to international

relations

and

locate

among

these the two applied theories in focus in this thesis.

I also

comment on what I take to be the primary, generic advantages and
disadvantages of these various theories as theories of international
ethics.

First, I briefly look at natural-law theory, which is included

in the rule-oriented class of ethical theories.

I then make some

remarks on Kantianism, rights theories, and contractarianism, all of
which also count as rule-oriented theories.

Finally, I make some

observations about utilitarianism, as a consequence-oriented

theory

of ethics, applied to issues of international relations.
In my review of the advantages and disadvantages of the
various theories of international ethics, I make some fairly standard
assumptions

about

desiderata

in a theory of international ethics.

For example, I assume that a good theory of international ethics
would

include

features

like

the

following:

(1)

it

would

be

cosmopolitan; (2) it would be accessible to those to whom it applies;
(3) it would

have

the resources

to provide

for a

contextually

sensitive critique of current values within groups; (4) it would have
a

perspicuous

decision-procedure

that

was

relevant

to

non-

idealised agents and agencies; (5) it would allow for a plurality of

agents and agencies; (6) it would be informative, in a world of need,
about moral obligations that extend beyond the strict requirements
of

justice.1

I return to the issue of desiderata

in a theory of

international ethics in Chapters 5 and 6.

Natural
(i) Distinguishing
The
with

Law

Features

natural-law

developments

tradition

in

Christian

within
moral

ethics

is often

philosophy

associated

and

thought,

particularly in Catholicism, since the time of Aquinas (Boyle 1992,
p. 112).

The natural-law tradition, however, is not restricted to a

religious view.

Rather, natural-law theorists maintain that, through

use of practical reason, rational beings can identify basic human
goods and the moral precepts through which these human

goods

can be attained.
It is convenient to call the nonreligious component of the
natural-law tradition 'common morality'.2

Joseph Boyle depicts four

features of common morality shared by natural-law theorists.
the precepts
beyond

of the Mosaic decalogue

question,

even

though

these

are taken
precepts

as
are

First,

"established
most

often

regarded as the implications of more fundamental principles" (Boyle

1 These criteria strongly overlap with the standards of applied ethical
reasoning about problems of the public domain set by Onora O'Neill (O'Neill
1986, p. 49).
^This term was coined by Alan Donagan (Boyle 1992, p. 117).

1992, p. 117).3 Second, common morality treats some of the
precepts of the decalogue as absolute prohibitions on some kinds of
action (Boyle 1992, p. 118). Such prohibitions can hold even when
there is a strong positive obligation to promote an overriding good
or to avoid an urgent disaster. Further, when deliberating on which
course of action is the right one, natural-law theorists maintain that
the intention of the agent is important. They interpret St. Paul's
dictum that 'one must not do evil that good may come of it', when
applied to actions that harm human beings, as referring to harms
that are intended. In cases where the harm comes about as a sideeffect of the action, the action might still be wrong, but it might also
be permissible. (The doctrine of double effect instantiates this
idea.) Third, the moral norms of common morality are agent
relative.
(They direct the actions of agents rather than the
production of outcomes.) A moral norm, such as the proscription of
murder "is addressed to every person and directs each not to
murder" (Boyle 1992, p. 118). The focus of moral responsibility is
put on the agent, such that each is responsible for their own choices
and intentions. These three features of common morality fall
within the spectrum of deontological moral theory.
The fourth feature of common morality is its universalism. It
is universal in that it provides a basis for how one is to treat all
human beings in virtue of our shared humanity. According to
Boyle, "common morality...rejects those forms of relativism that
locate moral standards in the lived values of specific communities"
^For Boyle, more fundamental principles would include the love
commandments or the Golden Rule or, in the Kantian tradkion, the
implications of the categorical imperative or, in the Thomist tradition, the
demands of right reason (Boyle 1992, p. 117).

(Boyle 1992, p. 122).

So, while all people have rights, these rights

are implied by the obligations which stem from the fundamental
principles of common morality.

As an aspect of its universalism,

common morality includes a general duty to help others.
of

this

duty

stretches

community or nation.
others

may

mean

beyond

the

boundaries

The scope

of

one's

own

So, for example, this general duty to help

that

"when

many

in

the

third

world

face

imminent starvation relatively wealthy people in richer parts of the
world have a serious moral obligation to come to their aid" (Boyle
1992, p. 123).
(ii) The Advantages

of Natural-Law

Natural-law

Theory

theory has several advantages in its

to international relations.

application

First, the theory's universalism tends to

make it cosmopolitan in its outlook.

Certain moral prescriptions and

proscriptions that apply transcend national and cultural

boundaries.

One's neighbour can include the whole of humanity.
Second,

natural-law

development

and

revision

commitments).

Normative

theory

casuistry,

involves

moral principles.

theory
of

provides
moral

moral
which

a

principles

deliberation
is used

method

for

(reform

within

the
of

natural-law

to develop

and

revise

According to Boyle, "no one is stuck with a set of

values that cannot be criticised by appeal to a higher

standard"

(Boyle

morality,

1992,

deliberation
values.

p.

need

124).
not

be

So,

even

tied

to

within
established

common
or

establishment

Third,

natural-law

theory

construes

moral

discourse

or

dialogue in terms of values that are in principle accessible to all.
The basic precepts of common morality

are accessible

to

human

reason, and so knowable by anyone capable of thought and action
(Boyle 1992, p. 123).
"moral

dialogue

As Boyle comments: according to the theory

with

others

has

a

chance

to

succeed

because...neither one's own contribution to the dialogue nor that of
others is simply a function of values and concerns to which
other

party

cannot

utilitarianism,
theory

have

which

does

not

access"

is

(Boyle

algorithmic,

fundamentally

the

1992, p.

124).

casuistry

of

involve

natural-law

calculation

likely

considered

in

relation

norms...and

the investigation is designed to clarify which of

applies"

(Boyle

already

1992,

"possible

and

of

to

Rather,

Unlike

comparison

norms

outcomes.

a

established

p.

120).

the

This

actions

are

principles

and
the

procedure

of

classification is taken to be accessible to all in principle.
Fourth,

natural-law

theory

provides

moral dilemmas in a contextually
features of

the model

the

sensitive way.

of resolution

apparent conflict of obligation

for

in cases

resolution
Two

where

important

there

is

an

are the appeal to the doctrine

of

double effect and the application of practical wisdom, or

prudentia.

When indeterminacies remain after rational investigation
its best, prudentia
"presupposes
particulars

a
of

is
feel

action

necessary

for

the

that

of

for

concrete
requires

has

resolution.
emotional
possession

done

Prudentia
appeal
of

the

of

the

moral

virtues...and includes a responsiveness to the possibilities for doing
good that is irreducible to reasoning" (Boyle 1992, p. 126).

(in) The Disadvantages
Despite

its

of Natural-Law

advantages,

Theory

natural-law

theory

drawbacks in its application to international issues.
these

is

that

the

theory

does

not

provide

has

severe

Central among

a very

perspicuous

procedure for the application of moral principles to difficult cases.
Certain pivotal notions—like the 'common good'—are opaque, as are
certain other aspects of the decision-making process—like the role
of the virtuous leader's practical wisdom in assessing the concrete
details of difficult cases (Boyle 1992, p. 116).

Within natural-law

theory, the common good is the basis for the authority of political
society and its leaders.

Yet a central, controversial issue in the

application of the theory to international issues is how plausibly the
notion of the common good might be extended to embrace

the

entire

and

social

world,

given present

interdependence (Boyle 1992, pp.
process,

within

natural-law

levels
128 ff.).

theory,

can

of communication

The decision-making
be

uncertain

in

its

application because only basic principles are thought of as natural
and so readily knowable by mature human beings.
particular,
principles.

practical

issues

are then

derivative

Judgements on

from these

basic

As there can be several forms of derivation, it can be

uncertain which course of action is the right course of action (Boyle
1992, p. 125).

Kantianism
(i) Distinguishing

Features

Kant's moral theory falls into the category of rule-oriented
theories.

It is thoroughly deontological.

It is agent-centred (placing

an emphasis on agents' motives and intentions) and interprets right
action as action of a certain kind.

Kant's moral theory

sharply

contrasts with consequentialism, which holds that the rightness or
wrongness of an action is determined only by considerations

of

consequences.
For Kant, right action—including right action in international
relations—lies in responding to an a priori
categorical imperative.

demand of reason, the

This highest of moral principles bids each of

us to "[a]ct only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 1948, p. 84,
emphasis original).
this is to "[a]ct
whether

A practical imperative that Kant derives from

in such

a way that you always

in your own person

or in the person

treat

humanity,

of any other,

never

simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" ( K a n t
1948, p. 91, emphasis original).
Kant's approach to international ethics has three main aspects.
These are (1) that the state is a moral person, (2) that all persons
originally held the earth's land in community, and (3) that there is a
demand on all individuals and nations to strive for perpetual peace
(Donaldson 1992, pp. 145 ff.).

The third aspect of Kant's approach

to international ethics reflects the centrality of cooperation in Kant's

international ethic. International cooperation is an a priori demand
of reason.
(ii) Advantages of Kant's Theory
One promising feature of applying Kantian ethics to
international affairs is that it is deeply cosmopolitan. For Kant it is
a demand of reason, manifest in the categorical imperative, that we
treat all of humanity as ends in themselves. Accordingly, we have
obligations to all humans (and they have correlative human rights).
So, for Kant there are some cross-cultural moral requirements
which are implicit in the categorical imperative. The universalism
of Kantian ethics contrasts with cultural relativism.
According to Kant's international morality, there is a demand
for international cooperation. For Kant, international cooperation is
an a priori demand of reason. Kant's justification for international
cooperation is founded on morality. In this way he contrasts with
Hobbes, who bases international cooperation on the expected
benefits, and with Rawls, who sees cooperation as the basis for
moral obligations. For Kant, actual or potential international
reciprocity is largely irrelevant for determining the obligations of
international agencies.
Kant's metaphysical notion of the state, that it has
personhood, gives the state virtually every moral obligation that
morally rational individuals possess. These obligations include
keeping promises, refraining from lying, and furthering the
happiness of individuals, including individuals in other states. It
could even ground the moral obligation of one state to save the

lives of individuals starving in other states (Donaldson
149).

1992, p.

This is an obviously promising feature of Kantian

moral

theory, as it applies to international affairs, since it does not restrict
obligations of justice to individuals.

Furthermore, by giving states

the property of personhood, Kantian ethics can determine the moral
obligations of one state to another (Donaldson 1992, p. 144).
A further advantageous feature of Kant's personification of
the

state,

and

the moral

obligations

which

go along

with

his

conception of the state, is that it gives grounds for objection to the
"functional specialisation" argument.

According to the functional

specialisation argument, the roles and duties of agencies, such as
nation-states

and international

organisations

like the

International

Monetary Fund (IMF), are determined by their function.

Nation-

states, for example, have it as their function to secure the welfare of
their citizens and they have no duties to others outside their nation.
The function of the IMF, some may argue, is to provide short-term
assistance to nation-states for balance of payment problems

and

does not include any duty to secure human rights (Donaldson 1992,
pp. 152 f.).

On a Kantian account, by contrast, agencies such as

nation-states have moral responsibilities which are not restricted to
their own citizens but which extend to others outside the nationstate.

More generally, agencies that act on principles which neglect

human rights act on principles that are nonuniversalizable, and so
act in ways that are morally reprehensible.
Yet another promising feature of Kantian morality is that it
places emphasis on duties rather than rights and so tells us not only
which actions are forbidden but also which actions are obligatory.

Onora O'Neill makes use of Kant's distinction between perfect duties
and imperfect duties.^ On the Kantian account, perfect duties are
actions which are required in order to avoid acting on principles
which are nonuniversalizable on logical or conceptual grounds.
Perfect duties include duties of justice, which include acting on
principles of noncoercion and nondeception. According to Onora
O'Neill, the fulfilment of one's perfect duties not only requires
avoidance of certain actions but may require an agent to perform
some action which is necessary to avoid acting on principles of
coercion and deception. Imperfect
duties arise from special
consideration of our limited capacities and material needs as
embodied, human beings.^ In order to engage in autonomous
action, needy and finitely rational beings standardly need help and
cooperation from others. Because of our limited capacities and
material needs as humans, acting on principles of disrespect and
neglect of beneficence is nonuniversalizable. Accordingly, this gives
rise to imperfect duties such as duties of beneficence and respect.
Such imperfect duties can play an important role in moral issues
that arise from Third World debt because of the help and
cooperation that is often needed to secure the autonomy of agents
affected by Third World debt.6

^O'Neill points out that the Kantian distinction between perfect duties and
imperfect duties is different from the distinction made by rights theorists
and consequentialists (O'Neill 1986, pp. 102 & 138 ff.).
5Unlike perfect duties, imperfect duties are selective. Nonetheless, imperfect
duties are duties and it is not permissible not to act on them.
6For further discussion of the relation between justice and imperfect duties,
see my Ch. 5, the section, 'Justice and Imperfect Duties'.

(in) Disadvantages

of Kant's

Theory

There are at least three problems with Kant's theory, as an
ethical theory with application to international relations.

First, it

suffers from incompleteness.

For example, it is not clear just how

nation-states

Kantian

really

can be

moral

autonomous 'noumenal' selves (Donaldson

agents—with

rational,

1992, p. 154).

Second,

there is a problem about whether a thoroughgoing deontologism can
be sustained.

As Donaldson remarks, "[s]o few principles appear to

be truly universalizable" (Donaldson
principle
susceptible

such
to

as

'never

lie'

or

counterexamples.

1992, p. 154).
'never
Such

harm

Any general

innocents'

a principle

seems

would

then

warrant being refined in a way which makes it less general and
more specific.

Donaldson argues that it would seem difficult to

justify the more specific form of the principle without appealing to
considerations
deontological

of

consequences.

principles

If

this

seem

hostage

deliberation

can

is

the
to

case

then

the

consequentialist

considerations after all.
Finally,

Kantian

be

criticised

for

its

abstractness, especially in relation to its idealised account of human
agency.

This apparently renders Kantian ethics irrelevant to the

moral deliberation of actual, nonidealized humans.

Onora O'Neill,

for example, maintains that since Kant's moral prescriptions amount
to "a unique set of rules...and those rules could guide the action only
of idealized,

individual

agents, then Kant's own specific

ethical

conclusions would be irrelevant in all human affairs" (O'Neill 1986,
p.

137).

However, while O'Neill thinks that there is a serious

problem in this aspect of Kantian theory, she also thinks that a

3 0009 03203570 6
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revised

version of Kantian ethics is salvageable.

In Chapters 5 and

6, I discuss O'Neill's application of a revised version of Kantian
ethics to problems of the Third World in considerable detail.

Rights
(i) Rights talk common to various ethical
Rights

talk

seems

to

be

traditions

common

to

competing

traditions and there have been deontological and
attempts to justify rights claims.

ethical

consequentialist

Some central features of rights

talk (especially human rights talk) are these.

First, rights talk tends

to locate the notion of human dignity as the central notion in moral
discourse.
Second,
criticise

Rights are taken to reflect one's status as a person.
neglect
the

or violation

unfortunate

of rights

conditions

themselves (Vincent 1992, p. 254).

are typically

under

which

invoked
people

to
find

Third, talk of rights as natural

or human identifies them as species-specific, and not as culturespecific (Vincent 1992, p. 255).
The possessors of rights (moral or legal) can be divided into
three categories: individuals, states, and groups other than states.
The rights of individuals include what are often referred to as
human rights or natural rights, and these are considered
possessed
humankind.

by

each

and

every

individual

to be

who is a member

of

Such rights are typically considered to be moral rights.

The rights of states come about from the society of coexisting states.
States are the principle subjects of international law and so the

13

rights of states are usually thought of as legal rights or political
rights.

Rights

typically

associated

with

states

are the right

to

security of territory, the right to liberty as an independent polity
and the right to economic sovereignty.
which

include

multinational

Groups other than states,

corporations,

churches

and

political

groups, also play a role in international politics and are the subjects
of rights.

The rights of agencies other than states are at times

considered as moral rights and at times considered as legal rights.
Rights talk figures in rule-oriented ethical theories.^

While

Kantian deliberation is typically articulated in the form of moral
imperatives

or

duties,

it

is

not

uncommon

deliberation to be in the form of rights talk.

for

Kantian-centred

As Donaldson points

out, "Kant would defend the existence of global obligations,
their corollaries,

global human rights" (Donaldson

1992, p.

and
144).

Kant, at times refers to the rights of states: "According to Kant, each
state has an 'original right' to defend itself from harm" (Donaldson
1992, p. 145).
Within
important role.

the

contractarian

tradition,

rights

have

played

an

John Rawls, for example, in developing a theory of

justice for domestic liberal society, has as his first principle of
justice that "each person is to have an equal right to the most

^Each of these three categories of rights—the rights of individuals, states and
non-state groups—can be variously considered as legal or moral rights.
While we normally think of human rights as moral rights they can be
considered as legal rights, as is the case with the United Nations declaration
of human rights.
Similarly, reference to the rights of states is normally a
feature of legal discourse, but reference to such rights is also found in moral
theory.
^Natural-law theorists like Aquinas do not speak of rights, but modern
natural-law theorists like John Finnis accord them a central role (Mapel &
Nardin 1992, p. 311).

extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others"
(Rawls 1972, p. 60).

In Rawls' later work, in developing a theory of

international

the

justice,

essential role.

rights

of

peoples

(or

states)

play

an

Rawls also maintains that in order for a society to be

well-ordered it must respect basic human rights (Rawls

1993, p.

62).
Rights talk has also found its way into consequentialist theory.
John Stuart Mill, for example, thinks that to have a right "is to have
something which society ought to defend me in the possession of"
(Mill 1991, p. 189).
to

defend

security.
the

one's

For Mill, the justification of why society ought

possession

of

rights

is

grounded

in

personal

Without this security, we could only find gratification in

moment

as we

could

lose

whatever

we had

the

following

moment by anyone who at the time was stronger than ourselves.
Rights

also

play

an

consequentialist theories.

important

role

in

some

contemporary

Richard Hare, for example, maintains that

rights "are, indeed, an immensely important element in our moral
thinking—important enough to justify, in many cases, the claim that
they are 'trumps'" (Hare 1981, p. 155).

For Hare, rights play an

important role at the intuitive level of moral reasoning and gain
their justification at the critical level on account of their acceptance
utility.9 That is, rights are justified, at the critical level of moral
reasoning, if their general acceptance in the society in question will
maximise

the

interests

of

all

those

in that

society,

considered

impartially (Hare 1981, p. 156).

91 elaberate on the contrast between the intuitive and critical levels of moral
reasoning in Chs 3 and 4.

(ii) Advantages

of appeal to rights

One promising feature of an appeal to rights, in deliberation
on international relations, is that talk about rights is already
widespread.
Amnesty

so

International agencies such as the United Nations and

International

often refer to universal

human

rights

appeal to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

and

It is not

uncommon for people to talk about the rights of women and the
rights of children.

Not only are the rights of states referred to, but

also the rights of nations, peoples and races.
appealing

to

rights

would

deliberation on international

be

an

So, it would seem that

accessible

place

to

start

in

ethics.

Another promising feature of the language of rights, applied
to

international

relations,

is

that

those

who

incur

duties

that

correlate with rights are said to include a wide range of agencies
and agents.
duties.

Not only do states have rights but they also have

The duties of states may include the duty to ensure that the

human rights of their citizens are not violated.
apply to groups other than states.

Rights talk can

The rights of one group may

ground a correlative duty for another group.

For example, "a duty

to avoid depriving may require a particular kind of provision from
a

mining

company

subsistence

to

agriculture

a community
that would

habitually

be disrupted

dependent
by

on

a

development"

(Vincent 1992, p. 260).
(Hi) Disadvantages

of appeal to rights

Even so, this last virtue should not be exaggerated.
problem

associated

with

rights

talk,

particularly

talk

For one
of

human

rights, is that it carries a vague message as to who actually has the
correlative

obligation.

This is especially

the case for

positive

rights—those rights which people have which require the
of others (O'Neill 1986, p. 117 ff.).

assistance

For example, it is arguable that

human rights include welfare rights such as the right to minimal
subsistence.
subsistent

However,

needs

in

cases

are not met

where

(or cannot

individuals'
be met)

by

minimal
their

own

government, it is not clear on whom the correlative obligation falls.
According to O'Neill, within the discourse of rights, meeting
the needs
duty

of those in extreme poverty

which

may

deliberation

be bestowed

which

takes

is typically

at will.

rights

The point

rather

than

fundamental sees beneficence as less important.
meet

the

needs

of

all

the extremely

cannot be a universal obligation.

poor,

are

seen

obligation.
by rights

imperfect

here

is

that

obligations

as

Since no one can
meeting

their

needs

According to O'Neill, within rights

theory, feeding the poor cannot be a perfect
an imperfect

an

obligation but is rather

O'Neill maintains that imperfect obligations

theorists

as a matter

of charity

or

optional

beneficence (O'Neill 1986, p. 102).
Another problem with making an appeal to rights central
dealing

with

ethical

problems

that

arise

out

of

in

international

relations just is the fact that rights claims do not seem to be morally
basic.

They need to be justified in terms of further theory—be this

deontological or consequentialist.

So, while rights claims may play

some role in moral theory, it is important not to take the rights
claims as

central.
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A further possible problem with an appeal to rights, applied
globally, is that it may not be sensitive to non-western values.

It

could be argued, for example, that the notion of human rights, as
normally construed, reflects Western or Northern values—that

the

idea behind human rights, so construed, is to preserve and nurture
one's individuality.
cultures.

For

Yet individualism is not a central value to all

example,

within

Socialist

theory,

it

is

not

the

individual which is the focus of moral importance but rather the
group.

As

Vincent

remarks:

"because

a socialist

society

has

transcended the individualist self-interest of bourgeois society, the
social

grouping

rights" (Vincent

that

achieved

this became itself

1992, p. 263).

the

subject of

Further, a Western construal of

human rights may be inappropriate for those cultures in the South
which take social harmony and the preservation of the fabric of
social life as central political values.

In such cultures, individuals

gain their identity through a group rather than against it.

This

generates the idea that one has obligations to the group rather than
rights claims against

it, and that the rights of the group are more

important than the rights of the individual.
Finally, there are some problems with the extension of talk of
rights beyond individuals to social or political entities like states.
For example, some theorists argue that the (implicit or explicit)
consent of individuals who make up the state gives the state certain
rights; the idea being that the state then in return serves to further
the interests of its members.

Two problems with this are (i) that

only those states which did have the consent of their

members

would enjoy the relevant rights, and (ii) that states tend not to be
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the sorts of entity with which people can freely associate and from
which people can freely disassociate.

The first problem means that

nondemocratic states are likely to lack the moral prerequisites to be
rights holders.

The second problem raises a general doubt about

whether citizens can ever give the required noncoerced consent to
their membership of a state.

Contractarianism
(i) Distinguishing

Features

The contractarian tradition typically falls into the category of
rule-oriented

theories.

However,

some theorists have

maintained

that some construals of the contractarian method yield
consequentialist
from

other

especially

principles.

ethical
principles

What

traditions

distinguishes

is

the

idea

of justice,

are

developed

justification through a social contract.

that

utilitarian,

contractarianism
moral
and

principles,
derive

their

While there has been wide

disagreement among contractarians on what principles of justice are
derived from social contract theory, there is considerable similarity
in their method.

Three common aspects of contractarian theory are:

determining the circumstances under which justice is possible and
necessary,

a

description

of

the

moral

constraints

under

which

principles are chosen, and a theory of rational choice which explains
why the relevant principles are chosen (Mapel 1992, p. 182).
While a description of social circumstances is important
contractarian theories, there are varying views amongst

to

competing

theories as to what are the conditions or circumstances of justice.
One

way

in

assumptions

which
made

contractarians

concerning

the

differ is
motivations

in

relation

of

individuals

or

states

are

altruistic

and

the

individuals,

agencies such as states, towards social cooperation.
that

to

or

Some assume

law-abiding;

while

others assume that individuals or states are competitive and

that

social cooperation only comes about in the light of sanctions.
Another

important

feature of contractarianism

is that

there

are ethical constraints built into the initial 'contractual

agreement'.

But again, there is considerable disparity amongst the

competing

theories

about

example,

develops

having

little

ensure

that

contrast,

what

detail
the

Hobbes

these

his

ethical

theory

of justice

about their

principles

his

are.

around

the

to

would

contractarian

be

makes

some extra-contractarian

for

participants
in order

impartial.

theory

participants having considerable knowledge of their
Locke

Rawls,

actual circumstances

agreed

develops

constraints

to
By

around

the

circumstances.

presumptions;

for

example,

that individuals have certain natural rights.
A feature common

to contractarianism

is that

all have

theory about rational choice, which explains the principles
are

generated.

among

the

Here

too

competing

there

can be

contractarian

considerable
theories.

a

which

divergence
Classical

contractarians such as Hobbes focus on minimising certain harms.
Contemporary
original

contractarians

choosers

would

within certain constraints.
within

such

want

to

as

Rawls

maximise

maintain
certain

that

the

preferences

In his discussion of domestic justice

a liberal society, Rawls claims that individuals would want to

maximise the benefits of the worst off members in society.
Typically, the principles generated by contractarianism are not
consequence-oriented principles. Rather, contractarian theorists
tend to argue that contractarian reasoning generates principles
which see rights as more important than some consequenceoriented end state.
Another area in which contractarian theorists diverge is in
relation to their views on the likelihood of applying a contractarian
theory of justice internationally.
According to Mapel, classical
contractarians such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have deep
affinities with classical political realism (Mapel 1992, pp. 186 ff.).
Mapel argues that classical contractarians "[w]ith the partial
exception of Locke...tend to regard individuals outside of civil
society as primarily motivated by scarcity, fear, or a desire to
dominate" (Mapel 1992, p. 187). While classical contractarians are
inclined to view international cooperation as possible, they are
dubious about its eventuality. Both Hobbes and Locke maintain
that the preservation of the state is of more importance than
maintaining cooperation at the international level. Accordingly,
they see the possibility of international law and reciprocity as
limited (Mapel 1992, pp. 188 f.).
Contemporary contractarians, on the other hand, are more
optimistic about the possibility of international justice. One such
contemporary contractarian, who optimistically sketches an
international theory of justice, is John Rawls. I shall focus the rest
of this discussion on Rawls' recent work on an international theory
of justice.

(ii) Rawls' International Theory of Justice
Ideal Theory
In his Oxford Amnesty Lecture "The Law of Peoples", Rawls
sets out to give a sketch of "how the law of peoples may be
developed out of liberal ideas of justice similar to but more general
than the idea [he] called justice as fairness and presented in [his]
book A Theory of Justice" (Rawls 1993, p. 42).lo
In developing a global theory of justice, Rawls attempts to
include liberal societies and nonliberal societies. Three conditions
that a society must satisfy to be included in Rawls' theory of the
law of peoples are: that the domestic system of laws within that
C
society are seen as legitimate in the eyes of its own people, that the
society honours basic human rights, and that the society respects
principles of peace and is not expansionist. Rawls calls those
nonliberal societies which satisfy these conditions well-ordered
hierarchical societies.
In determining principles of international j u s t i c e , w h i c h
apply to both liberal and well-ordered hierarchical societies, Rawls
sets up a method similar to his method used in A Theory of Justice.
However, in the case of determining the law of peoples, each
society's interests and conception of justice is secured by a
lORawls makes a distinction between the
law. The former is made up of political
right, justice and the common good. The
and principles by which international law
f.).
11 That is, the law of peoples.

law of peoples and international
concepts which include principles of
law of peoples provides the concepts
can be judged (Rawls 1993, pp. 50

representative

of that

the

ignorance

veil

of

society. 12 Each representative is subject to
and

the

parties

then

available principles regarding the law of peoples.

deliberate

among

Being behind the

veil of ignorance they do not know such things as the size of their
territory,

their population

or the relative

strength

of the

people

whose fundamental interests they represent (Rawls 1993, pp. 54 &
64).13
Using this method, Rawls maintains that a set of familiar
principles

would

be

agreed

upon.

These

principles

include

independence of peoples, peoples' right to self-defense, duties to
observe treaties and undertakings and the duty to observe human
rights (Rawls

1993, p. 55).

According to Rawls, human

rights

include "the right to life and security, to personal property, and the
elements of the rule of law, as well as the right to a certain liberty
of

conscience

and

freedom

of

association,

and

the

right

to

emigration" (Rawls 1993, p. 68).
Rawls
societies
Rawls

argues

that

can be extended
set

out

representatives

to

show

the

principles

of

to well-ordered
that

"in

the

of well-ordered hierarchical

well-ordered
hierarchical

original

liberal
societies.

position

societies would

the
adopt

the same law of peoples that the representatives of liberal societies

l ^ R a w l s regards his method of considering representatives of societies as the
original choosers, rather than representatives of all individual persons of
the world, as broader.
According to Rawls, the alternative method would not
take proper account of people's societal and cultural values and runs the risk
of being too liberal (Rawls 1993, pp. 65 f.).
13 In initially determining these international principles of justice, Rawls
includes only the representatives of liberal societies behind the veil of
ignorance.
He then argues that the principles generated would be
considered as reasonable principles by representatives of well-ordered
hierarchical
societies.

do" (Rawls 1993, p. 60). Rawls does this in part by setting out three
requirements for a society to be well-ordered. First, in order to be
well-ordered a society "must be peaceful and gain its legitimate
aims through diplomacy and trade, and other ways of peace" (Rawls
1993, p. 61). Given this as a requirement, representatives of a
well-ordered hierarchical society, who are behind the veil of
ignorance, arguably would accept the same principles of
nonexpansionism and peaceful conduct to which representatives
from well-ordered liberal societies would agree. Second, the system
of law of a well-ordered society must be guided by a common-good
conception of justice. According to Rawls, this secures for each
member of society certain minimal rights. These rights include the
"means of subsistence and security (the right to life), to liberty
(freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupations) and
(personal) property as well as to formal equality...(for example, that
similar cases be treated similarly)" (Rawls 1993, p. 62). The third
requirement on a well-ordered society is that such a society
respects basic human rights.
Nonideal Theory
Rawls' theory deals not only with well-ordered societies, both
liberal and hierarchical, but with societies which lack the
requirements to be well-ordered. This includes both those societies
which refuse to acknowledge a reasonable law of the peoples and
those societies which, because of their circumstances, find it
difficult or impossible to become a well-ordered regime.

Those regimes which refuse to acknowledge the reasonable
law of peoples are what Rawls refers to as outlaw regimes. Outlaw
regimes, according to Rawls, come in many forms. Some outlaw
regimes "are headed by governments that seem to recognise no
conception of right and justice at all; often their legal order is at
bottom a system of coercion and terror" (Rawls 1993, p. 72). While
Rawls acknowledges that, at best, law-abiding societies can reach a
modus vivendi with outlaw regimes, they still have "a duty to the
well-being of peoples subjected to outlaw regimes, though not to
their rulers and elites" (Rawls 1993, p. 73, emphasis original).
Rawls further addresses those societies that "lack the political
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and the
resources, material and technological, that make well-ordered
societies possible" (Rawls 1993, p. 74). In such cases, Rawls
maintains, each society that is so burdened should be assisted in
reaching conditions which make becoming a well-ordered society
possible. Rawls advocates the security of human rights everywhere
and that well-ordered societies have a duty to ensure that basic
human needs are met everywhere. Such principles, according to
Rawls, are not tied to a liberal conception of justice since they are
principles of the law of peoples, which include well-ordered
nonliberal societies. Rawls rejects the idea of applying the
difference principle in such cases because he claims that it is liberal
principle of justice, which some well-ordered nonliberal societies
may reject.

(Hi) Disadvantages of Rawls' Theory of International

Justice

Rawls' theory of international justice is not without its
problems. According to Stanley Hoffmann, Rawls makes an
unwarranted assumption in setting up the conditions under which
the principles of justice are determined. In not asking the delegates
of democratic peoples, who are to determine the international
principles of justice, to ignore their political cultures, Rawls assumes
that the diversity of political cultures, and the holds such cultures
have on people's minds, are irremediable (Hoffmann 1992, p. 52).
Rawls can be further criticised for developing principles of
justice which pertain only to states and not to other of the world's
agents and individuals. As Hoffmann points out, international
society is made up of ''both a society of separate states (or peoples)
and a society of individuals, who play an important role in world
affairs" (Hoffmann 1992, p. 55). Rawls' "legalist" model does not
properly take into account the ways in which individuals and
agencies like international corporations can move across borders
and disrupt states. Individuals and other non-state agencies can act
across borders in ways which affect the economies of other states
by such means as investment (Hoffmann 1992, p. 53). Other
contractarians, such as Brian Barry, develop a theory of
international justice by considering international society as being a
society of individuals. (Rawls, himself, criticises this approach
because it is too liberal and so doesn't take proper account of
nonliberal conceptions of justice (Rawls 1993, p. 66).) So, while

Rawls

attempts to be sensitive to nonliberal political values,

he

neglects the role of individuals in international society.
Another problem with Rawls' law of peoples is that it is not
clear what would define a legitimate political unit.

Rawls refers to

peoples as "corporate bodies organised by their government [which]
now exist in some form all over the world" (Rawls 1993, p. 50).
This does not make it clear what a people's relation is to a state.

As

Hoffmann maintains, if we are to understand peoples as states "we
need to know what groups of persons are entitled to establish one,
and who is entitled to become a citizen" (Hoffmann 1992, p. 53).

If

peoples can be understood as states, further issues would also need
to be addressed, such as the treatment of minorities.
Another
silent

is

important

conflict

issue

resolution

interests across borders.

on which
when

Rawls'

states

are

theory

is

fairly

promoting

their

Rawls says too little about principles for

forming and regulating possible associations of democratic societies
and about standards for fair trade.

Some recent difficult cases of

states having conflicting interests include Japanese-American
relations

and

1992, p. 53).

Spanish

and Canadian

fishing practices

trade

(Hoffmann

Moreover, even if Rawls did include a fuller account

of such principles, it would be difficult on Rawls' view to justify a
world government powerful enough to enforce them.^^
It is arguable that, even if Rawls' law of peoples was put into
practice, there would still remain a highly unequal world of rich
l ^ I n following Kant, Rawls maintains that a world government with legal
powers exercisable by some central government "would be either a global
despotism or else a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various
regions and peoples try to gain political autonomy" (Rawls 1993, p. 55).

and poor states. While Rawls maintains that the delegates would
agree to mutual assistance between people in times of famine and
drought, this falls a long way short of his principles of distributive
justice for liberal domestic society, which he earlier developed in A
Theory of Justice (Hoffmann 1992, p. 53).
Further problems arise in relation to the issue of determining
principles to which representatives of "well-ordered hierarchical
societies" would agree. First, given that such societies don't have
free elections, it would be difficult to establish whether their
governments and systems of law would be seen as legitimate in the
eyes of their peoples. Second, it is difficult to give any clear answer
to whether societies whose principles are built on ideological or
religious doctrines are likely to respect human rights (Hoffmann
1992, p. 55).
Finally, there is a problem with the ways in which Rawls'
theory of international justice is developed at the level of ideal
theory.
This is problematic, in dealing with a theory of
international justice, because "in thinking about international affairs
the best we can come up with, in 'ideal theory', is very thin. It may
produce the Utopia of world government, or else take the form of
Rawls's meagre law of peoples, which does not add much to old
liberal notions of world harmony" (Hoffmann 1992, p. 55). As
Hoffmann points out, Rawls has too little to say about non-ideal
theory, which covers conditions of great injustice and social evil—
conditions which are central to so many of the ethical issues that
surround international justice. Rawls leaves us with only some
vague objective: to "seek effective ways permitted by the law of

peoples to move the society [that is, those societies that are not
well-ordered] some distance toward the goal [of being a law-abiding
society]" (Rawls 1993, p. 72).

Utilitarianism
(i) Distinguishing

Features

The utilitarian tradition is a thoroughly
theory.

consequence-oriented

While some utilitarians advocate rule utilitarianism,

any

justification for rules is dependent on the likely consequences of
implementing

those

utilitarianism.
utility or

There

are

two

central

features

of

First, the only thing that is intrinsically good is

well-being.

determining

rules.

whether

Second, the only morally relevant factor in
an action is right or wrong is its

consequences, viewed impersonally.

overall

These two central features of

utilitarianism amount to the claim that an agent ought to perform
an action if and only if that action maximises utility.
The foundations of utilitarianism are normally attributed
Jeremy Bentham.

to

Bentham, however, was influenced by several of

his predecessors, especially David Hume.

Hume, who was not,

strictly speaking, a utilitarian, set out to describe how our moral
reactions have come about.

For Hume, the feeling of moral approval

is aroused by the disposition in people to promote the public good.
He argues that such a disposition is approved of because it is

15 Utilitarians differ in how they identify utility or well-being. For example,
some identify it with pleasure, some with happiness (often construed as
pleasure), some with the satisfaction of desires.

socially useful, that is, it has utility. Hume, however, does not use
'utility' in any strict utilitarian sense and does not claim that utility
ought to be maximised.
According to Bentham, all action is motivated by self-interest.
In particular, one could act only to promote one's own happiness,
which, for Bentham, is indistinguishable from pleasure. On the
other hand, for Bentham, our moral duty is to promote general
happiness, and this gives rise to a tension between our duty and
our motive. For Bentham, this tension is resolvable. According to
Anthony Ellis, there are factors which can make it in our interest to
pursue general happiness, and "[t]he most interesting to Bentham
were those that are provided by the government through the law:
the various sorts of punishment and penalty (various sorts of pain)
that the law exacts for actions that damage the general happiness"
(Ellis 1992, p. 160).
While utilitarians differ on what it is exactly that ought to be
maximised, once they have agreed to the principle "that our duty is
to secure the general happiness, then the rest of morality, political
as well as individual, would reduce to a matter of empirical
calculation" (Ellis 1992, p. 163). Calculations may then still be quite
complex. Bentham, for example, proposed his 'felicific calculus'
which was comprised of seven dimensions by which pleasure and
pain are to be measured. These dimensions included intensity and
duration; and so, for example, a brief, intense pain can be traded off
for a mild but enduring pain.

While Bentham identified utility (or happiness)—which was
the only thing that was intrinsically desirable—with sensational
pleasure, John Stuart Mill thought that some pleasures were more
desirable than others. Mill maintains that "[i]t is quite compatible
with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of
pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others." (Mill
1991, p. 138, emphasis original). For Mill, those pleasures that
come about by exercising the higher faculties are of higher quality
than those pleasures that are merely pleasures of sensation.
An issue which has generated significant controversy is the
role of justice within utilitarianism. Important issues on the role of
justice include problems surrounding the distribution of utility.
Firstly, if (given a stable population,) utility could be maximised by
two different distributions, one where the utility was concentrated
in a few, and the other where it was distributed equally but more
thinly, which distribution is preferable? While some utilitarians
maintain that neither distribution is preferable, others opt for a
principle of equality, though it is difficult to see how that can be
required under utilitarianism. A further issue that arises is
whether or not utility is to be distributed according to some other
criteria such as desert, need or merit. Some utilitarians, such as
Mill and Hare, have argued that distribution in accordance with
principles of justice does indeed maximise utility,
Injustice plays an important role in Mill's theory of utilitarianism. Mill
maintains that "[j]ustice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which
concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore
of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life"
(Mill 1991, p. 195). In Hare's case, principles of justice are important in
maximising utility. I discuss Hare's moderate egalitarianism in Ch. 4.

31

Henry Sidgwick, an important figure in the development of
utilitarianism, raised another issue for the theory that has

been

much discussed; namely, whether or not we should maximise total
utility or average utility.

This issue has often been related to

problems with population policy.

Is it preferable to have a small

population where the happiness for most people is very high, or to
have a very large population where the happiness for most people
is quite low? In the first case, the average utility is likely to be very
high but total utility relatively low whereas, in the second case, the
average

utility

is likely

to be quite

relatively high (Ellis 1992, p. 168).

low

but the

total

utility

A related question which could

also arise concerns the control of death rates.

If one aimed to

maximise average utility, and those members of society who were
less happy than average could be eliminated without decreasing the
happiness

of others, then it seems those members ought to be

eliminated.

On the other hand, if you aimed at maximising total

happiness, which Sidgwick thought you ought to aim at, then you
ought to increase population to the point where to increase it any
further would decrease overall utility.

In the latter case, this could

very well mean that the average utility is relatively low.
There have been various versions of utilitarianism, including
rule

utilitarianism.

utilitarianism.
that

which

Rule

utilitarianism

contrasts

with

act

Act utilitarianism holds that "the right act is always
maximizes

utility"

(Ellis

1992,

p.

170).

Rule

utilitarianism holds that "[t]he correct rules are those the general
observance of which maximises utility, and the correct action is
always that which is in accord with such a rule even if, in a

particular circumstance, it fails to maximise utility" (Ellis 1992, p.
170). Richard Hare, whom I will be discussing in more detail in
Chapters 3 and 4, is a preference utilitarian. Hare maintains that it
is desires that ought be ranked preferentially, both intra-personally
and inter-personally, and that one ought to aim at maximally
satisfying desires generally. Hare tries to combine the virtues of
both act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. He maintains that
"we would be wise to be guided, not by a felicific calculation on
each occasion, but by a set of well chosen prima facie principles, if
we want to achieve those acts which even act-utilitarianism...would
in full knowledge pronounce to be right" (Hare 1981, p. 192). Hare
thinks that deliberating about each individual act would tend not to
maximise utility; rather, we should follow those rules that have
been tried and tested. He also maintains that we should develop
our sentiments to make it difficult for us to act against those rules
except in exceptional circumstances.
(ii) Advantages of

Utilitarianism

One promising feature of applying utilitarianism to
international affairs is that it is not tied to a narrow account of
agency and so it does not presuppose that agents have idealized
capacities to reason (O'Neill 1986, pp. 35 & 53). Being a
consequence-oriented theory, actions and policies, quite generally,
are open for assessment based on the actual or likely results of
those actions or policies.
Utilitarian reasoning also has the advantage, in its application
to international affairs, of being accessible in a certain way.

Consequential reasoning is entrenched in the decision-making
procedures of individuals and agencies at various levels (O'Neill
1986, p. 53). It is quite standard for individuals, institutions and
agencies to decide on some course of action over the available
courses of action in terms of which is likely to produce the best
results. Policies of individuals and social agencies are often
determined by some cost-benefit deliberation.
Utilitarianism is deeply cosmopolitan and can allow for
communitarian sensitivity. It is cosmopolitan in that one's moral
obligation includes a duty to mankind in general. It allows for
duties one may have to their nation, family or friends, but only
insofar as such a duty is conducive to maximising overall utility.
Utilitarianism allows for communitarian sensitivity insofar as it
recognises that, because of human social and communal nature, the
cultivation of communities and their particular values is often
conducive to promoting the interests of the members of those
communities.
Utilitarianism can be deployed to justify political systems—for
example, the existence of political entities like states. From a
utilitarian point of view, however, political systems are merely
instrumental to maximising the general good; so, the justification of
states, or of any political institution or set of arrangements, depends
on how well these promote the general good. While there have
been some who have argued that utility would be maximised by
some other system such as a world government, it seems that most
utilitarians argue that utility is maximised by the existence of
nation-states (Ellis 1992, p. 173). Moreover, utilitarianism can, in

principle, tell us not only whether certain political institutions
should exist; it can also tell us what aims and functions these
institutions and entities ought to have. On the theory, the function
of states and other institutions is to maximise utility. While, in the
case of states, this perhaps would best come about normally by
states maximising the utility of their own members, in some cases,
when states have conflicting interests, the principle of utility would
instruct states to maximise global utility.
(in) Disadvantages

of

Utilitarianism

One problem with applying utilitarianism to practical,
international issues is the difficulty in reaching some conclusive
decision on what ought to be done. One reason for this difficulty is
that, when engaging in the empirical calculations of expected
consequences, it can turn out that the consequences are so far
reaching that it is practically impossible to reckon what they are
with any certainty. Another reason why appying utilitarian
reasoning to practical, international issues can be inconclusive is
that, because of our cognitive limitations, it is difficult to consider
every possible course of action. Consider the way in which
utilitarians differ on what ought to be done in relation to the
practical issue of famine relief. Garrett Hardin and Peter Singer,
both of whom argue from utilitarian premisses, defend
diametrically opposed conclusions on what we ought to do in
relation to global famine and starvation. Peter Singer argues that
we (that is, the moderately well-off people in wealthy countries
such as Australia) ought to give up our material resources to relieve
the suffering associated with famine "until we reach the level of

marginal utility—that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would
cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would
relieve by my gift" (Singer 1979, p. 32).

Garrett Hardin, on the

other hand, argues that we ought not to give aid to famine victims
because giving aid would allow the poorer nations to increase in
population at a rate greater than they would otherwise, which in
the end would result in more people suffering from famine (Hardin
1977, p. 279 ff.)-

On the one hand, it could be argued that Singer

does not consider the far reaching consequences of famine relief;
alternatively, it could be argued that Hardin does not consider the
consequences of all the possible courses of action, such as aid in the
form of population control.
A related problem with applying utilitarianism to issues of
international

relations

is

that

there

are

often

considerable

inaccuracies in determining which acts or policies would maximise
utility.

One reason for this is that there can be difficulties in

identifying, without bias, those acts which would maximise utility.
For example, while the meeting of basic needs is typically taken
into

consideration

when

deliberating

about

the

preferences

of

others, some preferences, which are tied to other peoples' cultures,
are often overlooked—preferences concerning such matters as land,
caste, tribe, tradition and religious affiliation. ^ ^
Finally, Onora O'Neill criticises utilitarian reasoning because it
cannot be both critical of established ethical outlooks and accessible

l^O'Neill raises this objection in O'Neill 1986, p. 67. See my Ch. 5 , the section,
'O'Neill on the Virtues and Vices of Consequentialism', subsection (ii),
'Vices
of Consequentialism',
part (a), 'Calculating benefits and O'Neill's third
standard'.

to the relevant agents and agencies. In brief, utilitarian reasoning
aspires to accurate, perspectiveless, empirical deliberation. In the
case of global issues, such deliberation, even if possible, would be
accessible only to certain experts, and so would not be accessible to
many of those whose action is needed (O'Neill 1986, p. 84 ff.).i8

Conclusion
So far I have characterised some of the main ethical theories
that apply to international relations and I have given what I take to
be their chief, generic advantages and disadvantages. In the
chapters that follow I consider Susan George's proposal to solve the
Third World crisis, especially in relation to extensive distributive
inequalities, in the light of two ethical theories that clearly apply to
issues of international distributive justice. One theory is Hare's
preference utilitarianism and the other is O'Neill's Kantian-inspired
theory. I have chosen to assess George's proposal in terms of these
two theories for the following reasons. First, each theory represents
a relevant contribution to the solution of problems of international
justice that arise in relation to Third World poverty and debt.
Second, each theory represents such a contribution to issues of
justice for the Third World from within a different and important
ethical tradition. Among the ethical theories that apply to

18See my Ch. 5, the section, 'O'Neill on the Virtues and Vices of
Consequentialism', subsection (ii), 'Vices of Consequentialism', part (b),
'Reckoning the consequences and O'Neill's second standard'.

international

relations

that I have reviewed

above,

utilitarianism

and Kantianism are significant contenders.!^

19of course, as I comment in Ch. 3, Hare sees himself as reconciling central
aspects of Kantianism and preference utilitarianism.
However, the
reconciliation is controversial (See Ch. 3, fn. 5).

CHAPTER 2
SUSAN GEORGE'S ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD WORLD DEBT CRISIS AND
HER PROPOSED SOLUTION

Before proceeding to assess Susan George's proposed solution
to the Third World debt crisis in the light of Hare's and O'Neill's
ethical theories, I need to outline the salient details of George's
analysis of the debt crisis and her proposed solution. i

I appeal to

Susan George's analysis and proposed solution as she is well-known
and highly regarded for her independent contribution to discussion
of the Third World debt crisis.^

In this chapter, I set out George's

account of (i) why Third World debt is such a problem and (ii) some
of the central, contributing causes of Third World debt.

I then

outline George's own proposed 3-D solution^ to the debt crisis and
contrast it with the IMF solution. In subsequent chapters, I consider
how just a solution to the problem of Third World debt George's 3-D
solution is.4
1 While Susan George's book A Fate Worse Than Debt was first published in
1988 and reprinted with revisions in 1989, in the foreword to the 1994
printing, George maintains that 'Third World debt is, so to speak, flourishing
and that this book is more relevant than ever" (George 1994, p. ix).
^Barry Wilkins is among those who hold George's independent analysis of
Third World debt in high regard.
Wilkins refers to George's analysis as
powerful and incisive (Wilkins 1992, p. 182).
3George calls her solution the 3-D solution because she proposes to use the
debt crisis as a means of promoting democracy and sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t .
4Before proceeding it is important to make some general remarks on the
vocabulary used. Throughout the literature to which I refer, a distinction is
often drawn between the South and the North.
This is simply because the
wealthier, developed countries (members of the so called First World) tend to
be in the northern hemisphere whereas the poorer, developing countries
(members of the so called Third World) tend to be in the equatorial regions
and in the southern hemisphere.
There are, however, some exceptions to this

Why Third Word Debt is Such a Problem
In this section, I detail Susan George's account of Third World
debt.

In particular, I focus on what George claims to be the problem

with Third World debt.

I indicate her views on how this debt

affects ordinary people in First World and Third World countries.
(i) Debt

serviceability

According

to Susan George, Third World debt topped

the

trillion-dollar mark in 1986 (George 1989, p. 12).
George points out that debt is not necessarily a bad thing.
Many people profit from borrowing money.

Companies borrow and

pattern.
For example, Australia and New Zealand are countries that are
geographically south but have, for most of their population, present living
standards which are comparable with First World standards.
So, in the
literature, the 'North' is used to refer to First World countries, even though
some of these countries are in the southern hemisphere and the 'South' is
used to refer to Third World countries.
Throughout the relevant literature, there is also a distinction often
made between creditor and debtor nations.
Susan George often uses this
terminology. However, some First World governments such as those of
Australia and the United States are in debt but have living standards which,
for most of their population, are considerably better than those in most other
nations.
For George, a 'debtor' country is one which is in considerable debt
and is having great difficulty in servicing its loans.
A typical characteristic
of what George refers to as a 'debtor' country is the implementation of
International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies (which are often imposed). In
general, I will refer to such 'debtor' countries as Third World countries.
Throughout this thesis, I will mostly employ the contrastive terms
'First World' and 'Third World' to mark the widely different conditions under
which the peoples of the world live. I will refer to Third World countries as
those which, for the most part, have a standard of living which is
considerably less than that presently enjoyed by most of the population in
nations such as Australia and the United States. It is difficult to define exactly
what constitute Third World conditions.
Such conditions would include
considerable undernourishment due to lack of food, high mortality rates
among infants, a generally low life-expectancy, and widespread suffering
brought about by poverty.
It is possible for countries which
presently count
as First World countries to be temporarily placed in Third World conditions,
say in the event of war or natural disaster.
The focus of this thesis, however,
is long standing Third World conditions brought about, at least partly, by
international
debt.

at times are perceived as functioning well when they are deep in
debt, since this indicates that they are credit-worthy. Governments
borrow from their citizens in terms of government securities, from
banks and from international institutions. The United States (US) in
1986 had a public debt of $(US) 2 trillion, which was twice that of
the Third World.5
The problem is not simply that countries are in debt, nor is it
necessarily the size of the debt. Debts become critical when they
can no longer be serviced. When the cost of servicing debts or
paying back the interest becomes so high that new loans are
needed, the problem becomes critical.
In order to service debts, debtor countries need money. This
money can be obtained either by a trade surplus or by borrowing
more money. If there is not a surplus of trade there is a need to
borrow. If such a process continues then the debt grows to a point
where even paying back the interest becomes unmanageable and
the country falls into a spiral where the debt continually increases
with no end in sight.
As George points out, in the case of the Third World, debt is at
the point where servicing under present terms involves massive
sacrifice for most of those in the Third World. For some countries,
full servicing seems impossible. The money borrowed has often
been unproductively used, and further money is being borrowed to
5 Following George I use the US convention for 1 trillion, which is 1 million x
1 million. Furthermore, all monetary figures I quote will be in $(US), for
which I will simply use '$'.

service the debt.
again

This drives the debtors further into debt and is

unproductive.6

(ii) Poverty

and

When

a

inequalities
country's

debt

comes

to

an

alarming

level

and

problems in serving the debt become apparent, both external and
internal pressures are applied to the people of the debtor country in
order

to

service

the

debt.

Taxes

are

often increased,

decreased, and basic food items are increased in price.
reduction

in government

spending, people

wages

Due to a

often lose their jobs.

This pressure is not felt uniformly across the population.

According

to George, it is typically the poorest who are hardest hit.

By the

1980s

(WFA)

organisations

maintained

such

that debt

as

the World

"was becoming

Food

Assembly

the great, unsung cause of

increased hunger and lack of food security"

(George 1989, p. 1).

George gives detailed accounts of the poverty and suffering
which

have

arisen

from Third

World

debt.

She describes

the

conditions under which a large portion of the population in Third
World countries lives.

Basic needs such as food, education and

medicines have become increasingly unaffordable to the poorest in
the Third World.

While debt has meant hardships and suffering to

the poor in Third World countries, there are power elites in the First
World and Third World who profit handsomely from Third World
debt.

^This further borrowing is unproductive
is not conducive to development.

insofar as

the newly

incurred

debt

The burden of Third World debt is carried not only by people
in the Third World debtor nations. Many people in the First World
creditor nations are also bearing the burden.
(in) The Debt Boomerang

According to George, the majority of citizens from First World
countries are also bearing the debt burden in what she describes as
the six boomerangs: environmental destruction, drugs, cost to tax
payers, unemployment and lost markets, immigration pressures,
and heightened conflict and war. George uses the term boomerang
to describe how the Third World debt "strikes the North as it flies
back from the South" (George 1992, p. xiii).
First, debt-induced poverty causes those in the Third World to
exploit natural resources in the most immediately profitable way.
This is typically the least sustainable use of natural resources.
Among the consequences are an increase in global warming and a
depletion of genetic bio-diversity (George 1992, pp. 1 ff.).
Second, illegal drugs such as cocaine are the major earners for
heavily indebted Latin-American countries such as Peru, Bolivia
and Columbia. According to George, these countries can earn more
export dollars from producing and processing coca than they can
from legal crops. The social and economic cost of drug consumption
in the creditor countries is extreme. According to George, it costs
the US $60 billion per year (George 1992, pp. 34 ff.).
Third, governments in the First World, such as the US and the
United Kingdom (UK), have used their tax payers' money to give

banks tax concessions so that they can write off so-called
debts' from Third World countries (George 1992, pp. 63 ff.).

'bad

But in

most cases this has not reduced the actual debts of the Third World
debtor countries.

George claims that by 1991 the larger banks in

the UK had gained tax credits for half their exposure (George 1992,
p. 79).
Fourth, due to the indebtedness of the Third World, imports of
First World goods have become unaffordable.

Consequently, the

countries of the First World have lost markets, which has resulted
in the loss of jobs in the First World.

In 1990, at a sub-committee

of the US Senate Finance Committee, Stuart Tucker estimated that
the loss of jobs due to these lost exports accounted for one fifth of
the total US unemployment (George 1992, p. 101).

The Third World

countries have also increased production of selective crops (cash
crops) which were traditionally produced in the First World.

This

has resulted in further job losses in the First World.
Fifth, the number of immigrants and refugees from Third
World countries has been increasing.

People are fleeing the poverty

and hardships (brought about, at least in part, by economic policies
imposed by the IMF) of their Third World countries in hope for a
better future in the First World.

According to the International

Labour Oganisation (ILO) there were more that 100 million legal or
illegal immigrants or refugees in the world in 1991 (George 1992,
pp. 112

& 186).

The final boomerang that George discusses is the threat of war
that

results

from the

debt

crisis

(George

1992,

pp.

136 ff.).

According to George, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 largely in
retaliation of Kuwait's insistence that Iraq repay a $12 billion loan
(George 1992, pp. 154 ff.).^ Third World countries typically spend
heavily on militarization. While lacking in economic bargaining
power, they can often appeal to their military power.
(iv) Debtor nations have little bargaining power and are open to
exploitation
George points out that if the debtor nations are to service
their loans, they need to obtain money by exporting more than they
import (George 1989, pp. 58 ff.). Debtor nations are being
prevented from exporting because of the tariffs in the First World.
The tariffs make the price of the goods produced in the Third World
too expensive to compete with the domestically produced goods.
The Third World countries are also not getting a fair price for their
goods. As a result, they are not exporting more than they import.
To service their loans they then need to borrow further. Some
effects of this are that the debtor countries go further into debt,
there is a reduction in overall international trade, the debtors are
unable to purchase the equipment they need to boost production,
and they are unable to afford such essentials as medicine and
foodstuffs (George 1989, p. 59).
Because of the disadvantaged economic position of the debtor
nations, they are susceptible to coercion.8 For instance, due to the
success of the Brazilian computer industry, IBM computers were
7 George uses the US convention for 1 billion, which is 1 thousand x 1 million.
81 use the term 'coercion' here in a fairly broad sense. I discuss different
notions of coercion in detail in Ch. 6.

losing their export profits from Brazil. In May 1986, the US sent
their Under-Secretary of State to warn Brazil that they could lose
their steel, shoes, and orange juice markets to the US if they didn't
allow IBM to supply the computers (George 1989, p. 72).
In summary, the problem with Third World debt is that the
debt is so large that servicing it has become impossible. The debt
results in poverty and hunger for a large portion of the people in
the Third World; but the debt also affects detrimentally many in the
First World. Because of their desperate circumstances, many of the
people in the Third World are open to exploitation, especially the
poorest of the poor.
The Causes of Third World Debt
George
Third World
development
development

outlines a number of central, contributing causes of
debt. One of these causes is what is known as the
model, which she sometimes dubs 'the malmodel'.

(i) The development

model

The development model embraces the policy that it is in each
country's interest to participate as much as possible in world trade.
The IMF was set up at the end of the Second World War to
implement such a policy as best it could. This policy was adopted
by both the First World and the Third World. It was an outerdirected, export-oriented policy. It favoured economic growth,
industrialisation and modernisation.

George describes this model as imitative. The Third World
wanted to become like the rich First World. However, George
maintains that such a model did not take into account some
important features of the local cultures in the Third World.
Typically, the Third World was predominantly dependent on smallscale peasant agriculture (George 1989, pp. 14 f.). The history and
social foundations of the First World were very different from the
history and social foundations of the Third World.
Part of the development model also involved modernisation,
which included consumerism.
An example of relentless
consumerism, which was part of the image of modernisation, is the
buying spree that was rampant in Chile from 1979 to 1982, where
people could exchange Chilean pesos, which were unrealistically
overvalued, for American dollars. As a result of this, middle-class
Chileans were purchasing imported rather than nationally made
goods. This resulted in Chilean firms not being able to sell their
goods and consequently they went out of business. Trade deficit
and unemployment soared. In 1988 Chile had a debt of $19 billion
($1540 per head), $11 billion of which was owed to banks due to
such spending sprees (George 1989, pp. 15 f.).
The development model that proved expensive to Chile was
typical of the development model that was applied to Third World
countries. This development model, and the borrowing that
accompanied it, gave some of the power elites the opportunity to
gain at others' expense by way of capital flight and corruption.

(ii) Capital flight and corruption
According to George, corrupt government officials who took
out loans in the name of their country often reinvested large
portions of this money in First World commercial banks, in their
own private accounts. The debtor country was still left with the
debt to pay, with no investment or little investment in the debtor
country. National companies were also known to partake in similar
practices. Companies have been known to borrow money from
abroad, have their government guarantee their debt on the
pretence that they will invest at home, and then, rather than invest
at home, reinvest abroad (George 1989, pp. 19 ff.). In 1986, Morgan
Guaranty estimated that seventy per cent of the new loans from
1983 to 1985 to the big ten Latin American^ debtors resulted in
capital flight. In that period, it is estimated that Mexico had an
estimated $16 billion worth of capital flight with new net
borrowings of only $9 billion, lo
Much of Third World debt can be accounted for by what
George describes as outright theft. For example, there were a
number of loans made to Nicaragua under Somoza for the
reconstruction of Managua after an earthquake in 1972. Most of
this money was pocketed by Somoza (George 1989, p. 18). Another
example of such corruption that George mentions is the Philippines'
^The big ten Latin American debtors at this time were Brazil, Mexico,
Venezuela, Peru, Columbia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.
l^The recently deposed president of Zaire (now The Democratic Republic of
Congo), General Mobutu Sese Soko, was estimated to have squandered the
equivalent of the entire country's debt, in the form of capital flight and
extravagances such as several european châteaux. The Zairian debt in 1987
was estimated at $6 billion (George 1989, pp. 106 ff.).

Morong (Bataan) nuclear power plant which was ordered in
from Westinghouse for a price of $2.1 billion.
made

against

1976

This purchase was

a quote by General Electric for half

this

amount.

Westinghouse acknowledges paying a 'commission' to Marcos which
is believed to have been $80 million.

Because the plant was found

to be located in a zone of high seismic activity, it was

never

operational (George 1989, pp. 18 f.).ii
(Hi)

Militarisation
George cites the purchasing of arms as another form of non-

productive spending that has helped to boost Third World debt.

She

estimates that by 1987, 20 per cent of Third World debt could have
been attributed to the purchasing of arms.

The IMF, as part of its

adjustment programs, insists that debtors make drastic
in civil

spending.

reductions

By contrast, it doesn't insist on the reduction of

arms spending, giving as its reason that that would be "interfering
in the internal affairs of sovereign nations" (George 1989, p. 22).
As George points out "an obvious but often conveniently forgotten
point is that arms purchases are never productive.
no wealth

and, when not manufactured locally,

They produce
they don't

even

create jobs or inject money into the local economy" (George 1989, p.

l i l t is also claimed that by 1988 up to $40 billion of Brazil's debt was due to
non-operational nuclear reactors (George 1989, pp. 18 f.).
The pursuit of
prestige has also contributed to corruption.
For example, not only did
General Mobutu of Zaire transfer his squandered money overseas, but he also
built Presidential mansions in each of the country's eight provinces.
He was
said to own over fifty Mercedes and jet planes which were, in part, paid for
by national borrowings (George 1989, pp. 106 ff.).
Areas typically targeted are welfare, education, health, housing, public
transport—essential services for reasonable living standards.
13 It is quite ironic that they give this as a reason since the IMF adjustment
programs typically interfere with other internal affairs of sovereign states.

24).

Armies are unproductive and expensive to keep, both in times

of peace and in war.i^
(iv) The money

mongers

George describes much of the Third World debt as due to
recklessness

on

the

part

of

the

bankers

and

borrowers.

The

borrowers often took out loans for non-productive projects and for
militarisation.

The bankers, those who arranged the loans, often

saw the nature of their work as only to ensure that these loans
were

made.

When

giving

these

loans,

considerations

of

how

productive the projects might be were typically not their concern.
They
would.

often realised
At times

that if they
they

didn't lend

even realised

the money,

others

that the project was

not

productive for the country of the borrower, and further, they had
good reason to believe that it would be squandered by those in
power and that there was a high risk that the debtor could not
repay the loan (George 1989, pp. 30 ff.).
According to George, the lenders, the international bankers,
typically took no interest in the local people to whose country they
were peddling

money.

Unlike domestic banking,

where

lenders

make sure a company has enough assets to cover its debt, creditworthiness

was

typically

international banking.

not

taken

into

consideration

in

The bankers would ensure that the loans

were guaranteed by a central bank or from the government (George
1989, p. 31).

This was the common practice of bankers at least until

14it can be conceded that the military may provide emergency assistance
during natural disaster or ward off pirates stealing what has already been
produced.
(Gun boats were recently purchased by the Philippines from
Australia for protecting their fisheries.)

the early eighties.
bankrupt.

It was believed that countries could not go

The banks had lent money frivolously. This not only left the
Third World in debt but it also generated fear in the First World
that the banks would become insolvent. The US Treasury stepped
in and sheltered the banks from their ill-advised lending decisions
at the tax-payers' expense. As a result, the big nine banks of the US
profited handsomely in this time from 1982 to 1986 because their
dividends increased and there was a rise in share values (George
1989, p. 39).
In many cases, according to George, "banks were simply
financing US and European corporations that wanted to sell their
products in the Third World. Banks thus had no reason to care
about what was happening inside the borrowing country: they were
financing not the Philippines and Brazil but Boeing and
Westinghouse, usually in partnership with the Export-Import Bank
(and other national equivalents)" (George 1989, p. 45). Those left
with the debt burden were the citizens of the debtor countries.
George notes two other contributive causes of Third World debt. First, in
the 1980s, interest rates didn't fall as much as inflation rates. Previous to this
time, particularly in the mid to late 1970s, inflation was greater than interest
rates. The net effect of this was that people were being paid to borrow. It was
cheaper for countries to borrow than to dip into their reserves. "New loans
were sought to pay off old ones. Indebtedness snowballed" (George 1989, p.
28).
Another detrimental feature for the Third World, especially for nonoil exporting countries, was the rise in oil prices. There were sharp rises in
1973_74 and again in 1979-80. In the 1974-82 period, these countries imported
nearly $345 billion. Had oil prices increased at the same rate as other
commodities, the Third World would have paid only $85 billion (George 1989,
p. 28). Even oil-exporting countries such as Mexico weren't prevented from
falling deep into debt. "PEMEX, the Mexican state oil corporation, borrowed
$20 billion all by itself—a quarter of the total Mexican debt in 1982" (George
1989, p. 29).

51

The IMF Solution to Third World Debt
George focuses on the IMF because it is an agency which has
played a large role in 'solving' the debt crisis.

George maintains that

its 'solutions' have not helped the debtors economically and have
had disastrous social consequences.^ ^
In the 1970s, the IMF played a relatively small role.
days

nobody

wanted

the IMF around—the

were

self-congratulatory

"In those

lenders because

about their efficient recycling

of

they
petro-

dollars, the borrowers because they had no desire to submit to the
Fund's

stringent

supplied

less

conditions... .Between

than

5 per

cent

of

1974

the

developing countries" (George 1989, p. 48).

and

financing

1979

the

needs

IMF

of

the

In the early eighties, in

the wake of global recession, the lending banks realised that they
could

have

serious repayment

problems

with

their Third

World

loans.
The banks could then see that it was to their advantage to
have an international agency such as the IMF which had "both the

l^George also finds the Baker plan, proposed by James Baker in 1985,
unsatisfactory as it is not significantly different from the development model
and the austere strategies of the IMF (George 1989, pp. 190 f.). George finds
Bradley's proposal, put forward by Senator Bill Bradley, more satisfactory
than Baker's and that of the IMF, as it is more sensitive to those in the Third
World who are bearing the burden of the debt (George 1989, p. 193 f.). George
also discusses a number of proposals and strategies that have been
implemented from within the South.
While some, such as the initiatives of
the Cartagena Group, the Peruvian president Perez, and the People's
Economic Organizations, work independently towards greater equality and
the meeting of people's basic needs, there is, according to George, a need for
such groups to unite in their efforts. These are not criticized by George for
their motives but, rather, for their incompleteness.
These initiatives are not
effective when operating in isolation.
This is why George emphasises the
need to act in concert (George 1989, pp. 213 ff.).
l ^ T h i s problem was worsened by the increase in the rise in real interest
rates.

clout to force repayment and the capacity to mobilize enough
financial resources to make repayment possible" (George 1989, p.
49).
xhe banks also saw it to their advantage to have someone
else lend their money. The IMF is said to be funded by memberstates' quotas and other contributions.^9 This money which funds
the IMF comes from the states, a practice which "enforces taxation
without representation on the citizens of the industrialized
countries" (George 1989, p. 49).
The IMF was created at the end of the Second World War
when the US was in need of an institution that would help reestablish and promote trade. The IMF had as its objective to
promote the growth of world trade (George 1989, p. 50). If
countries were importing more than they were exporting, the IMF,
through adjustment programs, would force them "to increase that
participation, even if this is demonstrably against the best interests
of the people concerned" (George 1989, p. 50).
George describes the IMF as powerful and influential. If the
IMF does not approve loans to a country then other sources see that
country as a considerable credit risk. Debtor countries are reluctant
to resist the IMF's proposals because there is little hope of obtaining
loans from other sources without the 'IMF's stamp of approval'
(George 1989, p. 51).
18 The IMF has the clout that (say) banks or creditor governments don't have
because countries in need of borrowing, especially Third World countries,
depend on IMF approval to borrow from other financial institutions. If a
country is considered a 'bad debtor' by the IMF, then other financial
institutions will see that country as too high a risk to lend money to.
l^The IMF was set up to assist and promote world trade. A number of
governments contributed to the IMF resources which were then meant for
borrowing in times of need.

The way the IMF programs are set up is based upon the idea
of reducing domestic consumption and increasing exports. George
notes that what these programs usually amount to is: "...devaluation
of the currency (to discourage imports and encourage exports);
drastic reduction of government expenditure, particularly social
spending and elimination of food and other consumption subsidies;
privation of government enterprises and/or increase in prices
charged by them (electricity, water, transportation, etc.) and the
abolition of price controls; 'demand management' (meaning
reduction of consumption) through caps on wages, along with
restrictions of credit, and higher taxes and interest rates in an effort
to reduce inflation" (George 1989, p. 52).
Two main problems George finds with this are: first, the elites,
often the military, typically benefit from such measures while most
of the people are worse off, especially the poorest; second, those
who suffer from these measures are not the ones who brought
about or gained from the irresponsible debts in the first place—who
were again the elites (George 1989, p. 52)
The IMF has often denied responsibility for the social
consequences of its policies. George cites Jacques de Larosiere, one
of the IMF's former managing directors. In his defence of the IMF,
de Larosiere claimed that the IMF is not responsible for the way in
which the required effort to repay debts is distributed among the
various social groups and the various expenditure categories.
Distribution of burden in any particular country is something that is
decided by government of that country. De Larosiere commented
that "the fund cannot take upon itself the role of dictating social and

political objectives to sovereign governments" (George 1989, p. 53).
George,

on

the other

hand,

believes

that

the

IMF could

make

"greater social equality, access to education, health care and other
basic services, fairer income distribution, etc." part of its programs
(George

1989, p. 53).

George further claims that those countries

which have insisted on maintaining social objectives have had the
greatest difficulties with the IMF.

According to George, there is no

evidence that the IMF wants to apply any of the just

mentioned

social and economic policies.
The IMF is claimed to be a non-political institution.
power,

however,

is

proportional

to

the

member-country

Voting
quotas.

This, George claims, gives the US de facto veto power on the most
important policy issues (George 1989, p. 55).^^
George picks Jamaica, in the period from 1977 to 1987, as a fair example to
test the IMF solution to Third World Debt. Jamaica had implemented IMF
policies over this period of time and it was small enough to be responsive to
the IMF policies.
Jamaica had also been politically cooperative with the views
of the larger banks, creditor-country governments and their central banks,
the World Bank and the IMF (George 1989, pp. 171 ff.).
In assessing the success of the IMF solution, George focusses on two
key features: the state of the economy as a whole, and how ordinary
Jamaicans fared. First, in assessing the economic position of Jamaica, George
claims that the debt in Jamaica rose from $150m in 1971 to $813m in 1976,
$1.7b in 1979 to $3.3b in 1987 (George 1989, p. 174). There was a drop in real
incomes of 25 per cent and inflation went up 320 per cent from 1972 to 1980.
Joblessness hit a record 31 per cent in 1979. Local food production declined
and food imports rose (George 1989, p. 176). In short, the IMF adjustment
programs did not solve the economic problems that Jamaica was facing. In
fact, Jamaica's economic position continually weakened.
So what did this mean to the Jamaicans? Because of the policies of the
IMF, such as reducing government spending, health, education and public
transport became too expensive for the poor and government subsidies
disappeared. Part of the IMF policy was to devalue the Jamaican dollar.
Since
Jamaica was locked into the international economy, the cost of fuel and food
products (most of which are imported) became more expensive.
The IMF had encouraged the government to export and was not
concerned with supplying food for local people. Prices of things that were
essential to small farmers rose so much that many went out of business.
The
small farmers relied on machinery, fertilizers and seeds, the prices of which
sky-rocketed.
Malnutrition rose in Jamaica in this period (George 1989, p.
185). Furthermore, due to devaluation, and since most basic drugs were

Goerge's 3-D Solution
George points out that the effectiveness of her own 3-D
solution will be conditional on greater unity among the debtors and
on the political backing of both the First and Third Worlds. It will
also require that moves be made away from international markets
and that there be a focus on meeting the real needs of the people at
t^jQ the grass-roots of society in the Third World. George's solution
is agriculturally based, gives rural people representation, and gives
priority to the landless and to women. George argues that Third
World debt could be used to promote democracy and real
development in the Third World. She also thinks that First World
governments and institutions are unlikely to deviate from the
development model unless there is strong and sustained popular
pressure.
In her 3-D solution, George proposes that the debts be paid in
two ways: reimbursement in cash and reimbursement in kind. The
first instance of debt that she addresses is low-income African debt
which accounts for at most 7 per cent of global Third World debt.
Since only 10-15 per cent of Africa's debt is owed to banks, George
maintains that there is opportunity "to experiment, innovate, and
take modest risks in managing the reimbursement process to the
ultimate benefit of everyone involved" (George 1989, p. 246).

imported, many had to do without basic medical needs (George 1989, p. 186).
Also, hygiene in the hospitals worsened. Health care and hospitals became
increasingly more expensive and, for many women, pre-natal care and birth
delivery in hospitals was too expensive.

(í) African debt
(a) Reimbursement in cash
Reimbursement in cash involves paying back the debt in the
debtors' local currencies.
George proposes that African
governments make regular interest payments into a national
development fund. Each state's fund would be represented by
democratically elected representatives of the civil society and
representatives of the state. The fund would then make loans to
small-scale farmers and rural entrepreneurs. "Each payment made
by a government into its own national development fund would
trigger a corresponding reduction (or, on the matching-grant
principle, double or triple reduction) of its external debt in hard
currency by the IMF, the multilateral development banks and the
official bilateral creditors" (George 1989, p. 249). The creditors,
however, would not receive any further repayments, since the
money that the development fund receives would be reused
internally in that country.
George points out that repressive governments, especially
military regimes, would be resistant to such programs. This is why
she thinks outside pressure is necessary. However, because
virtually everyone is losing from the present debt management
strategies, there are presently opportunities for such groups as
"peace activists, women's movements, trade unions, farmers and
export orientated industries" to coalesce in pushing the debt crisis
into a means of genuine development and democracy (George 1989,
p. 244). Such a coalition could "oblige Western governments to put

their money where their mouths are in defending democratic
values" (George 1989, p. 244).
The 3-D solution requires that the debtor governments
redirect economic activity away from the international markets and
towards an inner-directed economy which focuses on satisfaction of
their people's real needs. Especially for the least developed
countries of Africa, this would mean a strong agricultural emphasis
aiming to supply food crops and renewable energy sources (George
1989, p. 245).
The foundations of social policy would be "health care,
literacy, education, the promotion of women. Available foreign
exchange would be used to acquire capital goods and basic
equipment—not to pay for debt service, arms or prestige items"
(George 1989, p. 245). George further advocates the full
participation of both Northern and Southern Non Government
Organisations (NGOs). NGOs, according to George, have a proven
record of project management and innovative ideas. They are also
usually less corrupt than entrenched bureaucracies and local elites.
George maintains that, because her proposal is political, it
would need to start with public debt (which accounts for most of
the debt). However, this proposal is also affordable to banks:
George claims that "by 1988 Third World loans accounted for only 6
per cent of their total loan exposure" (George 1989, p. 245).

(b) Reimbursement in kind
The other type of repayment that George proposes is what she
calls 'reimbursement in kind'. She claims that even poor African
countries contain "natural, material and cultural treasures that are
part of humankind's heritage", such as wilderness areas, traditional
agricultural techniques, and local languages (George 1989, p. 250).
Under the present socio-economic conditions in the Third World,
these treasures are being squandered, eroded or irrevocably
destroyed.
As examples of reimbursement in kind, George lists such
things as: conservation and reproduction of species (both animal
and vegetable); soil conservation; reforestation (especially with local
varieties); development and improvement of wells and small-scale
irrigation techniques; recording and implementing traditional
earthen architecture; recording traditional agriculture; medical and
pharmaceutical knowledge; and compilation of dictionaries and
grammars of local languages (George 1989, p. 250 f.).
The idea of reimbursement in kind is to allow indebted
countries in Africa to 'pay off part of their debt by preserving their
own heritage. George points out that African elites have been keen
to imitate the West in culture and life-style. By working on, and
being paid to work on, heritage-preserving programs, people may
also find a new pride in their cultures.
George proposes that the work done in these projects be
progressively written off against the debt as these programs

progress.

The work that people do on such a reimbursement-in-

kind program

will need to be paid for as the people will

not

otherwise have time to take themselves from their daily necessary
duties.

They will need to be paid by the development fund which

could be topped up with fresh money by the First World.

The aims of the 3-D solution are to give recognition

and

remuneration for the African people's contribution to our common
heritage,

to

agricultural
hunger

and

rehabilitate

strengthen

the

"peasantry,

sector,

and

thus

the

poverty

the

environment

on

work

the

pastoralists

towards

which
and

the

hunger
provide

and

the

elimination

thrives,

[and]

of
to

income-generating

activities for people who live in it" (George 1989, p. 251).
(ii) Latin American

debt

George claims that Latin American debt is more complicated
than African debt.

First, Latin America's debt is much larger; and

second, Latin American debt is divided into about one-third public
debt and about two-thirds private debt (George 1989, pp. 252 f.).
One complication with applying the 3-D solution to Latin America,
which involves a more efficient and more autonomous development
model,

is

that

it would

development' model.

be far less

expensive

than

the

'mal-

So the 3-D solution 'comes on the cheap'

relative to the size of the debt that needs to be discharged.
second complication has to do with the banks.

A

Banks, to which Latin

America is heavily in debt, are extremely unlikely to partake in
political innovations unless they are forced to do so.

Furthermore,

Latin America will be dependent on fresh capital for the foreseeable
future (George 1989, p. 253).

So, according to George, any proposals

which ignore the participation and the interests of banks are a nonstarter.
According to George, the Latin American case requires that
the 3-D solution be supplemented.

Further, a problem that needs to

be overcome for even the supplemented 3-D proposal to come to
fruition

is

the

governments.

lack

of

Indeed,

unity

between

the

those in political power

from the present arrangements.

Latin

American

typically

benefit

Unity, according to George,

only be reached by popular movements where the people
Latin America pressurise their governments.

can

within

George discusses a

number of further strategies that could be applied to Latin America.
She points

out, however,

that these strategies

are dependent

on

unity and solidarity in the Third World.
The

first

proposed

conflicts of interests

strategy

consists

that exist between

in

exploiting

transnational

other sectors of the First World economies.

present

banks

and

Because debtors are

financially committed to debt repayments, they are unable to afford
products from First World farms and firms.

The proposal is that the

debtors reduce their imports to that which could not be produced
within

their

country

and restrict

purchases

of foreign goods

to

goods which are vital to development, such as fertilizers, food stuffs
and machinery.

They then buy these from the creditor nations in

proportion to the debt held by the particular creditor (George 1989,
pp. 254 f.).

The cost of the products can be deducted from the debt

owed to that creditor country.

By implementing such a strategy, money would be returned to
the creditor economies, but it would be spread more between their
industrial suppliers, their farmers and their banks.

This would help

to maintain jobs in the industrial countries as well as free up hard
currency for the debtors to purchase items necessary for genuine
development.

If the creditors thought it necessary to compensate

their own banks, George thinks this would be possible by increased
tax revenue due to increased business.
The second proposed strategy consists in fixing a minimum
price on the commodities sold by the debtors to the prices they
were attracting before global price reductions (George 1989, pp. 256
ff.).

George claims that the commodity prices were depressed, in

part,

due

to

IMF

and

World

Bank

adjustment programs

which

insisted that a large number of debtor countries export a limited
range of products.

In receiving more payment for their

export

products, the debtors will be more able to repay their creditors.
The

third

governments
reduced

proposed

insist

interest

on

rates,

the

strategy
banks

is

returning,

the flight capital

(George 1989, pp. 258 f.).

that

the
or

unified
loaning

of their

own

debtor
back

at

nationals

Such a measure would free up capital for

debt repayment or allow the debtors much needed fresh capital for
development.

George's

Reasons Against

Unconditional

Cancellation

or

Repudiation
It is noteworthy that George's 3-D Solution to the Third World
debt

crisis

does

repudiation

of

not

the

involve

debt.

an

unconditional

George

argues

cancellation

against

or

unconditional

cancellation or repudiation for four main reasons.^^
First,

unconditional

write-offs

would

reward

the

most

repressive, profligate and corrupt regimes which borrowed the most
for the worst reasons, while penalising the more prudent countries
who have been doing their best to reimburse their creditors (George
1989, p. 240).
Second, a generalized wipe-out would give the West a perfect
excuse to cut off all aid.
credit-worthiness

would

If the debtors were to repudiate, their

drop

to

zero

for

some

time.

Credit-

worthiness or new money is something that George thinks the Third
World will be in dire need of for a long time to come (1989, p.
240).22

George maintains that the debtors should honour

debts

suppliers;

to

otherwise,

imported basic necessities.

they

would

not

have

their

access

to

"Greater self-reliance is a worthy goal;

forcible cut-off from the rest of the world is not" (George 1989, p.
240).
Third,

George

argues

that partial

cancellation

of

would not make conditions any different for the debtors.

the

debt
As it

21 George clarifies the difference between different types of default.
Creditors cancel, debtors repudiate (George 1989, p. 238).
22George maintains that one possible exception to this is Brazil because Brazil
could develop satisfactorily by depending entirely on local resources.

stands now, Latin America is only paying 50 percent of its interest
charges.

This is why the debt keeps piling up.

If the debt were to

be reduced by 50 per cent or less, the rate of repayment would not
decrease.

At best the debtors could pay off the interest and the

debt would stop piling up or pile up at a slower rate.
circumstances

In such

"Latin America would become worse, or would be

unchanged" (George 1989, p. 240).
Fourth, George thinks that even if there was total cancellation
and

fresh money

(an unlikely

scenario),

governments

would

be

likely to go back to the development models that got them into
trouble in the first place.

The benefits of such cancellation are

unlikely to 'trickle-down' to the majority.

The elites in the Third

World would be the only ones to benefit (George 1989, pp. 241 ff.).

Morally Relevant Features of the Third World Debt
George's

account of Third World debt and her

Crisis

subsequent

proposed solutions draw out and emphasise a number of morally
relevant features of the debt crisis.
First, Third World debt has fuelled inequities in both
Third World and the First World.

the

The financial and political elites

have profited handsomely from the crisis.

The bankers who have

arranged the loans have enjoyed very high salaries.

The Third

world

prestigious

elites

have

often

squandered

the

money

on

projects at home or invested the money in private bank accounts
overseas.

On the other hand, workers in the First World have lost

their jobs due to the loss of markets and taxpayers have
reimbursed the First World banks. The poor in the Third World
have borne the burden of repaying the loans.
Second, the poor in Third World countries are repaying the
debt that they had no say in acquiring. That is, the loans were
made by those in power but the burden of repayment has fallen on
the poorer citizens of the country. Often those in power have been
military dictators and not elected governments. Even when they
have been elected governments, the projects on which the borrowed
money has been spent have often not been in the interests of the
citizens, especially the poorest.
Third, the poverty that has been caused by Third World debt
and debt associated oppression has caused hunger and suffering
from avoidable diseases.
Fourth, the debt crisis has been a major contributor to
envirocide. Forests have been logged at rapid rates in the Third
World to sell timber and to make way for cash crops or cattle farms
so that export dollars can be earned to service the debt. Fewer
environmental restrictions have been placed in Third World
countries; this has licensed transnational companies to pollute at
rates prohibited in the First World.
Fifth, democracy is something that many First World
institutions claim to value. The current Third World debt crisis has
denied people their democratic rights. This crisis, however, gives
First World institutions an opportunity to ensure that people's
democratic rights in the Third World are met. The 3-D solution

could give the oppressed in the Third World an opportunity to take
control over their lives.
George also thinks the 3-D solution has prudential value for
the First World—she thinks, for example, that this is the only
feasible way to prevent Africa from withdrawing from the world
system.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have characterised Susan George's analysis
of the origins and significance of the Third World debt crisis and her
own proposed 3-D solution. In Chapter 3, I set the scene for
assessing George's 3-D solution in the light of R. M. Hare's account of
justice, as this applies to issues of international distributive justice.

CHAPTER 3
HARE'S PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM AND HIS PRIMA FACIE
MODERATE EGALITARIANISM
In this chapter, I give an account of R. M. Hare's theory of
justice, both formal and substantial, and relate it to his moral
theory. My aim is to expound rather than to critically assess Hare's
position. The main point of the chapter is to provide a context
within which to assess George's proposed 3-D solution to the Third
World debt crisis in terms of Hare's theory of distributive justice, as
this has international application.
Hare is a utilitarian who maintains that justice plays a central
role in moral theory. The moral theory that Hare defends is
preference utilitarianism, which aims at maximising people's
preferences. Hare maintains that preference utilitarianism of the
type he defends marries crucial aspects of Kantianism and act
utilitarianism (Hare 1981, pp. 4 f. & 42 f.).i Hare distinguishes
between meta-ethical constraints on normative ethics and the
substantial normative ethics such constraints govern. Within
normative ethics, he distinguishes between two levels of thinking.
He connects the meta-ethical constraints—which supposedly follow
from the meanings of moral words—with considerations of formal
iHare is an indirect or rule utilitarian in tliat he maintains that utility is
maximised by applying prima facie principles which we use at the intuitive
level of moral thinking, but he is a direct ov act utilitarian at the critical
level. I characterise the difference Hare draws between the intuitive and the
critical levels of moral thinking below (Hare 1981, p. 43). See also fn. 6, this
chapter.

justice.

The

two

levels

intuitive and the critical.

of

normative-ethical

are prima facie moral principles

intuitive

level

principles

normative

are resolvable

considerations

of

are

the

Principles of substantial justice, according

to Hare,

of

thinking

thinking.

which

Conflicts

belong to the
between

at the critical level of thinking

maximal

utility

such
where

(preference-satisfaction)

are

overriding.

Two Levels

of Normative

Moral

Thinking

For Hare there are two levels of normative moral reasoning.
He calls these levels the critical level and the intuitive level.

At the

intuitive level we have a set of prima facie principles which we
apply in day-to-day life.

This intuitive level is not self-sustaining,

according to Hare, and so there is a need for a critical level of moral
thinking.
(i) The intuitive

level

The intuitive level of moral thinking consists of
simple, prima facie, intuitive principles.

relatively

According to Hare, our

moral education plays an important role in the formation of our
intuitive principles (Hare 1981, pp. 30 f.).

If we have been well

brought up, we acquire certain sentiments and reactions
actions of different types.

towards

When we do things which we normally

consider as wrong, such as breaking promises or telling lies, we can
have involuntary physical reactions such as blushing or a change

might occur in the electrical properties of the skin.

In such cases

we also find ourselves with a feeling of compunction.2
According
where

to Hare, when we find ourselves in a situation

we make

a judgement

that it would

be best,

all

things

considered, to lie on that occasion, we may still have a feeling of
compunction when lying.

This residual feeling of compunction or

guilt is closely tied to a sense of ought in which we continue to
think that we ought not to be telling the lie.

In such

cases,

however, there is another sense of ought which is relevant, namely,
one such that we think that, all things considered, we ought to tell
the lie.

Hare thinks that people often confuse these different senses

of ought, one of which is operating at the intuitive level and the
other at the critical level.
On Hare's view, the relatively simple, prima facie principles
that are held at the intuitive level of moral thinking are a necessary
part

of

''Having

human

moral

thinking,

though

they

do not exhaust

it.

the principles, in the usual sense of the word, is having the

dispositions

to

experience

the

feelings,

though

it

is

not...incompatible with submitting the principles to critical thought
when that is appropriate and safe" (Hare

1981, p. 39,

emphasis

original).
Our prima facie principles, according to Hare, are best kept
relatively simple and general for reasons of practicality.

Basically,

no two situations and no two people are ever exactly like each

^Hare gives some detailed discussion of the differences among negative
responses like regret, remorse, compunction and guilt.
The generic point is
that, in such cases, there is a negative psychological response.

other. The principles are needed to cover a range of situations
which have some particular morally relevant feature in common.
Any two situations will have some features in common and some
differing features. When the differing features of a situation are
not different to a previous situation in a way that is morally
relevant, then the previously learnt principle will normally be the
appropriate principle. There may, however, be some cases where
there is reason to be critical of a previously learnt principle. At the
same time, one must be careful not to be critical of previously
learnt principles in a spontaneous and irrational way.
Hare notes that problems can arise at the intuitive level of
moral thinking, where we rely on our relatively simple, prima facie
principles, as "we are bound to find ourselves in situations in which
they conflict and in which, therefore, some other, non-intuitive kind
of thinking is called for, to resolve the conflict" (Hare 1981, p. 40).
Critical level thinking is needed to resolve such conflicts among
relevant prima facie principles. Critical level thinking requires, in
such cases, that we question the intuitions that we have, that we
question whether past decisions were the right ones, and that we
review our dispositions which have been formed by our upbringing.
(ii) The critical level
It is at the critical level of moral thinking that we justify the
principles that we are to apply at the intuitive level. According to
Hare, "there is a need for a critical level of thinking by which we
select the prima facie principles for use at the intuitive level, settle
conflicts between them, and give to the whole system of them a

justification which intuition by itself can never provide" (Hare
1978, p. 117).3
Critical thinking, according to Hare, "consists in making a
choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of
the moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and by nothing else"
(Hare 1981, p. 40). Unlike the prima facie principles at the intuitive
level of thinking, critical moral principles can be of unlimited
specificity. Both the critical and the intuitive principles, however,
are universal prescriptions.
(a) Universalizability at the critical level
Critical thinking, according to Hare, operates under a
constraint of universalizability. Universalizability requires that if
we make a moral judgement about any particular situation, then we
must be prepared to make that same judgement in morally relevant
similar circumstances. These similar circumstances need not be
actual circumstances but logically possible, hypothetical, similar
circumstances. Hare says that "critical thinking has to...find a moral
judgement which the thinker is prepared to make about this
conflict-situation and is also prepared to make about all the other
similar situations" (Hare 1981, p. 42).
Universalizability is the requirement, in making moral
prescriptions, to make the step "from prescriptions which I accept
for my own experiences to prescriptions which I must accept for
experiences I should have, were I to be in someone else's position
3 Hare thinks that, without critical thinking, moral systems lack the
wherewithal for such justification. Intuitionist moral theories, on his view,
are unable to settle conflicts that arise between principles.
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with

his

preferences"

(Hare

1981,

p.

108).

It

follows

from

universalizability that, if I prescribe that I do a particular act or
refrain from a particular act that affects others, then I must be
prepared to prescribe that others do or refrain from doing the act, if
our roles were reversed, including our motivational states.^
Moral reasoning, for Hare, involves more than merely formal
constraints on reasoning which follow from an understanding of the
language of morality.
Universalizability,

he

The substantial premises are also
claims,

prescriptions of others (i.e.

demands

that

we

crucial.

treat

the

their desires, likings, and, in general,

preferences) on a par with our own original prescriptions

(Hare

^Hare claims that universalizability is a logical requirement of morality
which is built into the meaning of moral terms.
John Mackie has argued,
however, that while universalizability is a logical requirement of morality, it
is not extendible to the degree that Hare claims.
Mackie distinguishes three
stages of universalisation.
The first stage of universalization Mackie calls 'the irrelevance of
numerical differences'.
Mackie interprets this first stage as a requirement
of the meaning of moral terms and the logic of moral statements.
This
requirement can be simply that individual reference to individuals, nations
and so on are eliminated (Mackie 1977, p. 83).
Mackie then characterises a second stage of universalization, which
he calls 'putting oneself in the other person's place'.
As the name suggests,
this stage of universalization requires that the asserter imagines herself in
the other person's place and asks whether she can accept the maxim as a
directive guiding the behaviour of others towards herself.
Mackie then introduces the third stage of universalization, which he
calls 'taking account of different tastes and rival ideas'.
This third stage
involves "putting oneself even more thoroughly into the other person's
place, so that one takes on his desires, tastes, preferences, ideals, and values
as well as his other qualities and abilities and external situation" (Mackie
1977, pp. 92 ff.). The purpose of this stage of universalization is to find
action-guiding principles which take into consideration the tastes and ideals
of others who may be affected by the actions. It is by adopting this stage and
by weighting equally the actual interests of those who may be affected that
some kind of utilitarianism is reached.
Mackie contends that "it is at most the first stage, the ruling out of
purely numerical differences as morally irrelevant, that is built into the
meaning of moral language" (Mackie 1977, p. 97). For his part, Hare denies
that there are these different stages of universalization in moral judgements
and contends that Mackie has only pointed out a "progression in the use we
make of this single logical property as we develop our theory of moral
reasoning" (Hare 1981, p. 108).

1981, p. 16 f.). So, what is essential in generating moral principles
at the critical level is universalizability informed by the relevant
non-moral facts—including, especially, facts about the prescriptions
(preferences) of parties affected by the action at issue.
Hare's conception of rationality also plays an important role in
his account of sound moral reasoning. For what such reasoning
requires is universalizability rationally applied. Rationality, on
Hare's view, requires that one be cognisant of the facts surrounding
the application of the prescription in consideration. This will
include, for any affected individual, "facts about his position as it
affects him with his preferences" (Hare 1981, p. 89). Since only an
archangel can be aware of all the facts, the sort of critical thinking
that is required—which is the closest approximation to an archangel
to which we human beings can aspire—is that we take into account,
as best we can, what we take to be the salient facts.
Hare's thesis of universalizability, as has been noted, requires
that one take into consideration what it would be like, in some
course of action, to have the preferences of the other affected
person (or persons). Universalizability does not require simply that
one imaginatively consider what it would be like for oneself to be in
the situation of the other. It is not enough to consider how oneself
would feel, or consider what one's own preference would be, with
one's own present set of desires and values.
One must
imaginatively project oneself into the situation taking account of the
other's set of preferences, (Hare 1981, pp. 94 ff.). It is important to
keep in mind that "the motivational states he actually now has may

run quite counter to [one's] own present ones" (Hare 1981, pp. 108
f-).
Hare maintains that, since critical thinking, properly applied,
includes that the critical thinker "occupies, respectively, the
positions of all the other parties in the actual situation, no
judgement will be acceptable to him which does not do the best, all
in all, for all the parties" (Hare 1981, p. 42). The judgements that
the critical thinker makes, according to Hare, are the ones that an
act-utilitarian would make. It is in this way. Hare thinks, that
utilitarianism and Kantianism are synthesized.
According to Hare, many people wrongly think that Kant and
utilitarians stand at opposite poles of moral philosophy. For his
part. Hare claims that "the formal, logical properties of the moral
words, the understanding of which we owe above all to Kant, yield a
system of moral reasoning whose conclusions have a content
identical with that of a certain kind of utilitarianism" (Hare 1981, p.
4). The sorts of prima facie principles that a Kantian would choose
at the critical level by applying the categorical imperative are the
same as what a utilitarian would select (Hare 1981, p. 50).5
(b) Utilitarianism at the critical level
The critical thinker that Hare describes as 'archangelic' is
impartial, rational and benevolent, when deciding on what
principles to apply at the intuitive level. Hare thinks that such a
critical thinker would agree to principles that an act preference5It is a contentious issue, however, whether the marriage Hare forges
between utilitarianism and Kantianism really works. See Persson 1983, pp. 43
ff..

utilitarian would agree to.^ The justification, in brief, is that, when
considering all the possible outcomes of a particular action, it would
be rational—as a solution to an intrapersonal conflict that has been
induced by imaginative projection—to prefer the situation in which
utility, construed as preference satisfaction, is maximised.
Hare's requirement of universalizability, which he claims is a
purely formal property of moral reasoning, requires that we treat
all preferences, including the preferences of others, with equal
weight. It is required further that one's universalizing be rationally
applied. Hare's notion of rationality includes that one take account
of all the relevant facts surrounding the proposed prescription.
Salient among such facts, on Hare's theory, are the preferences of
the affected parties. To know what another's preferences are one
needs to imaginatively project what it would be like to be the other;
or, in other words, to imaginatively identify with the other. Once
identifying with the other, one takes on preferences corresponding
to the preferences of the other in the form: "I now prefer with
strength S that if I were in that situation x should happen rather
than not" (Hare 1981, p. 95). In this way one is meant to acquire a
desire equal in strength to the desire of another. Since the desire of
another actually becomes matched by a desire of oneself, what was
6Hare sometimes refers to act utilitarianism and at other times to
preference
utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism often contrasts with rule utilitarianism.
Hare maintains that there could, strictly speaking, be a difference between
happiness and preference
utilitarianism. This difference would be that the
happiness
utilitarian would consider only now-for-now preferences and
then-for-then preferences. A preference utilitarian would consider all
preferences, including now-for-then preferences (Hare 1981, pp. 103 ff.).
Hare also thinks that the distinction that many often make between act and
rule utihtarianism is confused. For Hare, critical thinking is act utilitarian,
which can also be rule utilitarian if the rule is to be of unlimited specificity.
Rule utilitarianism, normally construed, comprises prima facie principles at
the intuitive level (Hare 1981, p. 43).

an interpersonal conflict becomes an intrapersonal conflict, which
requires rational resolution. Such rational resolution consists in
maximal preference satisfaction—in the simplest case of two
competing desires, satisfying the strongest desire.
Hare illustrates how a critical thinker will come to rationally^
prescribe utilitarian principles by considering the following
bilateral example which involves a conflict in interests between two
people. One person has a bicycle parked in a position where
another person wants to park his car.
The other party wants me not to move his bicycle, but I
want more to move it in order to park my car. I am fully
aware of the strength of his desire, and therefore have a
desire of equal strength that, were I in his situation, the
bicycle should stay where it is. But I also have my original
desire to move it in order to park my car. This later desire
wins by superior strength....We see here in miniature how
the requirement to universalize our prescriptions generates
utilitarianism (Hare 1981, p. 111).
While Hare uses this simple bilateral case to illustrate how
preference utilitarianism is reached by universalizing, he claims
that there is in principle no difficulty in extending the method to
multilateral cases. The diffículties that arise, he says, are practical
The notion of rationality that Hare appeals to here is similar to the notion of
rationality that is often appealed to in discussions of prudence. In the case of
prudence, it is rational to treat one's own future preferences as of equal
weight to one's present preferences. What is prudentially rational is to
maximise the satisfaction of one's present and future preferences. What is
morally rational, in accordance with universalizability, is the maximising of
others' and one's own preferences.

ones of having full knowledge of what the involved parties'
preferences are and of performing the complicated thought
processes. Hare admits that in many cases of moral problems it
would be too difficult for humans with limited cognitive capacities
to perform an elaborate calculation of utilities and that only an
archangel could perform them (Hare 1981, pp. 121 f.). We would
do better he thinks to stick to well tried and fairly general
principles.

The Role of Justice in Hare's Moral Theory
The following section characterises the role of justice in Hare's
moral theory. Hare distinguishes formal justice from substantial
justice. According to Hare, formal justice is the requirement that
moral principles be universalizable, whereas substantial principles
of justice are those prima facie principles of justice that we adopt in
everyday life.
(i) Formal justice
Formal justice, according to Hare, is simply the requirement
that moral principles be universalizable (Hare 1978, p. 117; 1981, p.
157). So, formal justice consists in the observance of a set of canons
in our moral arguments, which are derivable from the formal,
logical properties of the moral words, and from the requirement
that individual references be excluded from the moral principles.
The canons that Hare refers to would include that "we are not
allowed to discriminate between individuals unless there is some

qualitative difference between them which is the ground for the
discrimination; and...that the equal interests of different individuals
have equal moral weight" (Hare 1978, p. 117). Hare uses an
example to illustrate how something could be formally unjust. "If I
have to give a single indivisible cream puff to one or other of my
twins, who both want it equally, it may be morally right to toss a
coin, rather than give it to neither....What would be at fault
(logically) would be to make the moral judgement that I ought to
give it to one twin rather than the other, when there was nothing to
differentiate them. That is why we toss coins in such cases, to
introduce a difference" (Hare 1981, p. 157).
Formal distributive justice, however, is not sufficient to get to
substantial justice. Hare maintains that formal justice will not, for
example, tell us whether or not "people with big houses should get
greater political power" (Hare 1981, p. 157). What is needed, in
addition to the formal constraints on justice, are the empirical facts,
especially facts about what people's preferences are.
(ii) Substantial (material)

justice

Formal justice, and the formal impartiality associated with it,
are insufficient for developing substantial principles of distributive
justice, as these require only that we treat everybody's interests as
of equal weight. Hare illustrates this with the following example.
Suppose that we were to take a dollar from every person in town
and that the resultant loss in purchasing power of each person was
hardly noticed and so the resultant utility enjoyed by each is not
much diminished. Further suppose that this large sum of money

was given to one man such that he could subsequently buy himself
a holiday which he could enjoy very much.

If we were to take a

completely impartial point of view, we would have to regard who
has the holiday as irrelevant.

Now, allowing that the losses in

utility of the many were exactly outweighed by the gain in utility of
the

fortunate

individual,

impartiality would be met.

then

the

requirements

of

formal

However, while such a redistribution

would meet the requirements of formal justice, Hare maintains that
most of us would consider such a distribution as unjust (Hare 1978,
p. 123).
According to Hare, the substantial principles of distributive
justice are the prima

facie

principles we adopt in everyday life

which critical thinking will endorse.
be built

around

our conception

These principles of justice will
of fairness and desert.

Such

principles will depend on the empirical facts of what we would be
prepared to accept as distributively preferable, if we were in the
shoes of the other affected parties, as it were.
substantial
societies.

principles

of

just

distribution

Hare concedes that
will

differ

between

Of course, these principles can only be obtained when

conceptions of fairness or desert pass the test of universalizability.
But what people's

conceptions

of fairness and desert^ are is an

empirical matter.

All such "principles of 'particular'

substantial

justice are prima facie and not critical principles" (Hare 1981, p.
158).

^Mill writes extensively on the different conceptions of justice which
include rights of personal liberty and property, desert, the keeping and
breaking of faith, partiality and equality (Mill 1991, pp. 178 ff.). Like Hare,
Mill thinks that the competing principles of justice surrounding these
notions is ultimately to be adjudicated in terms of utility.

Hare as a Prima Facie Moderate Egalitarian
As has been noted, Hare acknowledges that substantial
principles of distributive justice will vary between societies. In this
way, the principles of justice one ought to propagate vary with the
probable effects of propagating them, and these effects importantly
depend on the dispositions of people in the society in question
(Hare 1978, p. 130).
Hare himself advocates moderate
egalitarianism as the substantial theory of justice for at least
Western liberal societies.9 Hare points out that "neither political
liberty nor economic equality are of necessity good things in
themselves" (Hare 1981, p. 166). How important they are, and
what degree of liberty or economic equality people ought to have,
depends on what peoples' actual preferences in a given society are.
There can be good reasons for some inequality, such as the need for
differentials to provide incentives. It even seems reasonable to
think that some inequality would be best for all. Hare points out
that egalitarian principles would support progressive taxation of the
rich but this could come into conflict with utility (Hare 1978, p.
125). Such principles, if enforced, could diminish incentives and
reduce the overall goods to be distributed. Hare gives two reasons
why the principles of distributive justice, chosen by an impartially
benevolent critical thinker, would be moderately egalitarian, lo One
^This appUes not only to those societies that are currently liberal
democracies. For example. Hare maintains that, in some but not all
circumstances, in the light of the predictable actual consequences, one could
justify, on utilitarian grounds, changing a slave-owning society into a free
and moderate egalitarian one (even through revolution) (Hare 1978, pp. 126
ff.).
lOHare does not explicitly address the issue of just distribution of power and
status, but claims that "the method...for determining the just distribution of
wealth can be used, with necessary changes in empirical premisses, for
determining the just distribution of power and of status" (Hare 1981, p. 164).

is diminishing marginal utility and the other is peoples' envy. Hare
points out, however, that "both of the arguments in favour of
moderate equality, and all of those against extreme egalitarianism,
rest on contingent empirical facts or conjectures" (Hare 1981, p.
166). For this reason it is essential for the critical thinker to find
out what people's actual preferences are before committing himself
to prima facie principles.
As just noted. Hare offers two arguments in favour of
moderate egalitarian principles of distributive justice (for Western
liberal societies and relevantly similar ones). One argument relates
to diminishing marginal utility, while the other relates to people's
envy. The argument for diminishing marginal utility is based on
the empirical premise that an increase in money or some other good
to a poor man increases utility more than the same increase when
given to a rich man. "In terms of preferences, the impartial critical
thinker who put himself in the shoes of both of these people would
prefer that he should, in those cases, be given the increment if he
were the poor man than if he were the rich man, supposing that he
could have it in both roles" (Hare 1981, p. 164 f.). The second
argument in support of moderate egalitarianism is based on an
empirical premise that inequality "has a tendency to produce envy,
which is a disagreeable state of mind and leads people to do
disagreeable things" (Hare 1978, p. 126).ii
I take it that, for Hare, a moderate egalitarian society is one which has a
moderately equal distribution of wealth, power and status. While some
inequality in distribution is permissible, extreme inequality is
impermissible.
l i l t is worth emphasising that Hare's arguments in support of moderate
egalitarianism, including those against extreme egalitarianism, are based on
empirical assumptions. Whether or not, in its own terms, Hare's moral theory
supports moderate egalitarianism as the theory of substantial justice when
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have characterised Hare's theory of justice,
both formal and substantial,
Hare,

as we have

critical

level)

and related it to his moral

seen, is an act preference-utilitarian

who

endorses

moderate

egalitarianism

theory.
(at

the

(at

the

intuitive level) as the substantial principle of justice for Western
liberal societies and societies relevantly like them.

Hare's theory of

justice

of

applies

in

an

obvious

way

to

issues

international

distributive justice, as, for example, in relation to Third World debt.
The

central

distributive

question
principles

at

the
best

critical

level

promote

the

is

what

substantial

satisfaction

of

the

preferences of all affected parties, in both the Third and the First
Worlds.
crisis

George's proposed 3-D solution to the Third World debt
is

egalitarian.

apparently

egalitarian,

perhaps

even

moderately

In the next chapter, I explore the extent to which her

proposal is egalitarian and I consider whether it can plausibly be
said

to

embody

standpoint

of act

satisfactory

principles

of

distribution

from

the

preference-utilitarianism.

applied to a group of affected people depends on what the people's actual
preferences are (or predictably would be) and on whether moderate
egalitarianism is the best way to maximise those preferences.
Hare even
allows for the possibility that democracy may not be the best way to serve the
interests of a given group (Hare, 1981, pp. 167 f.).

CHAPTER 4
ASSESSMENT OF GEORGE'S 3-D SOLUTION IN THE LIGHT OF HARE'S
THEORY OF JUSTICE

My

principal

aim

in this

chapter

is

to discuss

whether

George's 3-D solution is a just solution in the light of Hare's theory
of distributive justice.

George's 3-D solution is motivated by a will

to free people from the poverty and mass starvation which are, in
large part, products of international debt.

Her solution offers what

she sees as the best, practicable way in which the debt crisis could
be resolved justly.

It is therefore instructive to consider how just

her proposed solution is, from the standpoint of a significant theory
of distributive justice like Hare's.
My discussion falls into two main parts, reflecting the two
central aspects of Hare's theory of justice.

As discussed in Chapter

3, Hare is an act preference-utilitarian (at the critical level) who
endorses

moderate

substantial
societies

egalitarianism

principle

of

and relevantly

(at the intuitive level)

distributive
similar ones.

justice

for

western

Correspondingly,

as the
liberal
in

this

present chapter, I consider (i) the relation between George's 3-D
solution and egalitarianism, including moderate egalitarianism, and
(ii) the more fundamental issue of whether it can plausibly

be

claimed for George's 3-D solution that it would maximally satisfy
the relevant set of preferences about distribution.

George's 3-D Solution as

Egalitarian

The burden of the debt crisis, as George characterises it, falls
unequally on the citizens of both the First World and the Third
World.
tiny

The burden falls heavily on the poor in both Worlds while a

minority,

handsomely.

the

politically

and

financially

powerful,

profit

This results in large inequalities in power, status and,

more importantly, in resources between the rich and the poor.
George's
debtor

proposed

governments

reimbursement

making

regular

in

cash—which

interest

payments

involves
into

a

national development fund and then reusing the money for projects
internal to that country, such as small scale farming^—aims
redirecting economic activity away from the international

at

markets

and towards an inner-directed economy which focuses on meeting
people's

basic

development

and

fund

non-basic
with

needs.

democratically

By

having

elected

a

national

representatives,

people would have more control over their own lives.

By contrast,

according to George, when people are subjected to the externally
driven demands of their governments and the IMF, they are far
more restricted in the choices available to them in terms of the
crops that they grow and how their collective resources are to be
distributed.

By adopting her solution, George thinks that more

power would be given to the otherwise disempowered people in the
Third World.

The 3-D solution would allow people to choose

between their resources being used for such things as health care
and education, or militarisation and prestige projects.^
ISee my Ch. 2, the section, 'George's 3-D Solution'.
^Under conditions at the time of George's proposal, the governments and
other power ehtes of Third World countries often used public money on

To allow

people

access to such things

as the means

of

producing food which they need, and would otherwise do without,
would be a step towards a more egalitarian society.
accessible

such

things

as

health

care

and

To make more

education

is

also

egalitarian, insofar as it is likely to put the less privileged people in
the community in a better position than they would otherwise be.
Education gives people a greater opportunity to pursue a greater
number of goals.

In the present state of affairs, public resources in

the Third World are scarcely spent on education, which
access difficult for the poor.

makes

Access to health care often gives

people a better quality of life, which is sometimes available only to
the

wealthy.
Reimbursement

in kind, which involves

debt reduction

in

exchange for heritage-preserving programs, is an important feature
of George's 3-D solution.^ This strategy aims not only to benefit
mankind

collectively,

but

also to encourage

people

from

non-

western cultures to take pride in their heritage and culture.

The

present international market-driven economy does not incorporate
as

values

such

environmental

things

integrity.

present 'development'
irrevocably

destroyed.

as

heritage,

These

culture,

treasures,

under

language

and

pressure

from

strategies, are being squandered, eroded or
The main idea behind reimbursement

in

kind is to recognise and remunerate past and future contributions

militarisation and prestige projects such as mega-dams and nuclear power
stations.
George still condemns the World Bank and IMF for their prestige
projects. For instance, in her visit to Australia in April, 1994, she condemned
the World Bank for policies surrounding the Narmada Valley project, a
proposed massive and expensive irrigation and electricity generation
scheme in India. (See also George & Sabelli 1994, pp. 175 ff..)
3See my Ch. 2, the section, 'George's 3-D Solution'.

of African peoples to our common heritage and the preservation
and restoration of the environment, which are public goods.4
Reimbursement in kind counts as egalitarian because it offers
economic

and

political

compensation

to

the

poor

for

their

contribution to the collection and recording of information on our
collective heritage and for their contribution to the maintenance of
the environment.5

Two aspects of this egalitarianism are as follows.

First, payment to, and political strengthening of, the peasantry, the
pastoralists, and the agricultural sector aims to eliminate hunger
and the poverty on which hunger thrives.

Second, moving the

emphasis

to

from

environmental

income-producing
sustainability,

and

exports
the

self-sufficiency,

recognition

of

cultural

diversity as a value aims to allow people in the Third World to
determine for themselves what their needs are.

Given that their

cultural practices have been sustainable in the past, this will give
such people a more secure and promising future than the one that
the present export-oriented culture gives.

George claims that the

"3-D solution seeks greater equality and social justice"
1989, p. 251).

(George,

Greater equality, which is central to egalitarianism,

is sought after by increasing the opportunities and quality of life of
those furthest down the socio-economic ladder.

4Reimbursement in kind is applicable not only to Africa. There are a
number of different cultures in many parts of the Third World outside Africa
that lack recognition in the present export-oriented context.
5 Also, by preserving the environment or engaging in environmentally
sustainable practices, more resources are available in the long run.
When
resources are scarce, they are often affordable only to the wealthy.
This, in
turn, increases the differences between the rich and the poor.

As discussed in Chapter 2,6 George maintains that, in the case
of Latin America, additional supplementary measures are needed in
order to resolve the debt crisis.

These measures include indebted

Latin American countries being more selective in the purchasing of
foreign goods, raising the price of commodity export products, and
returning capital flight.
The

first

supplementary

measure

involves

indebted

Latin

American countries buying only essential items such as fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals,

machine

making

bank repayments.

making

the

Third

tools,

parts,

This, together

World

egalitarian in two ways.

spare

more

etc.,

with

rather

than

an emphasis

self-sufficient, would

count

on
as

First, money from the Third World would

be redirected away from the banks and distributed more between
industrial suppliers and farmers.

Such redirection of money would

help maintain and restore jobs in First World countries, many of
which have been shed or are threatened due to a loss of the Third
World's purchasing

power.

These measures would work to the

advantage of the least advantaged people in the First World (i.e.
the workers and unemployed).

Second, an emphasis on improving

capital equipment, creating jobs, and making the Third World more
self-sufficient in basic foods, assists the poorest groups by helping
them to meet their basic needs such as food and nutrition.
The

second

supplementary

measure

consists

of

Latin

American countries working collectively to increase the price of
export

commodities.

This

would

not

necessarily

6 s e e my Ch. 2, the section 'George's 3-D Solution', subsection (ii),
American
debt" .

affect

'Latin

the

distribution of resources in the Third World. It would, however,
give the Third World more money which could be used to repay the
debt and to import essential items. These extra export dollars could
be used to decrease the inequalities that exist between debtor and
creditor nations and could also be used to assist the poorer groups
in the Third World. So, increasing the price of export commodities
would not be egalitarian in itself, but could be used to promote
egalitarian distributions if assisted by other strategies.
As a third supplementary measure, George proposes that
flight capital be returned to the countries from where it came. This
money could be used both to repay the debt and to purchase the
items needed for genuine development. Such measures would be
egalitarian if the money that was squandered by the power elites,
when returned, was used to the benefit of the poor. As with the
extra money available from increased export prices, the
distribution of the benefits of these measures would determine
whether or not they counted as egalitarian.
Is George's 3-D solution moderately egalitarian?
Hare's notion of moderate egalitarianism is that distribution
of wealth (and power and status) be nearly equal. Some
inequalities, however, may be permissible if they promote utility,
understood as maximal preference satisfaction.
George's solution is arguably consistent with this notion of
moderate egalitarianism. First, the 3-D solution clearly aims at

removing the extremes of present inequalities. Second, the solution
focuses on materially and politically empowering, through
structural changes, groups such as the poor, people in rural areas,
minority ethnic groups, youth, women, artisans and peasants. The
degree of empowering aimed at is considerable. Third, there is
little reason to think, however, that George's proposed solution aims
at an extreme egalitarian rearrangement of economic and political
life in the Third World. For, as well as the disempowered in the
Third and First Worlds, her solution takes account of the existence
and motivations of established institutions such as the IMF, banks
and national governments. The solution aims at a modus vivendi
among these competing interest groups which will considerably
improve the economic and political position of the disadvantaged
and vulnerable in both the Third and First Worlds. Furthermore,
George's approach to solving the debt crisis seems to be consistent
with promoting democratic political structures within mixed
economies, where there is bound to remain an unequal distribution
of economic and political power. George's solution, while taking
account of present powerful and empowering institutions, aims at
reducing the degree of inequality that exists between the elites and
the poor; however, presumably for practical reasons, her proposal
does not aim at the removal of all inequalities.
It is difficult to judge conclusively whether George's solution
is moderately egalitarian in principle. Whether or not it would
count as moderately egalitarian would depend on how much
inequality she is prepared to allow. Her solution emphasises the
promotion of greater equality, but George is not explicit on either

how much equality there ought to be or on how much equality she
thinks her solution would generate.
count

as more

egalitarian

than

Her solution would, however,

the present

arrangements

under

IMF strategies and other proposals, such as the proposals of Baker
and Bradley.'7

Is George's

Solution Sensitive to the Preferences of All
Those

Affected?

Moderate egalitarianism, on Hare's theory, is a prima

facie

principle, the justification of which depends on whether it would
best maximise the preferences of the relevant parties.

In the case

of Third World debt, the relevant parties include the whole of the
global community which can be divided up into the Third and First
Worlds.
will

Whether or not George's solution is just, on Hare's theory,

ultimately

depend

on

whether

preferences of all parties concerned.
of George's

solution

it

would

best

satisfy

the

It is clear from my discussion

and egalitarianism

that her solution

would

satisfy many preferences about the distribution of goods that may
reasonably

be credited

to ordinary people in the Third

World.

However, a possible objection is that George's 3-D solution is valueimperialistic, especially in relation to its requirement of democracy,
and so runs the risk of failing to meet Hare's standards of justice.
In

this

section,

I discuss

whether

George's

solution

is

value-

imperialistic in relation to the Third World, and how her proposed

7See my Ch. 2, fn. 1, and George 1989, pp. 190 ff..

solution fares in relation to the preferences of the people in the
First World, including the lenders.
(i) Third

World preferences

and value

imperialism.

An important objection to George's 3-D solution is that, insofar
as it insists on democratic political structures, it is insensitive to the
values or preferences of many of the people in the Third World.8
That is, it could be argued that the démocratisation on which George
makes

reimbursement

conditional

does

not

properly

take

into

consideration the cultural values (and associated preferences) of at
least some of the affected people.

In short, it could be argued that

George's solution is an instance of value imperialism.

To this kind

of objection George replies: "Once they have experienced democracy
and basic freedoms, has any people ever willingly given them up?"
(George 1989, p. 251).

So, George apparently thinks that, while in

some cultures democracy may not have been a value in the past, if
the people from that culture were to experience democracy,
would very likely adopt it as a value.

they

However, it is arguable that,

in some other cultures, where such things as hierarchical
structures (for example) are valued or preferred, democracy

tribal
may

conflict with other decision-making processes, which are acceptable
to

a

given

group

despite

being

undemocratic

(as

in

chieftain

cultures).
In many ways, George's 3-D solution is sensitive to the values
and preferences of the people within the different cultures of the
Third World (consider some of the proposals in the reimbursement
81 am assuming that people's values normally correspond to their
preferences.
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in kind aspect of her solution, for example).

However, as in the case

of the emphasis on the First World value of democracy, she may fall
short of the sensitivity to the actual preferences of those affected
which Hare thinks must ground any just ordering of

society—

including any moderate egalitarian, democratic ordering.9
From Hare's point of view, there is, however, a prima facie
case

for introducing

nondemocratic
hierarchical

democracy

(even those

to societies

societies

that

that count

as

are

currently

well-ordered

societies).lo Hare maintains that when deliberating on

whether to implement a particular policy, one ought to take into
consideration

both

the

present

and

affected parties (Hare 1981, pp. 100 f.).

future preferences

of

the

As indicated above, George

is confident that once people have experienced democracy, they
will be unwilling to give it up.

However, it is a difficult empirical

issue whether George is right in her prediction about the changed
future preferences of those who now live in nondemocratic Third
World societies and presently prefer that their societies not be
democratised.
adjudicate here.

This is not an issue that I am really in a position to
I am simply marking it out as a concern in trying

to assess how just George's 3-D solution is in terms of Hare's theory
of justice. 11

9See my Ch. 3, the section, 'Hare as a Prima Facie Moderate Egalitarian'.
10See Hare's discussion of the pros and cons in relation to changing a slaveowning society into a moderate egalitarian one (See Hare 1978, pp. 128 f., and
my Ch. 3, fn.9).
I l l revisit the objection that George's 3-D solution is value-imperialistic in
Ch. 6, when considering that solution in the light of O'Neill's theory of
justice.

(ii) First

World

From

the

fundamental
following.

preferences
perspective

issue

in

of

Hare's

assessing

theory

George's

of

3-D

justice,

solution

is

the
the

How well does George's egalitarian solution contribute to

the maximal

satisfaction of the preferences of all

the affected

persons in both the Third and First Worlds?
But just who are the affected parties? For Hare, the affected
parties

are

all

those

people

whose

preference

satisfaction

influenced by any of the possible courses of action.

is

In the case of

Third World debt, this would cast the net fairly widely, given the
interconnectedness (economic and environmental) of peoples in the
contemporary world.

Even so, it is fairly easy to identify at least

some of those (including institutions) who very clearly fall into the
class of affected parties.
the lenders—such

For example, in the First World, there are

as the banks and the bankers.

In the Third

World, there are the urban and rural poor (who so far have been
the focus of discussion).

But others are also clearly identifiable.

George's book The Debt Boomerang
in relation to the First World.

is interesting in this connection,

George maintains that the affected,

wronged parties of the Third World debt crisis include the poor or
politically vulnerable in both the Third and First

Worlds.

In the two sections that follow I discuss how George's 3-D
solution

is likely

to bear

on the preferences

affected groups in the First World—exploited

of

the different,

and exploiters.

It

turns out that George's 3-D solution is congenial to the preference
satisfaction

of

many

in the

First

World,

given

certain

natural

assumptions
present

about people's preferences.

This contrasts with

situation of Third World debt, which thwarts

the

preference

satisfaction among many in the First World in various ways.
(a) The debt boomerang and preferences in the First World
As indicated in Chapter 2, according to George the majority of
citizens from the First World creditor nations are also bearing the
debt

burden

in

what

environmental

she

describes

destruction,

unemployment

and

lost

drugs,

markets,

as

the

cost

six
to

immigration

boomerangs:
tax

payers,

pressures

and,

heightened conflict and war.
First, the Third World debt crisis exacerbates the problem of
global environmental destruction.

Among the consequences are an

increase in global warming and a depletion of genetic bio-diversity
(George 1992, pp. 1 ff.).

Those in the First World have an interest

in maintaining (or using sustainably) the natural resources of the
earth.

Such things as ozone depletion are already affecting many in

the First World by means of increases in rates of skin

cancer.

Deforestation is often claimed to play a major causal role in the
extent

to

which

weather

patterns

have

become

more

erratic.

Genetic bio-diversity is something that many in the First World
value in itself and for the benefits it has in maintaining ecosystems
from which we all benefit.

It is through the natural environment

that we have reaped and continue to reap benefits from such things
as

medical

present

and

and

biological

future

research.

preferences

is

The

satisfaction

dependent

on

of

many

environmental

p r e s e r v a t i o n . 12 George's 3-D solution aims at environmental
preservation, which is needed for satisfying important preferences
of all, including the ordinary person in the First World.
Second, the Third World debt crisis has forced many in Third
World countries into producing illegal drugs as the most reliable
means of earning export dollars. The adverse effects of the drug
industry on the people in the First World include both monetary
and social costs (George 1992, pp. 34 ff.). Inseparable from the
drug industry is organised and street crime. Those at the top of the
drug industry are the ones typically involved in organised crime.
The costs to the general population in the US include $2.5 billion
per year for intensive care for 'crack babies' and the price that
some users pay is the suffering associated with AIDS. The users
who become addicted to the drugs often need to resort to such
crimes as theft, sometimes violent theft, to support their addiction.
Such crime, and even the threat of such crime, makes for great
insecurity in a community. The adverse effects of the drug
industry impede the satisfaction of many preferences of many
throughout the First World, including addicts and nonaddicts.
George thinks that a realistic approach to the drug problem,
including its adverse effects on First World communities, needs to
address a number of different issues, including the social structure
12 The preference satisfaction of future generations is something that Hare
mentions but does not address in detail (Hare 1978, p. 127). He does, however,
think that the satisfaction of future preferences carries equal moral weight
to the satisfaction of present preferences (Hare 1981, pp. 100 f.). He holds
this interpersonally and intrapersonally. It would seem then that, for Hare,
the preferences of future generations are of equal weight to the preferences
of present generations. Some problems of unpredictability arise, however,
which make 'calculations' difficult. Even so, there is a strong prima facie
case for thinking that future generations would prefer that the present
generation preserve the environment.

within First World communities. However, she says, "nothing can
be accomplished until the deadly debt-drugs link is severed"
(George 1992, p. 62). George's 3-D solution aims at making
indebted drug-producing counties more self-reliant and less
dependent on the production of drugs.
Third, governments in the First World are bailing out the
banks for so-called 'bad debts' from Third World countries (George
1992, pp. 63 ff.). So, ordinary people in the First World are paying,
in the form of tax concessions, for the banks' 'mistakes'. According
to George, most people are unaware that their taxes are being used
in such ways. It is reasonable to expect that people in the First
World would prefer their taxes spent differently (this may explain
why First World tax payers are not informed that their taxes are
used in this way). According to George: "There is nothing banks
hate more than having the public see that it is 'bailing them out'—
because there is nothing the public/taxpayer hates more! That,
however is precisely what is happening" (George 1992, p. 65).
George's 3-D solution aims at controlling the way banks benefit
from profits while they are at the same time 'bailed out' by
taxpayers for their bad debts. "Help to any banks, large or small,
ought to be accompanied by an equivalent popular control over the
profits. Such help could, for example, be tied to better terms for
farmers, small business, etc." (George 1989, p. 259). In this way,
George's aim of making banks more accountable would assist in
satisfying the preferences of ordinary people in the First World
such as the farmers and the taxpayers.

Fourth, the Third World debt crisis has resulted in the loss of
jobs in the First World as imported First World goods have become
unafordable for ordinary people in the Third World and some items
traditionally produced in the First World are being produced in the
Third World. George's 3-D solution, however, would encourage and
enhance the opportunities for the unemployed in the First World to
get jobs. This would work in two ways. On the one hand, George's
proposal includes a move for the Third World away from cash-crop
export-orientated economics. This would give those in the First
World an opportunity to produce once again those products that
they traditionally produced. On the other hand, there would be
some items of which those in the Third World would be in need,
such as farming equipment, which are typically produced in the
First World. This would give further employment opportunities for
those in the First World. So, in respect of the preference for
employment, common in the First World, an application of George's
3-D solution would also contribute to the preference satisfaction of
many in the First World.
Fifth, the Third World debt crisis and the effects of the
subsequent IMF adjustment programs have made life so
unbearable for many in the Third World that they have fled their
countries. This has effectively increased the number of immigrants
and refugees, putting more pressure on the First World to
accommodate them. For the people in the First World, this often
means racial tension, including violent clashes. George maintains
that there is a need to make immigration less necessary; otherwise
"clashes in the North are likely to become not only more frequent

but far uglier" (George 1992, p. 112). By implementing the
proposals of the 3-D solution, conditions in the Third World are
likely to be such that there would be less need to emigrate from the
Third World. Also, immigrants from the First World often compete
with the workers in the First World for jobs. Not only does this
create racial tension among the workers, but it also means that jobs
that would otherwise go to First World workers are going to the
immigrants. Once again, more preferences all round would seem
satisfied by the application of George's 3-D solution.
The final boomerang effect that George discusses is the threat
of war that results from the debt crisis (1992, pp. 136 ff.). Military
spending and debt accumulation are inseparable. The military
spending and associated debt applies not only to the Third World.
Military spending accounts for a large part of the debt of the US. A
solution, such as George's proposed 3-D solution, which includes the
use of resources to meet people's basic needs, requires at least a
reduction in military spending. As the recent example of the Gulf
War s h o w s , 1 3 the threat of war is a threat that can be realised. The
costs of that war were very high indeed—not only to the people in
the Third World but also to ordinary people in the First World,
which is evident from the casualties among First World combatants
and the costs to First World taxpayers. Insofar as an application of
George's 3-D solution would reduce the threat of war that results
from the debt crisis, it would obviously promote preference
satisfaction among many in the First World—and in the Third World.
13See my Ch. 2, the section 'Why Third World Debt is Such a Problem',
subsection, '(Hi) The Debt Boomerang'.

(b) The lenders and preferences in the First World
George's
repayment

and

3-D

solution

contrasts

proposes

with

any

cancel the debt, in whole or in part.

a renegotiation
recommendation

of debt
simply

It has to be remembered that

George opposes both unconditional and partial cancellation
debt. 14

to

Her proposal is for 'creative reimbursement'.

of the

What can we

say about George's 3-D solution in relation to the preferences of the
First World lenders—the banks, bankers and financial institutions of
the

First World? I think the following is a plausible claim.

No

doubt many First World lenders currently favour the repayment of
Third World debt under existing arrangements.
strong reasons
solution

(and

However, there are

for First World leaders to favour George's
its

supplements)

over

existing

3-D

arrangements

and

some of them could be expected to change their current preferences
upon reflection on George's proposal,
First, the lenders, if they are to be consistent with their own
public 'rhetoric', ought to welcome the democratising element in the
3-D solution.
252).

George explicitly makes this point (George 1989, p.

The debt crisis gives First World institutions an opportunity

to spread democracy in the Third World.
Second, George's 3-D solution aims at keeping countries of the
Third World within

the world economic system as trading partners.

So, George thinks the 3-D solution has prudential value for the First
World—she thinks, for example, that this is the only feasible way to
l^See my Chapter 2, the section, 'George's Reasons Against Unconditional
Cancellation or Repudiation'.
In any case, the preferences of the lenders is only a small subset of the
preferences of all affected parties.

prevent Africa from withdrawing from the world system. "Unless
creditors want Africa to slide off the world map, they should adopt
creative reimbursement and the 3-D scenario....Everyone would
gain as, little by little, they became more prosperous and paying
customers" (George 1989, pp. 246 f.). First World lenders
presumably would prefer to keep countries of the Third World like
Africa within the world economic system as trading partners.
Third, George thinks that, in time, countries which
redeveloped in accordance with her 3-D solution (and its
supplements) would not only be more egalitarian and democratic,
they would be more economically viable, and so better trading
partners in the world economic system. If this is correct, as seems
plausible, this is another reason why First World lenders ought to
welcome George's proposal over others. Her proposal, if applied,
would turn the people of the Third World into better borrowers and
better traders, somewhere down the track.
Fourth, First World lenders ought to welcome the goodwill
that would be generated in the Third World by their preparedness
to renegotiate the repayment of debt in terms of 'creative
reimbursement'. Business typically likes and cultivates goodwill
among prospective borrowers and traders.
Fifth, First World lenders typically value the bindingness of
contracts. George's 3-D solution strikes a compromise that ought to
be congenial to them. On the one hand, through renegotiation, it
seeks to replace existing contracts for debt repayment. However, it

does not recommend that existing contracts simply be broken or
ignored.16
In

sum,

at

least

this

much

seems

plausible

about

the

attractiveness of George's solution to the lenders of money to the
Third World.

George's 3-D solution (and its supplements) should be

more welcome to many First World lenders than several of the
competing

solutions—for

even maintaining
reasonably

expect

example,

unconditional

existing IMF strategies.
at least

some

cancellation

One could

of the lenders

who

therefore
currently

favour present arrangements for debt repayment to change
preferences,

given

suitable reflection on the benefits,

or

their

including

global economic benefits, of George's proposal.

It is worth remembering that George's approach to reimbursement is very
concessional.
Many contracts entered into between the First World and the
Third World were not entered into freely and responsibly on both sides.
For
one thing, there was the coercive structural inequality between the First
World and the Third World (Wilkins 1992, p. 173). Indeed Wilkins argues that,
because of the disadvantaged position of the Third World, a model of mutually
binding contracts that were freely entered into is inappropriate in assessing
moral relations between the First World and the Third World in respect of
debt repayment (Wilkins 1992, p. 179). Second, much of the Third World debt
came about due to recklessness on behalf of both the bankers and borrowers.
See Chapter 2, T h e Causes of Third World Debt', section iv, 'The money
mongers'.
I return to these issues in Ch. 6.
Peter Bauer, on the other hand, argues that favourable treatment
towards debtors in the form of debt concessions—because of deterioration in
the external economic environment—is patronising and insubstantial.
"It is
patronising because it implies that Third World governments can be expected
to behave like children with little thought of the morrow, or pop stars who
promptly spend all they earn....[and insubstantial because]..,.exports and
export earnings of the debtors depend critically on the domestic conditions,
especially government policies" (Bauer 1990, pp. 13 f.).
In contrast to
Wilkins and George, Bauer argues that debtor counties have a moral
obligation to repay their debt.
Bauer claims that " [ f a v o u r a b l e treatment of
defaulting governments politicises life and also enables defaulters to
continue with damaging, and destructive policies" (Bauer 1990, p. 16).

Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to consider George's 3-D
solution to the Third World debt crisis in the light of Hare's theory
of distributive justice. Hare offers a moderate egalitarian theory of
substantial justice, the ultimate sanction of which is preferenceutilitarian. Arguably, George's 3-D solution is egalitarian, though it
is difficult to judge conclusively whether the solution is moderateegalitarian in principle. In any case, Hare's own moderate
egalitarianism is a relative substantial principle of justice.
Moderate egalitarianism is a substantial principle of justice for a
given society—like a Western liberal one—given all the relevant,
contingent facts, including all such facts about actual preferences.
Hare allows that, in other social groupings, preference-utility
ultimately might sanction social arrangements other than moderate
egalitarian ones.
The real issue therefore is the following. If George's
egalitarian (possibly moderate egalitarian) 3-D solution were
applied, would it best satisfy the preferences of all the parties
affected—that is, those affected both in the Third and First Worlds?
Given its egalitarian aspects, George's solution clearly would
promote the satisfaction of many important preferences of the
people of the Third World. However, it is arguable that, given its
insistence on democratic values, the 3-D solution is insensitive to
the preferences of some people in the Third World. These present
preferences for nondemocratic socio-political arrangements could
be outweighed by future preferences for democratic socio-political

arrangements and so justify the implementation of democratic
institutions. However, it cannot be glibly assumed, as George
perhaps does, that this is how all the relevant preferences would
sum up.
In relation to the First World, I have developed an argument
in two parts. First, given certain natural assumptions about
people's preferences, it is plausible to suppose that George's 3-D
solution would promote the preference satisfaction of many
ordinary people in the First World who are adversely affected by
the Third World debt crisis (those who are victims of the so called
'debt boomerang'). Second, at least some First World lenders could
be expected to come to prefer George's 3-D solution (and its
supplements), upon reflection about its benefits, including its global
economic benefits. In any event, the preferences of the lenders is
only a small subset of the preferences of all affected parties.
In sum, George's 3-D solution looks promising on several
counts as a just solution to the Third World debt crisis, from a
preference-utilitarian perspective on justice like Hare's. There is,
however, a legitimate concern about value imperialism, which is not
easily resolved.

CHAPTER 5
ONORA O'NEILL'S THEORY OF JUSTICE

In this chapter, I outline Onora O'Neill's
theory of justice.

Kantian-inspired

In Chapter 6, I assess George's 3-D solution in

relation to this theory.

O'Neill's theory (like Hare's) is applicable

internationally and interculturally, which is essential to deliberation
about just solutions to problems of Third World debt.

A further

promising feature of applying O'Neill's theory of justice to the Third
World debt crisis is that she applies her own theory to a closely
related topic, namely world hunger.

O'Neill is also of interest

because of her criticisms of utilitarianism

(especially

preference

utilitarianism).

What O'Neill Takes To Be the Virtues of a Good Moral
Theory
O'Neill
reasoning

argues

for

three

requirements

to

which

about the public domain should aspire.

requirements

(discussed

below)

can

be

ethical

Tfaese three

encapsulated

in

the

following comprehensive requirement: relevant ethical theory must
put forward principles which can be justified to relevant
with

varied moral

critical

ways

of

starting points; but it must also
reasoning

which

assist

moves

appraisals of problems faced (O'Neill 1986, pp. 49 f.).

agents

incorporate

beyond

initial

In the light of

her three requirements, O'Neill assesses consequentialism, rights
theory, and moral theory based on obligation and need (Kantian
Theory).
O'NeilFs project in her book Faces of Hunger is to articulate
the major premises (ethical principles) that apply to problems of
famine and world hunger—that is, premises or principles that meet
her three standards. She does not set out to be definitive about the
relevant minor premises (that is, all the relevant particular facts)
(O'Neill 1986, 51 f.).

CNeill's Three Standards of Good Ethical Reasoning
O'Neill's three standards relating to moral deliberation about
problems of the public domain are constraints of practicality or
action-guidingness. They are: (i) that there be an accurate,
nonidealized account of agency that allows for a plurality of agents;
(ii) that ethical reasoning be accessible but critical; and (iii) that
ethical reasoning rely on ethical principles which have considerable
power to resolve practical problems.
(i) The first standard
O'Neill's first standard requires that there be an accurate,
nonidealized account of agency, which allows for the agency of
institutions and collectives as well as the agency of individuals
(O'Neill 1986, p. 49.).

One potential problem for social ethical theory is selective
omission of many of the actual features of human reasoning and
choice (abstraction).

Another, which O'Neill takes more seriously, is

the selective addition of features (like perfect rationality) which is
inaccurate or misleading (idealization) (O'Neill 1986, pp. 29 f.).

For

O'Neill, ethical deliberation which introduces idealized conceptions
of

rationality

is inappropriate

for guiding

human

action

since

humans do not typically reason and make choices in an ideally
rational way.

Further, ethical deliberation which stems from an

account of idealized agency will not be accessible to a variety of
actual agents and so will not cross ideological and social boundaries
(O'Neill 1986, p. 31).
Ethical reasoning in the public domain must acknowledge the
variety

of

collectives,
Moreover,

agents in the audience it addresses—institutions
as well
it

must

as individuals
take

account

(O'Neill
of

the

1986,

limited

pp.

and

33 ff.).

capacities

for

understanding and action which characterise all such actual agents
(O'Neill 1986, pp. 34 ff.).

In the case of global hunger, reasoning has

to apply not only to agents but to agencies, since individual action
alone cannot solve the problem.

In some cases the practices of

institutions have a causal role in the problem (O'Neill 1986, pp. 35
ff.).

Reasoning which is individualistic does not apply to the

processes of decision-making of institutions.
A proper account of human agency should take into account
that

individuals

cognitive

have

capacities,

finite,

socially

and

ideologically

formed

and powers of action that are limited

defined by social context (O'Neill 1986, p. 35).

and

At the same time,

the ways agents and agencies differ must be taken into account.
Agencies often have greater resistance to pressure, they can often
articulate problems differently to individuals, and are more able to
assimilate information (O'Neill 1986, p. 37).

There are also some

things that individuals can do only in the context of an institution.
Individuals alone cannot "devalue a currency or irrigate a desert or
have a debate on the best criteria for a soft loan policy.

Individuals

can only take part in such activities in appropriate social contexts"
(O'Neill 1986, p. 38).
(ii) The second

standard

O'Neill's second standard requires that ethical reasoning
accessible but critical.

be

Ethical reasoning "should employ ethical and

other categories which are or can be made accessible to the agents
and agencies whose action is required, without being coopted by
whatever ethical outlook is already established" (O'Neill

1986, p.

49).
For ethical deliberation

to be action-guiding,

it must

be

accessible to its audience so that the audience can see how it is
relevant to them.

Idealized accounts of human agency are not only

inaccurate but often inaccessible to actual agents.
of

accessibility

categories

requires

that

practical

moral

that are familiar to the relevant

(O'Neill 1986, p. 28).

O'Neill's standard
reasoning

agents and

use

agencies

Accounts of agency may be inaccessible to

collectives and institutions when the reasoning is based on accounts
of

individual

agency.

Further,

for

ethical

deliberation

to

be

accessible, it must take account of the limited capacities of the

agents and agencies it addresses, such as finite rationality and finite
powers of action.
At

the

same

time,

ethical

reasoning

should

not

assume

existing frameworks which define problems and their solutions.
this way, ethical deliberation must be critical.

In

O'Neill cites a

number of criticisms of the policies of institutions such as the IMF,
the World Bank and transnational companies (O'Neill 1986, p. 36).
The

problem

in

dealing

with

development

strategies

for

such

institutions, according to O'Neill, is that their view of agency is built
around

the principles

that constitute their charter

and

mandate.

Because of this they are unable to take a critical perspective of
human

agency.

However,

inherent

dangers

of

conservatism

attach

to

the

accessibility requirement: restrictions to familiar categories may tie
ethical reasoning to local and other restricted views (O'Neill 1986,
pp. 28 & 39 f.).

In order for practical reasoning to be accessible, it

must use whatever categories (ethical or otherwise) are established
in the modes of discourse of each agent or agency; so, it must be
local, contextual and possibly sectorial (O'Neill 1986, pp. 38 ff.).
However,

by tying ethical deliberation

to local and

established

categories, there is a potential for it not to be critical of established
perceptions of problems (minor premises) and established

ethical

theories or principles (major premises) (O'Neill 1986, p. 28).
According
practical

to O'Neill,

reasoning

from

"[t]wo

becoming

steps are needed
hostage

to

to

prevent

established

and

1 O'Neill goes on to argue that moral reasoning need not be sectorial. See my
last comment, this section.

establishment

views of how

problems remedied.

situations

should be construed

First, plausible ethical principles

and

must be

identified and shown to be both able to guide action and accessible
to the relevant audiences, and yet more than projections of locally
established

categories and discourse.

descriptions

and appraisals

Secondly, the

of actual situations

particular

invoked—the minor

premises of ethical reasoning—must also be shown accessible to
whatever audiences the reasoning addresses, and yet more than the
prefered

perspectives

of

local

emphasis

original).^

vocabulary

that the relevant

understand

and

see

outlook"

(O'Neill

1986,

p.

43,

Reasoning may be accessible if it uses

as

agents and agencies

salient

and

important.

can come
Such

to

practical

reasoning—reasoning which is at once accessible and critical—is both
ethical and political

(O'Neill 1986, p. 45, emphasis original).

According to O'Neill, there is a special problem of accessibility
in the case of moral reasoning.

Moral reasoning is in various ways

disanalogous to other sorts of reasoning.

The specific social and

ideological context is usually clear in other sorts of reasoning.

Legal

reasoning takes place in the context of crimes, courts and juries,
with principles in the form of laws and rules.
and their roles are determined.

The relevant agents

Commercial reasoning takes place

in the context of opportunities to buy, sell, work and invest, with
principles such as contracts and bargaining.

The relevant agents

2 For reasoning to be practical, more than the ethical categories need to be
accessible to the agents and agencies. There is also a need for some method of
choosing which is the prefered description of a particular situation.
"An
adequate account of reasoning that can guide action must include not only
principles of action (the major premises) but an account of judgement which
explains why particular situations should be grasped under one rather than
another possible description (the minor premises)" (O'Neill 1986, p. 29).

and agencies and their roles are determined within a context. In
the case of ethical problems and their possible solutions, there is no
shared institutional or ideological context. Moral reasoning which
addresses the issues of famine and endemic hunger has to be
accessible to a variety of agents and agencies which cross
ideological and social boundaries (O'Neill 1986, p. 31).
In order adequately to address problems like famine and
world hunger, relevant ethical reasoning must be accessible to a
variety of agencies as well as agents. However, as well as being
accessible, ethical reasoning must be able to be critical of existing
construals of problems (O'Neill 1986, pp. 35 f.). So, while ethical
reasoning must be connected with the various 'moral starting
points' of the agents and agencies it addresses, "it may also
transform both the principles and the perceptions of particular
situations which constitute that starting point" (O'Neill 1986, p. 41).
What enables such communication
and transformation is that
radical conceptual incommensurability is implausible (O'Neill 1986,
pp. 41 f. & 45 ff.). That communication and transformation is
possible gives O'Neill reason to claim that ethical reasoning need not
be sectorial.
(Hi) The third standard
O'Neill's third standard requires that ethical reasoning should
operate with "ethical principles which have considerable—not
necessarily algorithmic—power to resolve dilemmas" (O'Neill 1986,
p. 49).

The issue here is action-guidingness. O'Neill puts the matter
this way: "Reasoning which is fully practical must also be able to
guide action. The underlying, major premises...must combine with
appropriate minor premises...to provide reasons for some rather
than other policies or actions to be pursued or avoided by particular
agents and agencies. Reasoning which is not in any way actionguiding just is not practical reasoning. It provides no principles by
which actual deliberation can lead to judgements about actions or
policies" (O'Neill 1986, p. 47). However, the requirement on ethical
principles (combined with relevant minor premises) that they be
action-guiding (provide reasons for action) need not amount to the
requirement that such principles provide a practical algorithm
(O'Neill 1986, p. 48).
The algorithmic nature of consequentialism is meant to make
it precise in its action-guidingness. However, in practice, due to the
incompleteness and imprecision of the available information,
consequentialism can, and often does, fail to guide action (I discuss
this in the next section). O'Neill points out that algorithms are not
needed to guide action and that a decision theory that offers a test
which indicates which actions are obligatory and which are
forbidden may be sufficiently action-guiding. O'Neill maintains that
a Kantian-inspired ethic can be action-guiding in this way. (I
discuss this in a later section.)

O'Neill on the Virtues and Vices of
In her discussion

of consequentialism,

utilitarianism—particularly
defended by Hare.

Consequentialism
O'Neill focuses on

preference-utilitarianism

of

the

sort

O'Neill maintains that utilitarianism fully meets

only her first standard of ethical reasoning and so does not fare
well as an adequate moral theory, especially for deliberating on
ethical issues such as world hunger.
(i) Virtues of

consequentialism
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One virtue is that consequentialist reasoning has obvious
to practical

"Consequentialist

issues

patterns

like famine, hunger

of

ethical

reasoning

and

poverty:

offer

evident

advantages for discussing both famine and persistent poverty and
hunger.

Since the results of whatever is done—or not done—are

evidently grave here, reasoning which centres on results seem to
the point" (O'Neill 1986, p. 52).
A second virtue of consequentialism, according to O'Neill, is
that consequentialism "is not tied to a stringent or narrow account
of agency" (O'Neill 1986, p. 53; cf. O'Neill's first
adequacy
Aspects

for a moral theory).
of

consequentialist

standard

A third virtue concerns accessibility.
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are

accessible

for

agents and social agencies (O'Neill 1986, p. 53; cf. O'Neill's
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many
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A fourth virtue of

a powerful

decision-

procedure for settling questions of what action is right to do (O'Neill

1986, p. 56; cf. O'Neill's third standard of adequacy for a moral
theory).
According to O'Neill, while these four aspects of
consequentialist reasoning at first seem promising with respect to
consequentialism's being an adequate moral theory, closer
reflection shows that in many ways consequentialism falls short of
being an adequate moral theory. The only standard of adequacy it
seems fully to meet is the first standard, the requirement of a
nonidealized account of agency which applies to individuals and
collectives.
(ii) Vices of

Consequentialism

In the abstract, consequentialist reasoning begins with the
idea that action is right if it leads to good consequences. However,
O'Neill claims that there are at least four additions which are
indispensable for consequentialist deliberation: First, some account
of what makes results good is needed. O'Neill claims that modern
consequentialists typically give an empirical but subjective account
of what makes actions good. She adds, further, that utilitarians
tend to differ on what makes the results of actions good (O'Neill,
1986, pp. 54 f.).3 Second, utilitarianism needs to be able to identify
the possible courses of action available. Third, there is a need for
enough causal knowledge, so that probable results of the available
courses of action can be known with reasonable accuracy. Fourth,
there needs to be clear account of the relationship between what is
3 It is at this point that O'Neill claims that most consequentialists are
utilitarians. In her discussion of consequentialism it seems that she usually
uses the terms consequentialist and utilitarian interchangeably.

good and what is right.

Classical utilitarians hold that whichever

action produces the best result is not only the best action but the
one that it is obligatory.

Other utilitarians, according to O'Neill,

reject such maximising principles and consider also the distribution
of good results.
cognitive
disutility

or

Other utilitarians again take account of

other
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However, what is noticeable is

diverse

conclusions

practical

issues

This can be illustrated

like

reached

when

hunger

by the divergence

and
in

the

conclusions between Singer, Hardin and Jackson.
In his article 'Famine, Affluence and Morality', Peter Singer
concludes that the rich, and even the moderately well-off, ought to
give

their

surplus

to

the

poor

until

they

have

reduced

their

standard of living to the point of marginal utility such that further
giving would sacrifice 'something of comparable moral importance'
(O'Neill 1986, p. 56).

So, according to Singer, utilitarianism demands

that the rich and the relatively well-off (which would include most
of those living in First World countries) sacrifice a sizeable portion
of their income.
Other consequentialists such as Garrett Hardin reach a very
different conclusion on the issue of Third World aid.

In his article,

'Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor', Hardin claims
that

gifts

and

consequentialist

aid

given

to

the

Third

World

grounds because they produce

are

wrong

greater harm

on
than

benefits in the long run.

In brief, Hardin claims that feeding the

poor now will result in the poor having more children; and so, in the
future, there will be further suffering in that there will be more
people to feed and eventually there will not be enough food to go
around (O'Neill 1986, pp. 58 ff.).
Tony Jackson also argues that various forms of food aid are
damaging to the recipients in the long run.

In Against

the

Grain,

Jackson argues that supplying free or subsidised food can damage
the livelihood of the local farmers.

Providing free or cheap food

results in the local farmers not being able to compete in an already
fragile economy (O'Neill 1986, pp. 61 f.).
In view of these diverse conclusions, O'Neill identifies two
central difficulties for (utilitarian) consequentialism as an
moral theory.
reckoning

applied

These difficulties concern calculating benefits and

consequences.

(a) Calculating benefits and O'Neill's third standard
In relation to calculating benefits there is, according to O'Neill,
a problem

of subjectivity.

(Non-Benthamite)

from a subjective account of value.

utilitarianism

starts

Essentially, whether a result is

a benefit or a harm depends on how it is seen by relevant subjects:
on their actual desires or preferences (O'Neill 1986, pp. 64 f.).
The problem this generates is that it leaves "judgements of
actual

benefit

impressionistic
benefit

or

and
claims

harm"

harm...large
about

(O'Neill

what
1986,

scope
others
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for

subjective
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O'Neill

and
to

charges

be
that

utilitarians have often made unwarranted assumptions about what
the poor would care about most. For example, such things as secure
food supplies, shelter, clean water, education, medical services and
other basic needs typically have been assumed to be uppermost
concerns when precise information has been unavailable. Such
assumptions, about what the poor care most about, however, have
often been made by appeal to some other outlook than that of the
poor themselves. O'Neill maintains that, if the actual preferences of
the poor were looked at closely, one might often find that land,
caste, tribe, traditional way of life and religious affiliations are
valued more or as much as material needs. Acute needs ought to
matter in utilitarian thinking only when they are perceived as
harms by the sufferers (O'Neill 1986, p. 61)A
Theoretically, (utilitarian) consequentialism looks promising
in respect of O'Neill's third standard. "As a pattern of thought,
consequentialism promises both wide scope and precise resolution
of problems." (O'Neill 1986, p. 62). However, O'Neill claims that,
because of problems associated with the nonbiased identification of
preferences, consequentialism is vulnerable, in its application, to
high inaccuracies about which acts and policies would maximise
4O'Neill identifies a number of other problems that arise from starting with a
subjective account of value. Obligations, which depend on optimal outcomes,
change because desires and preferences change. Also there is no way of
being critical of whatever desires or preferences someone has. Altruistic,
selfish and vindictive desires are to be weighed equally (O'Neill 1986, pp. 67
f.). Barbaric courses of action can only be judged wrong if there is an
alternative course of action which will lead to greater satisfaction of actual
preferences. There is also a tendency in utilitarian thinking to ignore
present preferences. This is because the scope of utilitarianism includes all
preferences, including future preferences. Future preferences include the
future preferences of those immediately affected by some course of action
and of those to be born. Given all the preferences to be weighed in
calculation, all present preferences are likely to be outweighed by future
preferences.

aggregate benefit (O'Neill 1986, p. 69). So, on O'Neill's account, one
conspicuous defect of consequentialism is that it falls short of her
third standard for a good moral theory.
(b) Reckoning the consequences and O'Neill's second standard
O'Neill thinks that utilitarian consequentialism, when applied
to problems like hunger, famine and development, cannot measure
up in relation to her second standard of accessibility with critical
power: "utilitarian ethical reasoning must either be abstract and
inaccessible—or accessible but uncritical of established and
establishment grids of categories" (O'Neill 1986, p. 78).
The problem here is another aspect of the problem of
subjectivity. Preference utilitarianism is committed to construing
benefit and harm in terms of the preferences of those affected (how
those affected see things). This commitment to the points of view
of those affected also makes such consequentialism liable to be
restricted to how those affected identify ethical problems and
reckon the consequences of alternative lines of action and policies
(O'Neill 1986, pp. 71 f.). What consequentialism needs is (i)
accurate, perspectiveless empirical and causal knowledge (supplied
by an objective social science) and (ii) such knowledge to remain
accessible to the affected parties (O'Neill 1986, pp. 72 f.). Both of
these conditions, O'Neill claims, are demanding.
Consider her second, accessibility condition.
Much
consequentialist reasoning on practical problems is conducted
within the constraints of established categories, perceptions and
values. Possible courses of action and policies are evaluated in

terms

of

how

well

they

meet

the

objectives

of

particular

institutions.
Institutions are not responsive to consequential reasoning
in general, but to consequentialist reasoning that fits their
working practices and mandate.

For example, if a

development loan is to be evaluated in consequentialist
terms it will be judged and assessed under specific
headings, to see whether this proposed use of funds is
indeed optimal (or at least better than other propsed uses)
in terms of a limited grid of categories which are embodied
in the working practices of a particular institution.

In some

cases these may be purely commercial criteria—How secure
is the loan? Will it be repaid? What rate of interest can be
negotiated? Consequentialist reasoning of this sort is
hardly to be thought of as ethical reasoning, since the
conception of benefit used is that of commercial advantage
to the loan making institution (O'Neill 1986, p. 74).

O'Neill points out that the categories used by institutions vary
and are not always restricted to considerations of profit.
however,

is
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that
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reasoning

is

Her point,

conducted

Such constraints enable some sorts of

within

considerations

rather than others to be accessible to those whose action may make
a difference.

In the process of consequentialist reasoning, policies

are made which lose focus on the central issue.

Accessible ethical

reasoning must reach actual agents whose perceptions of problems.

possibilities for action and knowledge of causes will be restricted.
So, accessible reasoning becomes tied to the status quo, and unable
to be critical (O'Neill, 1986, p. 78).
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accurate,

What is needed here is not just motivational

neutrality, but also cognitive
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Second, there is the

was conducted
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about

in a language

that

1986, pp. 84 ff.).

reasoning

unavoidably

deploys one or another specific grid of categories which is partly
alien to many agents and agencies whose action is needed" (O'Neill
1986, p. 86).
the experts.

It seems that such advice would be accessible only to
So, if expert advice aims at global generalizations, it is

accessible only to the community of experts—or, if it restricts itself
to agents' categories (as in interpretive or hermeneutic

approaches

to social inquiry), it will have only local accessibility (O'Neill 1986,
pp. 87 f.).
Third, it might be suggested that the neutral idiom of social
science could be spread, and so accessibility increased (O'Neill 1986,
p.88).

O'Neill, however, disputes that any social science currently

available in development
value

neutrality.

A

studies can lay any plausible claim to

common

example

of

this,

which

O'Neill

mentions, is the description of holdings as "property of some
landowner who rents them to his tenants" (O'Neill 1986, p. 89).
Such a description is not value-neutral, according to O'Neill, as it
invites questions in relation to fair rental prices, but suppresses the
question of whether any owner and rental relations are unjust.
"From a utilitarian perspective it cannot be an ethically neutral
matter to spread the categories and outlook of social science....Only
if utilitarian thinking could provide reasons for spreading one
rather than another group of social, and ethical categories would it
be reasonable to make utilitarian deliberation more widely
accessible by spreading a common set of categories which can then
underpin widely accessible instrumental reasoning" (O'Neill 1986, p.
91).
To sum up, utilitarianism needs both accurate,
perspectiveless, empirical and causal knowledge and accessibility of
that knowledge. Both requirements, however, are in conflict.
Accessibility of ethical reasoning seems tied to perspectivity in
ways that would render so-called neutral, expert empirical and
causal advice largely inaccessible. And, in any event, such expert
advice would not really be perspectiveless; it would be perspectival
in a way that limited its accessibility to other experts. So it seems
that utilitarian conequentialism cannot satisfy O'Neill's second
standard for a good moral theory.^
5There is another problem which afflicts utilitarian consequentialism as an
applied theory, when applied to large-scale problems. It places cognitive
demands on us in respect of comprehensive instrumental calculations which
standardly exceed what relevant information is available to us. This is
because it requires "that the benefit of all available acts and policies be
compared" (O'Neill 1986, p. 91, emphasis original).

(c) Justice
O'Neill maintains that the defects of utilitarianism spread to
its accounts of justice, since any utilitarian account of justice is
ultimately dependent on the Principle of Utility.

Utilitarians "see

the rules of justice simply as those rules of action whose breach is
likely to have the worst results" (O'Neill 1986, p. 93).

O'Neill

criticises utilitarian justice on the same grounds as she criticises
utilitarianism

more

generally.

The utilitarian

theory

of

justice

"depends on an account of social science which is either resolutely
bounded by currently established categories, so uncritical of them,
or defiantly oblivious of those categories, so inaccessible to actual
agents and agencies of social change" (O'Neill 1986, p. 95).
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6Sometimes the term 'neo-Kantianism' is used narrowly to characterise
several philosophical movements in Germany in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.
However, I use the term 'neo-Kantian' more broadly to identify
the Kantian inspired nature of O'Neill's prefered moral theory.
O'Neill claims
that her proposed theory "is mainly Kantian in origin and in aspiration" but
that it is also supplemented in some ways (O'Neill 1986, p. xiii).

(i) Neo-Kantianism

and O'Neill's first standard

According to O'Neill, a neo-Kantian approach to ethical
reasoning can accommodate agential heterogeneity. First, the
Categorical Imperative, which imposes moral obligations on agents
who are finitely rational and have limited powers of action, applies
equally well to human institutions and collectivities as to human
individuals. "Kant's theory of obligation is by definition a theory of
principles of action for beings of limited rationality. Human beings
are evidently finitely rational; but so are human institutions and
collectivities. Since Kantian obligations are supposed to guide the
action of agents with partial rather than idealized capacities to
understand and to act, they may equally serve the deliberating of
institutions and collectives with limited rationality and powers of
action. If the Categorical Imperative is relevant for partially
rational and autonomous beings, it can be made relevant for
institutional and collective as well as for individual deliberation"
(O'Neill 1986, p. 132).
Second, Kantian theory construes action as done on maxims or
principles of action, and proposes, in the Categorical Imperative,
that action be performed only on maxims that could also be adopted
by others. Maxims, O'Neill suggests, are plausibly construed, not as
introspectible, individual intentions, but as "the
fundamental
principles which guide actions, policies and practices, whether
individual, institutional or collective" (O'Neill 1986, p. 132, emphasis
original).

(ii) Neo-Kantianism and O'Neill's second standard
O'Neill's second constraint on applied ethical reasoning is that
it be accessible but retain critical power. She argues that Kantinspired ethical deliberation satisfies this constraint.
Such deliberation can avail itself of Kant's distinction between
determinant and reflective judgement. Determinant judgements
work out whether relatively abstract descriptions of situations and
principles of action would be satisfied by particular cases.
Reflective judgements determine whether or not particular cases,
seen as falling under specific descriptions, would satisfy certain
more abstract descriptions or principles (O'Neill 1986, p. 125).
According to O'Neill, reflective and determinant judging standardly
begins with locally established grids of categories. However, they
do not need to be limited by established categories. "Just as
Socrates and his friends found themselves probing and questioning
a view of justice that was established in Athens, so we can ask
whether a proposed account of what it takes to live up to some
abstract principle of justice or beneficence is adequate in a given
context, and (if it is not) can hunt for a better account" (O'Neill
1986, p. 126).
O'Neill defends Kantian ethics against the charge that it is too
abstract to be accessible and so guide action. It is true that Kantian
ethics is characterised by its commitment to the Categorical
Imperative, the 'supreme principle of practical reasoning'. But,
O'Neill argues, the Categorical Imperative is where practical
deliberation begins rather than ends. Kantian deliberation requires

as well the application and assessment of minor premises—
particular maxims of action. The selection of such maxims invokes
a critical use of local and contextual categories. This ensures the
accessibility of such maxims. "No agent or agency can use the
Categorical Imperative except by applying it to some maxim of
action. All complete Kantian deliberation requires the minor
premise of practical reasoning—the proposed maxim of action—to be
formulated, and then critically assessed in terms of the Categorical
Imperative. Agents and agencies select the minor premises of their
deliberations partly by using the grid of categories that constitutes
their local idiom and moral starting point, and partly by criticizing
that specification of problems, allocations of problems and claims
about available action in the light of wider considerations, including
ethical principles" (O'Neill 1986, p. 134).
As opposed to result-oriented thinking (such as
consequentialism) action-oriented reasoning (such as Kantian
deliberation) is considerably less demanding and so more
accessible. O'Neill claims that result-orientated thinking is either
inescapably tied to established or establishment ethical categories
or requires a value-neutral and scientific perspective which won't
be widely accessible. All that is required in action-oriented
reasoning, according to O'Neill, is "to assume that the agents and
agencies in a particular context have a 'moral starting point'—the
grid of categories of some outlook or milieu—which allows them to
raise at least some questions whose answers may provide reasons
for shifting the starting point" (O'Neill 1986, p. 127).

In sum, applied Kantian deliberation apparently meets
O'Neill's second standard of ethical reasoning. It employs ethical
and other categories which are accessible to actual agents and
agencies; at the same time, it allows agents and agencies to be
critical of their established views.
(in) Neo-Kantianism

and O'Neill's third standard

O'Neill's third constraint on applied ethical reasoning is that it
should invoke principles that have considerable power to resolve
dilemmas, without necessarily being algorithmic.
Kantian
deliberation, conducted in the light of the abstract Categorical
Imperative, seeks to identify maxims which could not be
universally shared—especially by beings of limited rationality and
powers. The fundamental requirement of any Kantian theory of
obligation is that one avoid acting on such unsharable maxims and
that one act on the converse of nonsharable ones. According to
O'Neill, nonsharable (i.e., nonuniversalizable) maxims, fall into two
main groups. There are principles which justice must reject,
including principles of coercion and principles of deceit, and
principles which our wider, imperfect obligations must reject,
including principles of disrespect, nonbeneficence and
nondevelopment.
Correspondingly, Kant divides principles of obligation into two
categories—principles for determining perfect duties and principles
for determining imperfect duties. Perfect duties are actions which
are required in order to avoid acting on fundamental principles
which are nonuniversalizable without inconsistency—and are

nonuniversalizable

on

logical

or

conceptual

grounds.7
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beings,
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claims,

there
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However, for mutually
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no

dependant

and finitely rational beings, there is a need for some respect and
help from others, and the development of some talents
1986, pp. 141 f.

(O'Neill

& pp. 159 ff.).8

Kantian-style deliberation can in principle be made relevant
to the deliberation

of actual,

non-idealized

agents

and

agencies

"provided that there are context-sensitive ways of specifying what
it takes to conform to principles such as those of noncoercion and
nondeception in the actual situations in which we find ourselves"
(O'Neill

1986, p. 138).

Kantian deliberation is not tied to any

particular institutional or ideological form of what is right for all
times

and

situations.

It

begins

by

showing

which

relatively

abstract principles cannot in principle be acted on by all and so
ought not to guide action.

It can be extended to show

which

particular acts, policies or institutions are forbidden or obligatory in
a given

situation

(O'Neill 1986, p. 136).

Though such deliberation

has considerable action-guiding power, it is not algorithmic.

For

^For discussion of why coercion and deception are nonuniversaUzable, see
O'Neill, 1986, p. 139.
8 The focus of this thesis is justice and so little attention is given here to the
moral principles which dictate our imperfect duties.
Suffice to say, Kantian
imperfect duties are selective obligations. An imperfect duty like
beneficence is, on the Kantian schema, less fundamental than justice (O'Neill
1986, pp. 160 ff.). See below for more discussion.

one, it does not rank all possible actions—it is a decision procedure
for detecting forbidden and obligatory action. Also, its deployment
in particular contexts of action calls for nonmechanical judgement
and sensitivity (O'Neill 1986, p. 136).

Noncoercion and Nondeception and the Centrality of
Material Justice
According to O'Neill, the obligations of invulnerable rational
beings would be exhausted by principles of justice. Human
vulnerability and insufficiency account for the principles of
imperfect duties. However, in the case of vulnerable, rational
beings such as human agents, even principles of justice must
centrally take account of material needs (O'Neill 1968, p. 140 f.,
emphasis original). Embodied humans have material needs which
are vulnerable to intervention and to damage. They can therefore
be coerced in ways which disembodied beings cannot.^ Embodied
human beings also have "limited, perspective knowledge—they
comprehend their world through limited grids of categories". This
contingent human condition renders them "vulnerable to many
forms of deception that would not affect ideally rational or
disembodied beings" (O'Neill 1986, pp. 140 f.). Any just global
order, according to O'Neill, must at least provide for the basic
material needs without which human beings "are overwhelmingly
vulnerable to coercion and deception" (O'Neill 1986, p. 141).
^O'Neill points out that there may be occasions when "a fundamental
commitment to noncoercion might require action which in subsidiary
respects was coercive or deceptive" (O'Neill 1986, p. 139, emphasis original;
see also p. 158).

O'Neill maintains that the moral theory that she is sponsoring
can yield detailed recommendations
that these will vary with context.

and proposals for action,

but

In general terms, justice requires

"public institutions and policies which secure freedom from deep
forms of coercion and deception" (O'Neill 1986, p. 146).lo

O'Neill

claims that there is a need for change in the present international
economic order as it is "patently an institutional structure
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fundamental coercion and deception (O'Neill 1986, p. 154).

and
avoid

O'Neill

further adds that in an unjust and needy world there is both more
opportunity and greater need for the fulfilment of imperfect duties,
such as respect and the developing of required skills and talents
(O'Neill 1986, p. 146).
Kantian ethics of the kind sponsored by O'Neill is revisionary
because it is concerned with fundamental

principles.

An action

which is in accordance with some institutional framework such as

lORlsewhere in her writings, O'Neill refers to the principles of justice as
including at least principles of nondeception and nonvictimisation.
Principles of victimisation include principles of coercion and principles of
violence.
O'Neill maintains that victimisation damages the agency of some
others (O'Neill 1992, pp. 64 ff.).

commercial bargaining might still be fundamentally
coercive.
Negotiations which adhere to principles of standard commercial
categories may still be fundamentally coercive. While such
categories might not coerce ideally rational or materially selfsufficient beings, they may be coercive when one party is
representing people whose needs are desperate. According to
O'Neill "[n]egotiators coerce unless they leave opening for others,
however desperate their actual circumstances, to refuse as well as
accept their offer" (O'Neill 1986, p. 147). When people accept the
conditions of an offer because they are too poor or vulnerable to
refuse then the offer is exploitative and c o e r c i v e . I n such cases,
there is a need for a revised 'moral starting point' which makes
noncoercion and nondeception fundamental.
While some
contemporary economic and democratic political institutions have
supposed barriers which are meant to prevent coercion and
deception, they often fall short or being geinuinely noncoercive or
nondeceptive. O'Neill maintains that "[i]f the context and the
content of individual decisions is determined by social and
economic structures which even sometimes rely on others' need in
order to secure 'consent' or 'agreement', these arrangements may be
fundamentally coercive and deceptive" (O'Neill 1986, p. 148).
O'Neill outlines what she claims to be some important features
of a just material w o r l d , First, a just economic order must provide
O'Neill claims that "justice requires that institutions, like acts, allows those
on the receiving end, even if frail and dependant, to refuse or renegotiate
any variable aspects of the roles and tasks assigned to them" (O'Neill 1992, p.
68). She adds further that more is required in order to be just to those who
are vulnerable to deception or victimization.
12O'Neill points out that principles of justice in times of abundance may
differ to principles of justice in times of scarcity.

for the production of the material goods which are needed to meet
the material needs of humans.

Secondly, sustained

production

be provided for since material needs are recurrent.

must

This means

that the means for future reproduction must be made available and
that

environmental

secure

the

damage

possibility

of

or

degradation

a just

economic

must

be

avoided

order

in

the

to

future.

Thirdly, "a just set of institutions must secure a distribution which
meets autonomy-destroying needs.

Since human beings are rarely

self-sufficient in material respects, and vary in productive capacity
and

opportunity,

a

just

distribution

is

not

likely

to

arise

spontaneously from an adequate organisation of production" (O'Neill
1986, p. 150).

O'Neill adds that ideal-typical capitalist institutions

may

criteria

fail these

distribution

will

meet

institutions

may

fail

because

they provide

needs,

and

these

criteria

that

no guarantee

ideal-typical

because

they

that

socialist

provide

no

guarantee that production will meet needs.
O'Neill claims that a Kantian conception of material justice can
be used to provide direction for the debate of international politics
and economical arrangements.

"It can offer reasons for rejecting

any account of the problems of world hunger, their allocation and
their remedy, which merely mirrors existing economic or power
relations, or which would be appropriate only for idealized agents
with limitless capacities and no unmet needs" (O'Neill 1986, p. 151).
Some

examples

of

current economic

categories

which

could

be

rejected are: transfers referred to as 'aid', which implies that the
transfer was not required by justice; and the term 'loan'
implies that the receivers may justly be required to repay

which
with

interest.

It

understood.

is

clear

that

such

matters

could

be

differently

On an intranational scale, even in capitalistic societies,

transfer payments in the form of taxation are not usually thought of
as 'aid' or as 'gifts' but rather as a form of just redistribution.
O'Neill

maintains

that

the implementation

of

international

justice affords "innumerable contexts of action" (O'Neill 1986, p.
152).

She comments that those "who contribute to economic or

social

life in

any

way

from manufacturing to education,

from

journalists to government service, or from professional service to
activity

in

the

women's

or

trade

union

movement,

have

opportunities to advocate and further conceptual, institutional and
legal

forms

that

reduce

the

power
152).

acceptance

While

of

arrangements"

(O'Neill

agencies

be able to act in more or less direct

may

1986, p.

and

unjust

such agents
ways

and
in

progressing towards global material justice, there are many indirect
ways that agents can contribute to material justice.
that

indirect

'political'

action

"by means

involvement

commitment

to

and

standards

of

education,

maintaining
of

justice

a

may

O'Neill claims

publicity,
clear

and

produce

normal
public

enormous

changes" <0'Neill 1986, p. 153) to levels of material justice.

Justice

and

Imperfect

Duties

According to O'Neill, a Kantianly just world is one which has
its economic, social and political structures based on universalizable
principles.

However, a world which was merely just would not be

sufficient for needy beings to reach their full potentiality.

Because

of their limited capacities, human beings need the help of others
and could not rationally will for principles of perfect duty only.
"Since

actual human beings

are not self-sufficient, they

(unlike

idealized rational beings) could never rationally seek a merely just
society" (O'Neill 1986, p. 159).
O'Neill maintains that under conditions
obtain

at present,

far from just,

where international

which

institutional

1986 p. 160).

supports famine relief

that

structures

"imperfect duty may be the only, if

response to human needs" (O'Neill
action

such as those

are

incomplete,

For example,

and development work

may

often be a good way to fulfil one's imperfect obligations of respect
and

beneficence,

unjust political

especially
structures.

when

needs

are

In circumstances

unmet

because

of injustice,

of

where

people are vulnerable to exploitation, coercion and deception, O'Neill
recommends

efforts

which

"aim

to

improve

literacy,

health,

farming, or other technical skills, or to foster autonomy or self-help"
(O'Neill 1986, p. 160).i3
O'Neill

emphasises

that

imperfect

duties

are

selective

obligations which are subordinate to and supplement the demands
of justice.

"Justice is the more fundamental obligation because it

O'Neill also points out that in some societies women (wives and daughters)
are especially vulnerable because they often have little control of resources
but have heavy commitments to meet others' needs.
"Where women are
isolated, secluded, bared from education or wage earning, or have access to
information only via the filter of more powerful family members, their
judgement is weakened and their independence stunted" (O'Neill 1992, pp. 70
f.). This gives reason to focus one's efforts on empowering women so that
they become less vulnerable.
l ^ o ' N e i l l comments: "Kantian imperfect duties are selective obligations. A
fundamental maxim of neglecting neither respect nor needed help, nor the
development of talents and other capacities, cannot be expressed in a policy
of meeting all needs or developing all talents
The selectivity of beneficence
and of the development of talents is unavoidable given the unlimited sorts of

concerns the framework of institutions and practices which form
the context of action and make certain problems salient,

certain

solutions possible and certain modes of thought available" (O'Neill
1986,

p.

161).

O'Neill

thinks

that

a serious

commitment

to

beneficent action requires a commitment to material justice and so
to the political change of unjust institutions.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined what O'Neill takes to be the
requirements

on ethical reasoning

about the public

domain

why she favours a revised version of Kantian moral theory.
paid

special

attention

consequentialism
Hare

endorses,

as

to what

a competing

O'Neill

sees

as the

theory—especially

preference-utilitarianism.

In

the

I have

defects
the

and

of

version

chapter

that

follows, I consider how well George's 3-D solution fares as a just
solution to the Third World debt crisis, in the light of O'Neill's
Kantian-inspired

moral

theory.

help and support that human action may need in various circumstances.
Although Kantian beneficence and development require only that agents
and agencies secure others' capacities for action, and not that they enable
them to achieve specific plans or aims, they demand more than any agent or
agency can secure for all others.
This selectivity is not ethically offensive if
imperfect obligations supplement and do not substitute for justice" (O'Neill
1986, pp. 161 f.).

CHAPTER 6
ASSESSMENT OF GEORGE'S 3-D SOLUTION IN THE LIGHT OF
O'NEILLS THEORY OF JUSTICE

In this chapter I discuss whether George's 3-D solution is a
just solution in the light of O'Neill's theory of justice.
falls into four sections.

My discussion

First, I discuss how the various features of

George's proposed solution to the Third World debt crisis aim to
meet people's material needs.
O'Neill's theory of justice.

Material needs play a central role in

Second, one of O'Neill's primary principles

of justice is the principle of noncoercion.

In this section, I explore

some significant accounts of the concept of coercion, locate these in
relation to O'Neill's few clarificatory remarks about the concept, and
discuss whether George's proposal is coercive.

Third, imperfect

duties also play an important role in O'Neill's moral theory more
generally.

In this section, I discuss whether George's proposal is

conducive to the fulfilment of one's imperfect duties, as O'Neill
conceives them.

Finally, I discuss whether the various aspects of

George's proposed 3-D solution are accessible to all affected parties,
despite being revisionary.
makes it a constraint
accessible

to

conservative.

the

It will be remembered

on applied

affected

moral

parties,

that

O'Neill

solutions that they

without

being

be

inherently

Material

Needs

O'Neill maintains that moral reasoning must take the notions
of obligation and need as central (O'Neill 1986, p. 49).

Justice,

according to O'Neill, requires that policies and institutions neither
coerce

nor

deceive

in

fundamental

ways.

Human

beings

especially vulnerable to deception and coercion if their
needs are not met.

are

material

"The details of human justice must take account

of the most basic needs that must be met if other human beings are
not to be fundamentally deceived or coerced.

Any just global order

must at least meet standards of material justice and provide for the
basic

material

needs

in

whose

absence

all

human

beings

are

overwhelmingly vulnerable to coercion and deception (O'Neill 1986,
p. 141).1

O'Neill maintains further that a just economic order must

provide for the production of goods, the sustained production of
goods, and the distribution of the goods, in a way which meets those
needs

required

Autonomous

human

certain needs.
human

for

autonomy
action

(O'Neill

is dependent

1986,
on the

pp.

149

ff.).^

satisfaction

of

When these needs are not met or are insecure,

autonomy

is

threatened

and

people

are

vulnerable

to

deception and coercion.
O'Neill's moral theory contrasts with other moral

theories,

such as utilitarianism, where actions are judged in terms of results
produced.

O'Neill's theory is also not rights-based.

O'Neill claims

1 O'Neill points out that in circumstances of global scarcity it would not be
possible to meet all material needs (O'Neill 1986, p. 149).
2See my Ch. 5, the section 'Noncoercion and Nondeception and the Centrality
of Material Justice'.

that rights-based

theories avoid

the question of agency.^

Rather,

O'Neill's moral theory is an obligation-based theory, which makes
"human autonomy (in its actual, partial forms) and human needs (in
their actual pressing variety) central, and that provides an account
both

of justice and

of beneficence" (O'Neill 1986, p. 142, emphasis

original).
In assessing whether or not George's proposed solution to the
Third World debt crisis is just on O'Neill's account of justice, it is
important to see whether or not the 3-D solution includes in its
aims at least the meeting of people's basic material needs.4 It is
clear

that George's proposed

central

aims.

According

solution

to George,

does have this among
her

3-D solution

its

requires

governments of Third World countries to "direct economic activity
away

from international

markets and towards the satisfaction of

their own people's real needs"

(George

1989, p. 245).

George

maintains that "[a] more, inner-directed economy would mean (for
the

least

agricultural

developed

countries

of

Africa in particular)

a

strong

sector as the basis for growth, providing both food

crops and renewable sources of energy.

The cornerstones of social

policy would become primary health care, literacy, education
the empowering of women; all investments in the future.

and

Available

foreign exchange would be used to acquire capital goods and basic
equipment—not

to pay for debt service, arms or prestige

(George 1989, p. 245).

items"

In the sections (i)-(iv) below, I indicate the

3 See my Ch. 1, the section 'Rights', the subsection '(Hi) Disadvantages
of
appeal to rights'.
4Of course, this is only a necessary condition for meeting O'Neill's standards
of justice.

ways in which George's proposed solution to the Third World debt
crisis seeks to meet people's basic material needs.
(i) Reimbursement

in cash

As part of her 3-D solution, George proposes that each debtor
government
fund.
be

make regular

into a national

development

Unlike present arrangements under the IMF, the fund would

co-managed

society.
sector

payments

with

authentic

representatives

from

the

civil

This is meant to include representatives from the rural
in

proportion

representation

in

to

her

their

numbers.

proposal

because,

George
she

includes

maintains,

under

present arrangements the basic needs of people from rural
are typically neglected.

rural

areas

By being forced into the production of cash

crops, for example, which are replacing traditional and more varied
crops,

rural

people

are missing

out on their

nutritional

needs.

Further, since the money they receive for their production of the
crops is often low, and the prices for commodities that need to be
imported often increase, it is also difficult for them to meet their
other basic material needs.
Another important feature included in George's 3-D solution is
that women, ethnic minorities and rural people are given fairer
representation.

Representation of women is important in meeting

basic needs, especially in poor economic conditions, since women
are often given the role and responsibility
needs

of other dependants.

of providing for the

In many cases, especially

in

poor

economies, decision-making is often left in the hands of males, both
at a grass roots level and at an executive level.

According to O'Neill,

women are often relegated to, and subordinated within, a domestic
sphere.

"They are impoverished but often providers.

They

are

powerless, yet others who are yet more vulnerable depend on them
for protection" (O'Neill 1992, p. 51).
impoverished

women

and

their

To meet the basic needs of

dependants,

representation

in

a

way prescribed by George is much more favourable than present
arrangements.

In some cases, ethnic minorities and rural people

are also marginalised since they can lack the opportunities to gain
access to the political system.

In many cases, those who are best

able to identify the basic needs of a particular group are likely to be
the members of the group.5 So, representation of women,

ethnic

minorities and rural people, as prescribed by George, is likely to be
important in meeting people's basic needs.

George's proposal then

includes a shift from decision-making by the power elites to a more
broadly based executive.
making

of

the broadly

Government participation in the decisionbased

development

fund is included

George's proposal primarily to supply its own technical

in

expertise.

With an emphasis on agriculture, renewable energy

sources,

health care, literacy and education as part of the 3-D solution,
people's needs are more likely to be met under that solution than
under
market

present

arrangements,

economy.

This

is

which

focus

so for present

on

an

needs

international
and

also

for

foreseeable future needs, which rely on energy sources not being
depleted and on education, which in various ways can lead to a

^While many basic needs, such as food, water and adequate medical care, are
fixed, some basic needs are tied to particular cultures.
For example, within
Australian Aboriginal culture, the need for traditional land is a basic need
because there are such strong spiritual associations with the land.
'Outsiders'
are not likely to identify these culturally relative basic needs.

better understanding of problems faced and their possible solutions.
Education also empowers people as it opens up more positions that
would otherwise be left to the privileged few.
(ii) Reimbursement

in kind

The aim of reimbursement in kind is to give recognition to,
and remuneration for, past and future contributions of indigenous
peoples to natural, material and cultural treasures, which are part
of our common heritage.

While not all the proposed

initiatives

George promotes here relate directly to the meeting of

people's

basic material needs, there are some that do, and the remuneration
she has in mind for those working on such programs would also
assist in meeting people's basic needs.

As part of this initiative,

ecological

conservation

play

especially

as

destroyed
ecological

the

under

natural

present

conservation

present and future
(Hi) Latin American

and

renewal

environment^

arrangements.
and

renewal

an
is

As
are

important

being

irrevocably

mentioned

important

role,

in

earlier,
meeting

needs.
auxiliary

measures

The first of George's proposed strategies, relating to Latin
American debt, is to restrict purchases of foreign goods to those
which are vital to development, such as fertilizers, food stuffs and
machinery.

Such a strategy is very much in line with the centrality

that O'Neill attaches to meeting people's basic needs.

First, it shifts

the priorities within Latin American countries from the purchasing
6By 'natural environment' I simply mean that which "includes everything
except man and what obviously bears the mark of man's handiwork"
(Passmore 1974, p. 5).

of prestigious products to purchasing products that are likely to
meet people's basic needs in the Third World.

Second, the money

generated in the First World is likely to benefit industrial suppliers
and

farmers

markets

there

who,

because

to the Third World.

of

the

debt

crisis,

have

lost

This would be of some help to

ordinary people in the First World whose basic needs are also going
unmet because they have become unemployed with markets lost to
the Third World (George 1989, p. 256).
George's second and third proposed auxiliary strategies are to
increase

commodity

prices

and

to

return

flight

capital.

By

increasing commodity prices, there would be more opportunity for
ordinary workers to receive higher pay which would then assist in
making

more

affordable that

material needs.
reduce

the

countries.

which

is required

to

meet

basic

Both these auxiliary strategies would, in effect,

amount

of

money

which

leaves

Latin

American

This would free up governmental funds which could be

used on such things as schooling and medical assistance (which the
IMF often target with their adjustment programs).
(iv)

Environmentalism
O'Neill maintains that sustained

for, since material needs are recurrent.
of

future

production

environmental

must

be

production must be provided
This means that the means
made

available

and

that

damage or degradation must be avoided to secure

the possibility of a just economic order in the future.

George's

proposed

on

3-D

solution

would

measure

up

favourably

this

requirement of O'Neill's, since George also emphasises the need for
'sustainable' production (O'Neill 1986, p. 149 f.).
As I indicated in Chapter 2, George illustrates how
World

debt

contributes

to global

environmental

Third

destruction.^ As

part of her 3-D solution, particularly in relation to reimbursement
in kind, George prescribes that the debt crisis be used to curb
environmental

destruction.

First, George recommends the "collection, conservation
reproduction

of

genetic

species

and

varieties

(both

animal

and
and

vegetable)" (George 1989, p. 250).

Such an initiative would assist in

the

of

maintenance

of

bio-diversity

important to ecological sustainability.

the

environment,

which

is

Furthermore, many botanic

species, not yet explored, may hold keys in the future for meeting
medical needs.

George maintains that "[t]ropical forests are the

great unexplored botanic frontiers: we simply have no idea what
future foods and medicines they may contain" (George 1992, p. 22).
Second, remuneration for soil conservation

and

anti-erosion

measures, which is part of George's proposal, is important since it
allows people to work towards the sustainable production of crops.
Under present arrangements, where there is a need to earn export
dollars, agricultural techniques are geared towards short term gains
which often irrevocably destroy fertile soils.

Deforestation

also

plays a devastating role in the destruction of fertile soils, often
converting bio-rich forests into deserts.

7See also George 1992, Ch. 1.

Third, George emphasises the need for reforestation, which is
important

in

diversity.

meeting

future

needs

as

it

helps

maintain

bio-

Reforestation also plays an important role in recyling

greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, which could
produce

global

warming,

an

outcome

which

otherwise

"would

place

unprecedented stresses on natural and social systems, precipitating
major dislocations of agriculture, industry, and coastal areas while
posing grave threats to species survival, human health, geographical
stability, and so on" (George 1992, p. 6).
Fourth, George proposes that people in the Third World be
remunerated

for the

"development

of new bio-mass

sources

for

energy purposes as an alternative to wood and charcoal...and as an
alternative source of income for poor people" (George 1989, p. 250).
Not only would this measure assist in meeting the needs of the poor
directly by giving them access to affordable fuel, but it could allow
for the regeneration of fuels.

Such alternative energy sources could

be sustained for future generations and these initiatives could be
conducive to a reduction in the rate of deforestation.
alternative

to bio-mass

energy

Another

sources has been nuclear

power.

Not only does nuclear power production come with the risk of
nuclear

disasters,^ it is not sustainable as it produces an increasing

amount of toxic nuclear waste that cannot be stored safely.
Fifth,
improvement

George's
of

proposal

wells

(George 1989, p. 250).

and

includes
small-scale

the

"development

irrigation

and

techniques"

Such initiatives assist in meeting people's

8One well-pubhcised nuclear disaster is the Chernobyl disaster,
radioactive contamination in a number of countries in Europe.

which

caused

present needs by supplying them with clean water and allowing for
the production of water to satisfy future needs. Small-scale
irrigation normally comes at a lower environmental cost than largescale irrigation. Indeed, in a recent visit to Australia, George
criticised the large-scale irrigation and hydro-electric project
proposed by the IMF in India.9 Not only are large-scale irrigation
projects environmentally detrimental, they are costly and can put
Third World countries further into debt.
In general, a primary focus of George's 3-D proposal is that
the Third World move away from an export-oriented economy
which imitates the West to one that has sustained production.
Coercion (and Deception)
So far I have been tracing the way in which George's 3-D
solution gives a primary place to meeting people's basic material
needs and thus accords with a central element in O'Neill's theory of
social justice. In this section, I continue to examine whether
George's proposed solution to the Third World debt crisis is just by
O'Neill's standards.
Two main features of O'Neill's theory of justice are that
principles on which people act ought not to be deceptive or
coercive. There is no good reason to think that George's proposal
9In 1994 George conducted a seminar as
UNSW, where she criticised the project.
on the matter in a subsequent interview
ABC television. Her criticisms included
the environmental impact.

part
She
with
both

of the Green Left Conference at
also made some critical remarks
Kerry O'Brien on Late Line,
the displacement of people and

relies on principles of deception.
is less

easily

proposal

dismissed.

as coercive.

The charge of coercion, however,

George

apparently

does

not

see

She maintains that "[g]overnments

however, have a choice.

Those refusing democratic

her

would,

development

could continue to service their debt in hard currency" (George 1989,
p. 247).

However, there is some reason to think that aspects of

George's proposal are coercive; and I discuss these below.
Even though the concept of coercion plays a central role in her
theory of justice, O'Neill does not give a full account of what she
takes coercion to be.

So it is difficult to make a safe assessment of

whether O'Neill would see George's proposal as coercive.

What I

propose to do is to look at several important pholosophical accounts
of coercion in order to assess whether George's proposal could count
as coercive.

First, I will examine George's proposal in the light of

Nozick's account of coercion.

Nozick's account is the point of

departure for much contemporary discussion of that notion.
then

examine

George's

proposal

in the light

I will

of an account

of

coercion provided by one of Nozick's chief critics, Harry Frankfurt.
Like

Nozick

and

others,
of

Frankfurt
choice

action;

but

that

coercion

compromises

freedom

commentators,

he thinks that the compromise must be total

that coercion entails compulsion.

or

maintains

unlike

most
and

Third, I shall assemble the few

clarificatory remarks O'Neill does make about coercion and locate
these in relation to Nozick, Frankfurt, and some other commentators
on coercion. I shall then assess George's proposal in the light of
central

ideas

about

coercion

which

emerge

from

this

process.

Among the other commentators on coercion whom I shall consider,
O'Neill's account is perhaps closest to that of Virginia Held.
(i) Nozick's

In

account

his

of

article,

coercion

'Coercion',

Nozick

sets

out

the

following

necessary and sufficient conditions for 'core' or 'central' cases of
coercion.
P coerces Q into not doing A if and only if:
(1) P threatens to bring about or have brought about some
consequence if Q does A (and knows he's threatening to do
this).
(2) A with this threatened consequence is rendered
substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for Q than A
was without the threatened

consequence.

(3) Part of P's reason for deciding to bring about the
consequence or have it brought about, if Q does A, is that P
believes this consequence worsens Q's alternative of doing A
(i.e.

that P believes that this consequence worsens Q's

alternative of doing A, or that Q would believe it does).
(4) Q does not do A.
(5) Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid (or lessen
the likelihood of) the consequence which P has threatened to
bring about or have brought about.

(6) Q knows that P has threatened to do the something
mentioned in (1), if he, Q, does A.
(7) Q believes that, and P believes that Q believes that, P's
threatened consequence would leave Q worse off, having
done A, than if Q didn't do A and P didn't bring about the
consequence (Nozick 1969, pp. 141 ff.).
In this account of the conditions of coercion, the concept of
threat

plays a central role.

Nozick distinguishes between threats

and offers and illustrates the role threats play in coercion by means
of the following examples:
(a) P is Q's usual supplier of drugs, and today when he
comes to Q he says that he will not sell them to Q, as he
normally does, for $20, but rather will give them to Q if and
only if Q beats up a certain person.
(b) P is a stranger who has been observing Q, and knows that
Q is a drug addict.

Both know that Q's usual supplier of

drugs was arrested this morning and that P had nothing to
do with his arrest.

P approaches Q and says that he will give

Q drugs if and only if Q beats up a certain person (Nozick
1969, p. 447).
The

two

cases

illustrate

between threats and offers.

a principle

This threat versus

about

the

difference

offer principle is:

(TOP) If P intentionally changes the consequences of two actions
A1 and A2 available to Q so as to lessen the desirability of
the consequences of Al, and so as to increase the

desirability of the consequences of A2, and part of P's
reason for acting as he does is to lessen and increase the
desireabilities of the respective consequences then
(a) This resultant change predominantly involves a threat to
Q if he does A1 if Q prefers doing the old A1 (without the
worsened consequences) to doing the new A2 (with the
improved

consequences).

(b) This resultant change predominantly involves an offer to
Q to do A2 if Q prefers doing the new A2 (with the improved
consequences) to the old A1 (without the worsened
consequences) (Nozick 1969, p. 449).
According

to

Nozick,

the

difference between

threats

and

offers, as set out in this principle, explains why threats rather than
offers are central to coercion.

When P threatens Q, Q is normally

unwilling that the change be made.

By contrast when P makes Q an

offer, Q is normally willing that the change be made (Nozick 1969,
p. 449).

Nozick maintains that it is in terms of such willingness or

unwillingness

to make

the change

that

one

can

elucidate

how

threats rather than offers normally compromise freedom of choice
or action.

Normally, when Q does A because of a threat by P, Q

l^Nozick tries to elucidate his claim in terms of the normal dispositions of a
partially described person—The Rational Man.
Nozick calls the situation
before a threat or offer is made, the prethreat or preoffer situation.
He calls
the situation after the threat or offer is made, the threat situation or the
offer situation.
Then he compares these choices:
(1) To move from the preoffer to the offer situation, and to do A in the offer
situation;
(2) To move from the prethreat to the threat situation, and to do A in the
threat
situation.
The Rational Man is normally willing to make both choices in (1), whereas
he would not be willing to make both choices in (2) (Nozick, 1969, pp. 461 f.).

(because he acts unwillingly) is subject to P's will—Q's action is not
fully voluntary.

By contrast, normally, when Q does A because of

an offer from P, Q (because he acts willingly) is not subject to P's
will—Q's action is fully voluntary (Nozick 1969, p. 459).
Nozick maintains that, whether a change is a threat or an offer
depends on how it affects the normal or expected course of events.
According to Nozick, it can be unclear whether a change is a threat
or an offer because it can be unclear what the normal and expected
course

of events is (Nozick

1969, pp. 449 ff.).

following example of such a case.

Consider

the

Suppose that it is in P's power to

save some promise keeping villain Q from drowning,^ and P knows
that Q will go on to do monstrous things if rescued.

Nonetheless P

says to Q '"I will take you in my boat and bring you to shore if and
only if you first promise to pay me $10,000 within three days of
reaching shore with my aid'" (Nozick 1969, p. 449).^^

In this case it

is not clear what P is morally expected to do and so it is not clear
whether P is making Q an offer or a threat.
Although, he maintains that threats are necessary for 'core'
coercion, Nozick allows that some offers may be coercive.

Nozick

considers the following example: "Suppose that P knows that Q has
committed a murder which the police are investigating, and knows
of evidence sufficient to convict Q of this murder.

P says to Q, 'If

you give me $10,000 I will not turn over the information I have to

11 For the sake of the example, we need to suppose that Q is a villain who
would go on to do monstrous things if rescued but that this villain has one
redeming feature, that he always keeps his promises, and P knows about this
only redeming feature of Q.
l^This example is an adaptation of an example given by Nozick. See Nozick
1969, pp. 449 f..

the police'" (Nozick 1969, pp. 452 f.).

Nozick argues that this is an

example of an offer since in the normal and expected course of
events,

the

information

about

Q is turned

over

to the

police.

Nonetheless, Nozick is inclined to view this offer as coercive.
(ii) Nozick's account of coercion and George's 3-D solution
George's 3-D proposal consists of giving people an option of
either complying with the measures of the IMF strategy or engaging
in

such

kind,

strategies

as reimbursement

and the supplementary

in

proposals.

cash,

reimbursement

Does George's

in

proposal

count, by Nozick's reckoning, as a coercive threat—or even coercive
offer—to any of the affected interest groups in either the Third or
First Worlds?
Ordinary people in the Third World.

George's proposal

might

be viewed as a coercive threat (or even a coercive offer) on Nozick's
account.

Consider the following example from Nozick's discussion.

"Suppose that usually a slave owner beats his slave each morning,
for no reason connected with the slave's behaviour.

Today he says

to his slave, 'Tomorrow I will not beat you if and only if you now do
A'" (Nozick 1969, p. 450).

Nozick counts the proposal of the slave

owner here as a threat because the normal and expected course of
events, which is included as an option in the proposal, is worse than
the morally expected course of events,

and he clearly counts the

Nozick concedes that it is an issue whether the example is a threat or an
offer. He claims that "[o]ne is tempted to view this as a threat, and one is also
tempted to view this as an offer.
I attribute these conflicting temptations to
the divergence between the normal course of events, in which the slave is
beaten each morning, and the (morally) expected course of events, in which
he is not. And I suggest that we have here a situation of a threat, and that
here the morally expected course of events takes precedence over the normal

slave owner's threat as coercive because the slave himself

would

prefer the morally expected to the normal course of events (Nozick
1969, pp. 450 f., cf. 448 f.; 459 ff.).!^
proposal.

Consider, now,

George's

This arguably can be cast as a conditional of the form, 'If

you don't comply with the 3-D solution then repay the debt in hard
currency under the IMF strategies'.

In the case of ordinary people

in the Third World, the normal and expected course of events under
the

IMF

strategies,

proposal,

seems

events.

which

worse

Considered

is included

than
in

the
this

as an option

morally
light,

in

expected

George's

George's

course

proposal

of

looks

coercively threatening, in Nozick's terms.
The power

elites.

On George's account, the power elites (in

both the Third World and the First World) may be reluctant to take
up the initiatives of George's 3-D solution.
to gain from the status
cooperate,

George

individuals,

both

power

elites

In cases where the power elites do not

proposes
externally

particular countries.
threatening

quo.

that
and

pressure
by

be

the people

placed

on

from within

such
the

It is very likely that such pressure would be

and coercive,
because

After all, they have a lot

were

in Nozick's terms.
they

First, it threatens the

not to comply

(in the face of

pressure from both within and without), they would lose out very
badly, with respect to the normal (and perhaps even the

morally

course of events in assessing whether we have a threat or an offer" (Nozick
1969, p. 450).
14in case one counts the slave owner's proposal as an offer, Nozick
apparently would count it as a coercive offer (Nozick 1969, p. 452).
l a u n d e r the IMF strategies ordinary people in the Third Word often suffer
from undernourishment due to lack of food, have high mortality rates among
infants, have low life-expectancies and endure widespread suffering
brought about by poverty. See my Ch. 2, fn.4, and the section T h e IMF
Suluiipn to Third World Debt'.
The morally expected course of events would
include atleast enough food for substantial nourishment.

expected) course of events.

Second, it is coercive because the power

elites would prefer the normal course of events, and not to move
from

the

prethreat

noteworthy

to

that this

the

threat

situation,

situation—coercively

However,

threatening

elites—may still be just on O'Neill's theory of justice.

the

it

is

power

For O'Neill,

cases of coercion may be just if they spring from some principle of
noncoercion.
commitment

O'Neill maintains that "[s]ometimes a
to

noncoercion

might

require

action

subsidiary respects was coercive or deceptive" (O'Neill
139).

fundamental
which

in

1986, p.

Furthermore, "in harsh circumstances lesser coercion might

be the only way to avoid fundamental coercion" (O'Neill 1986, p.
158).

A paradigm example of this would be coercing Hitler into not

coercing

the

coercive

in relation

fundamentally

Jews.i'^

So, even if George's proposal counted as
to the affected power elites, it would

be

noncoercive and so arguably just for O'Neill (in case

she conceded Nozick's account of coercion).
Ordinary people in the First World.
ordinary people in the First World.
be

countermanding

countries.

the money

George's proposal affects

First World institutions would

owed

to them

by Third

World

The money that ordinary people in the First World paid

1 6 c f . fn. 10, this chapter.
l^This distinction between fundamental
and subsidiary
coercion may be
understood in terms of means and ends.
A coercive policy may not count as
unjust, on O'Neill's theory, if it conduces to noncoercion.
In the case of
Hitler, who was causally responsible for the monstrous coercion of the Jews,
a fundamental commitment to noncoercion could require some instrumental
coercion.
Similarly, a fundamental
commitment to noncoercion could
require some instrumental coercion, in the case of the power elites.
Ordinary people in the Third World are typically in a position where their
basic needs are not met, which makes them vulnerable to coercion.
In this
case, a fundamental
commitment to noncoercion would favour principles
which ultimately aimed at meeting ordinary people's needs and would be
compatible with coercion of the power elites which conduced to this end.

in the form of taxes which went to the World Bank and the IMF,
and that they invested in banks which loaned money to the Third
World, would no longer be called on.i^

As George remarks. First

World "taxpayers will, one way or another, ultimately foot the bill
of official debt reduction" (O'Neill 1992, p. 63).
under

George's

proposal,

the money

were

otherwise

spending

on debt repayments

purchase

basic

pharmaceuticals,

imports
machine

such
tools,

On the other hand,

that Third

as
spare

World

would

"fertilizer,
parts,

countries

be used

foodstuffs,

transportation

communications equipment, etc." (George 1989, p. 256).

to

and

This would

mean more jobs for ordinary people in the First World.

George

maintains that "[b]ecause of debt, farming and manufacturing have
lost significant markets, just as those employed in these

sectors

have lost their jobs by the hundreds and thousands" (George 1992,
p. 93).i9
According

to

the

scenario

created

by

George,

ordinary

workers in the First World would have more to gain than to lose
from the implementation
money which returns

of her

3-D proposal.

Given

that

the

to the First World would be spread between

Northern industrial suppliers, farmers and the like, ordinary people
in the First World are likely to reap the benefits from maintaining

l ^ T h e point here is difficult to track and is contentious. Do ordinary
people in
the First World gain anything from the status quo?
Even if there are some
benefits f r o m their governments lending money to Third World countries,
and from the banks in which they have invested having as an asset the debt
owed to them by the Third World, the overall effect of the debt crisis is to
their detriment.
I have given a more detailed account of how George sees the
debt crisis as being to the disadvantage of ordinary people in the First World
in Ch. 2, in the section 'Why Third World Debt is Such a Problem'. See also
George 1992, pp. 63 ff..
Again, George gives more detail as to how people in the First World are
losing out because of the debt crisis in The Debt
Boomerang.

jobs that are being lost under current arrangements (George 1989,
p. 256; 1992, Ch. 4).

There does not seem to be anything significant

that ordinary workers in the First World would miss out on that
they would receive in the normal or morally expected course of
events.

So, there does not seem to be any reason, on Nozick's

account of coercion, to think that ordinary workers in the First
World would be coerced, by threat or offer, into the 3-D solution.
Rather, that solution seems to be simply an attractive offer to this
interested

group.

To sum up.

In terms of Nozick's account of coercion, the

assessment of George's 3-D solution—given the avoidance of coercion
and

the

promotion

somewhat mixed.

of

noncoercion

as principles

of

justice—is

Her proposal can be seen as involving a coercive

threat (or perhaps even a coercive offer) to ordinary people in the
Third World.

Further, her proposal very likely does involve a

coercive threat to the power elites in both the First and Third
Worlds.

However, from O'Neill's point of view, even if George's

proposal is coercively threatening in certain aspects, it will not
count as unjust if it is fundamentally noncoercive.
even count as just.

Indeed, it may

Finally, in the case of ordinary people in the

First World, George's 3-D solution is an attractive offer and not
coercive.
The

above

assessment

of

Nozick's conception of coercion.
coercion has its critics.

George's

3-D

solution

utilises

However, Nozick's conception of

One important critic is Harry G.

Frankfurt.^o

20For Frankfurt's critical discussion of Nozick on threats, offers and
coercion, see Frankfurt 1973, pp. 67 ff..

(ni) Frankfurt

on coercion

Frankfurt ties the notion of coercion to that of compulsion.
person who is coerced is compelled
choice

to do what he does.

but to do it" (Frankfurt 1973, p. 75).

"A

He has no

Frankfurt takes

coercion to imply compulsion because he takes coercion to imply
freedom from moral responsibility.

Frankfurt's account of coercion

is unusual in the way it ties coercion to compulsion.
According to Frankfurt's account of coercion, both offers and
threats can be coercive.

An offer is coercive "when the person who

receives it is moved into compliance by a desire which is not only
irresistible but which he would overcome if he could" (Frankfurt
1973, p. 80).

In such a case, the person's will is overcome by a

desire he wants not to have: "[h]e acts under a compulsion which
violates his own desires" (Frankfurt 1973, p. 81).
For Frankfurt, a threat

is coercive when the victim is moved

against his will to comply with the threat by an irresistible desire to
avoid

what is being threatened.

"A coercive threat, like a coercive

offer, is only coercive because it also violates its victim's autonomy"
(Frankfurt 1973, p. 81).

When one is coerced by a threat, one's

motive to comply with the threat is to prevent one's condition from
worsening. By contrast, when one is coerced by an offer, one's
motive to comply is to improve one's condition.
(iv) Frankfurt's

account of coercion and George's

proposal

On Frankfurt's account of coercion, there is no good reason for
thinking that ordinary people in the Third World or ordinary people

in the First World would be coerced into complying with George's
proposal. George assumes that people have the open choice of
participating in the programs set out in the 3-D solution or opting
out and complying with the status quo (such as the IMF strategies);
and it is just psychologically unrealistic to suppose either that any
benefits on offer, in relation to the choice of whether to participate
in the 3-D solution, are psychologically irresistible for ordinary
people or that any penalties threatened in relation to this choice are
such that the desire to avoid them is psychologically irresistible
among ordinary folk.
Could it be argued that a coercive threat is being placed on
the power elites who have an interest in maintaining the status
quol The will of the (reluctant) power elites would indeed be
subjected, in some degree, to the will of those who implemented the
strategies of the 3-D solution. George's proposal includes placing
pressure on the power elites of the First World and the Third World
to change their ways. It is unlikely, however, that this pressure,
which presumably would amount at least to duress, would also
count as coercion in Frankfurt's terms—in most cases, at any rate.
Indeed, such pressure, even if compelling, might well be just, on
O'Neill's theory of justice, because it would spring from a
commitment to fundamental noncoercion.
(v) O'Neill's conception of coercion
O'Neill herself is not very forthcoming about how she
understands the concept of coercion. In discussing why coercion is
forbidden, O'Neill claims that coercion "pre-empts others' action; it

treats others as things or tools and exacts their compliance....The
victims are not genuinely treated as agents, who would be able to
consent to or to refuse the other's action" (O'Neill 1986, p. 139).

So,

central to O'Neill's conception of coercion is the idea that coercion
radically undermines—even precludes—autonomous

agency.

Further, it is clear that O'Neill thinks that offers can be
coercive.

She maintains that "[njegotiators coerce unless they leave

opening for others, however desperate their actual

circumstances,

to refuse as well as to accept their offer" (O'Neill 1986, p. 147).
Needy beings may accept an offer that a self-sufficient and ideally
rational agent would not.

On O'Neill's view, bargainers who exploit

this by making the needy an 'offer they could not refuse' are acting
on a principle of coercion.
secure

'consent'

Relying on "others' need in order to

or 'agreement'...may

be fundamentally

coercive"

(O'Neill 1986, p. 148).
For

O'Neill,

actual

context—especially

in

relation

to

vulnerability—is important in determining whether some action (or
proposal) counts as coercive.

O'Neill maintains that "[t]he most

significant features of actual situations that must be taken

into

account in judgements of justice are the security or vulnerability
that allow actual others to dissent from and to seek change in
variable aspects of the arrangements which structure their lives"
(O'Neill 1992, p. 73).

So, in making any judgement on whether a

proposal counts as unjust because it is coercive, the vulnerability of
the recipient plays an important role.

The more vulnerable a

person is, the more care is needed in making a proposal that does
not coerce.

This is why O'Neill maintains

that when judging

proposals

"/i

vulnerable...

.[M]ore

than

they

when

demands

more,

not

less,

to

he just

to

the

will be demanded when others are vulnerable

are

secure

and

most

when

they

are

most

allows

that

vulnerable" (O'Neill 1992, p. 69, emphasis original).
It is
physical

also

noteworthy

circumstances

discussion

of just

widespread

that

O'Neill

apparently

can be coercive.

population

destitution

and

control
hunger

For example,

measures,
as

she

in

speaks

fundamentally

her
of

coercive

(O'Neill 1986, p. 158).
Finally,

as indicated

earlier, in discussing whether or not

George's 3-D solution counts as just on O'Neill's theory of justice, it is
important
coercive.
respect

to

assess

whether

that

proposal

is

fundamentally

For O'Neill, something may be coercive in some subsidiary
and

yet

fundamentally

be

consistent

with

justice

because

it

is

noncoercive.21

(vi) O'Neill, Nozick and Frankfurt
How close to O'Neill's conception of coercion are Nozick's and
Frankfurt's? Nozick's example of a putative non-coercive offer (by
the stranger to the drug addict) is likely to count as coercive on
O'Neill's theory.

Offering to give drugs to a drug addict, on the

condition that they beat up a certain person, exploits the addict's
impaired capacity to resist.
human

vulnerability

21 See my Ch. 5, fn. 9.

in

this

It seems that taking advantage of
way

would

count

as coercive

for

O'Neill.22

It seems irrelevant for her whether the example involves

a threat or an offer.
Frankfurt's account of coercion seems far too restrictive, by
O'Neill's lights.

O'Neill argues that coercion impairs autonomy—even

to the point of compulsion—but she does not require that autonomy
be impaired to the point of an inability to resist for there to be
coercion.23
(vii) O'Neill and some other conceptions of coercion
Gert.

Frankfurt treats coerced action as

compelled action.

(psychologically)

By contrast, Bernard Gert argues, in "Coercion and

Freedom", that a necessary condition for coercion is that the agent's
actions are voluntary.

Gert maintains that "only someone with the

ability to will can act freely or can act under coercion, that is only
voluntary actions are done freely or under coercion" (Gert 1972, p.
32).24
evil.

Gert maintains that all coercion involves a threat

of some

He distinguishes between a wide and a narrow

sense of

22Even Nozick, who thinks that the drug offerer does not coerce because he
does not threaten, concedes that, "the fact that P did not coerce Q into beating
up the person does not mean that it would not be true for Q to say, in some
legitimate sense of the phrase: 'I had no choice'" (Nozick 1969, p. 448).
231 take it that, when she speaks of making offers to the needy that they
'could not refuse', she mostly means that they could not reasonably be
expected to refuse.
J. McCloskey also emphasises that the coerced person acts. One thing
that is essential here is agency.
"The person who is subject to force, the
physical force of another, or to natural forces, has things happen to him"
(McCloskey 1980, p. 336). On this view, the person who is physically forced
into the police van, for example, is subjected to a force but is not coerced. In
contrast, "the coerced person does what he does; he chooses to do it. What
occurs to him does not simply happen to him; it occurs as a result of his
action" (McCloskey 1980, p. 336). Suzanne Uniacke thinks that the concept of
coercion is very closely tied to the concept of duress.
Uniacke maintains that
duress requires the person acting under duress to decide
to perform the
action. Coercion, on Uniacke's view, is a broader concept than duress, and
can include some positive inducements, such as bribes (Uniacke 1989, p. 54).

coercion. Coercion in the wide sense is the result of any threat of
evil. Coercion in the narrow sense is the result of a threat of evil
that provides an unreasonable incentive. On Gert's view, offers do
not count as coercive; rather they count as enticements.
Held.
Against Gert, Virginia Held maintains that "[a]n
unreasonable incentive to accept a good might be no less coercive
than an unreasonable incentive to avoid an evil." (Held 1972, p. 58).
According to Held, "[cjoercion is the activity of causing someone to
do something against his will, or of bringing about his doing what
he does against his will." (Held 1972, pp. 50 f.). As an example of
coercion without a threat of any sort. Held maintains that "one
person may coerce another into remaining in a room by locking the
only door, or coercion may have been used to transport a person
from one location to another although no injury was inflicted or
even threatened" (Held 1972, p. 51). Under such a broad
conception of coercion, coercion can involve threats, offers, and
other actions (or circumstances) which involve neither.
Central to Held's notion of coercion is that to coerce someone
is to make them act against their will. According to Held, people
can act against their will in various ways. By way of example, she
considers the contrast between seduction and rape, and maintains
that "[i]n one case constraint and threat are operative, in the other
inducement and offer. If the degree of inducement is set high
enough in the case of seduction, there may seem to be little
difference in the extent of coercion involved" (Held 1972, p. 58).
Not only does Held think that offers or inducements can be coercive;
she also thinks that offers or inducements can be coercive, even

when the coerced person might have supplied the deficiency of will
(Held 1972, pp. 58 ff.).

So Held, unlike Frankfurt, does not think

that (psychological) compulsion is essential to coercion, even though
she thinks that coerced persons act against their will.
O'Neill.
deciphered

O'Neill's conception of coercion—insofar as this can be
from

her

very close to Held's.
unproblematic

relatively

few

scattered

comments—seems

First, both O'Neill and Held allow it as

that there can be coercive threats and offers, but

they do not limit coercion to cases involving threats or offers.

For

example, both allow for mere physical coercion which may come
about by other actions (or circumstances).

Second, for both O'Neill

and Held, the central defining feature of coerced action is that the
agent's autonomy is seriously impaired—but both (unlike Frankfurt)
allow that this may fall short of compulsion.

Further, unlike Gert,

Held and O'Neill allow that coerced action may be compelled action.
(viii) Back to George's proposal and O'Neill's theory of justice
In order to consider George's proposal in the light of O'Neill's
theory

of

justice,

it

is

necessary

to

find

reconstruction of O'Neill's account of coercion.

the

most

plausible

All in all, it seems

that O'Neill's conception of coercion strongly overlaps with Held's,
and that the central idea is that coerced action is action performed
under

another's

influence

(or

influence

circumstance)

(or

in

a

seriously

circumstance),

where

compromises—and

may

that
on

occasion even completely override—the agent's autonomy or free
choice.

Is George's 3-D solution coercive when considered in the

light of such a conception of coercion?

Ordinary people in the Third World.

On O'Neill's view, it may

be fundamentally coercive to rely on others' need in order to secure
their 'consent' to a proposal (O'Neill 1986, p. 148).

However, there

is reason to think that O'Neill would not count George's proposal as
fundamentally coercive of ordinary people in the Third World, since
that proposal aims to undo the status

quo of underprivilege in the

Third World.
O'Neill allows that physical circumstances can themselves be
coercive

and

that

widespread

fundamentally coercive.

destitution

Under present

and

hunger

arrangements,

is

destitution

and hunger is widespread in the Third World.

So, the

actual

present

O'Neill's

view,

that

"in

harsh

to

avoid

conditions

fundamentally
circumstances

in

the

Third

coercive.
lesser

World

O'Neill

coercion

fundamental coercion" (O'Neill

are,

in

maintains

might be the only way
1986, p. 158).

George's proposal

seeks to eliminate those conditions which make the status

quo for

ordinary people in the Third World fundamentally coercive.

It is

noteworthy, therefore, that even if George's solution to the problem
of

destitution

and

hunger

is coercive

in

some^ subsidiary

way

because it relies on the neediness of ordinary people in the Third
World to secure their cooperation, it does not follow that O'Neill
would see it as unjust because it is coercive.

For if subsidiary

coercion is the only practicable way to avoid the

fundamental

coercion of widespread

constitutes

destitution and hunger (which

the neediness of ordinary people in the Third World), then not only
is that aspect of George's proposal not forbidden by O'Neill (on the
grounds that it is coercive), it is obligatory.

However, there is one way in which George's proposal runs
the risk of counting as unacceptably coercive. The terms of George's
proposal are conditional on démocratisation. She insists that the
proposed development funds be democratically run. For those
ordinary people in the Third World who value justice but who do
not embrace democracy as a value, this aspect of George's proposal
looks c o e r c i v e . 2 5 it seems implausible to suppose that the solution
to the physically coercive circumstances of destitution and hunger
in the Third World requires that politico-economic structures in the
Third World be democratised.
Power elites in the First and Third Worlds. The power elites
have a lot to gain from the fundamentally coercive status quo.
Arguably, there would need to be considerable pressure placed on
the power elites in both the First and Third Worlds to get them to
comply with George's proposal. Does the pressure proposed by
George count as coercive on O'Neill's account of coercion?
It is fairly clear what O'Neill's position would be here. Even if
the will of the power elites was forced, such coercion would not
count as unjust on O'Neill's theory. For, as noted, O'Neill maintains
that justice may even require that we be coercive in some
subsidiary respects in order to promote fundamental
noncoercion.

25Arguably, there are some undemocratic, but well-ordered, hierarchical
societies which make decisions for the members of their societies, which
reflect the interests of those members and maintain the requisite standards
of justice. Rawls uses the term 'well-ordered hierarchical society' to mean a
society which is "peaceful and not expansionist; its legal system satisfies
certain requisite conditions of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people"
(Rawls 1993, p. 43).

Ordinary people in the First World. Many ordinary people in
First World countries are vulnerable to such things as losing their
jobs. Markets which traditionally belonged to the First World are
being lost and transnational companies are moving their
manufacturing from the First to the Third World where they can
find cheaper labour.
In some respects, under present
arrangements, ordinary people in the First World are vulnerable to
such things as losing their jobs or a worsening in their conditions of
employment. George's proposal is sensitive to this vulnerability,
and includes in its aims the protection of jobs for ordinary people in
the First World by increasing the export of basic commodities such
as "fertilizers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, machine tools, spare
parts, transportation and communications equipment" (George
1989, p. 248). While these measures help protect the jobs of
ordinary people in the First World, less competition for markets
with workers in the Third World could quite possibly further help
workers in the First World by protecting their conditions of
employment, such as basic wages.26 This aspect of George's proposal
is a move towards making ordinary people in First World countries
less vulnerable and so puts them in a position where they are less
likely to be coerced. So, O'Neill is likely to approve of this aspect of
George's proposal.
Another issue worth addressing is whether George's proposal
is putting acceptable pressure on ordinary people in the First World
26The point here is that in order for the manufacturing of labour intensive
products in the First World to be competitive with Third World manufacturers
(which have relatively low labour costs), wages are often driven down which
is to the detriment of ordinary people in the First World such as workers and
their dependants.

to support her 3-D solution.
promise

of more jobs

attractive offer.

Since the 3-D solution holds out the

and more secure jobs, it seems like

an

The offer that George is putting to this interest

group is one which they are likely to favour; but they are hardly
likely

to

incentive

find

that

that

George's

they

extreme difficulty.

couldn't

proposal
refuse

or

offers
couldn't

an

unreasonable

refuse

without

So, George's offer seems to be one which leaves

open the possibility of autonomous acceptance or refusal.

Hence,

George's proposal does not seem to undermine the autonomy of
ordinary people in the First World and is likely to be seen by O'Neill
as noncoercive.
An essential part of George's proposal is that it relies on the
democratic

co-operation

First World.

of ordinary people and collectives in the

To overcome the status

quo of debt, hunger and

destitution, there is need for a political will from ordinary people
and

collectives

in the First World

to change

the

international

economic and political system, by putting pressure on the power
elites and large international agencies such as the IMF.

Given that

the democratic will of ordinary people and collectives in the First
World is necessary for the implementation of George's proposal, it
seems

implausible

to

think

that

its

implementation

would

be

coercive of them because it would undermine their autonomy or
free choice.
Conclusion.
people

The status quo of underprivilege among ordinary

in the Third

World

is arguably

fundamentally

coercive.

Even if there are aspects of George's proposal that are coercive of
ordinary people in the Third World in subsidiary ways,

O'Neill

would see such subsidiary coercion as mandatory, if necessary
eradicate

the

fundamental

conditions

coercion.

of

underprivilege

However,

it

is

not

that

clear

to

constitute

that

George's

proposal is coercive of ordinary people in the Third World in only
subsidiary

ways.

restructuring

has

For
the

example,

potential

her

to

demand

be

for

fundamentally

democratic
coercive

of

those whose traditional lifestyles embrace justice as a value within
a hierarchical context.
power

elites,

but

George's proposal does seem coercive of the

such

coercion

justice, by O'Neill's lights.
suppose

that

George's

may

even

be a requirement

of

Finally, it does not seem plausible to

proposal

compromises

ordinary people in the First World.

the

autonomy

of

It looks like an attractive offer

that they could perfectly well refuse, if they so pleased.

Imperfect

Duties

O'Neill distinguishes obligations which are determined by our
perfect

duties

imperfect duties.
order

to

avoid

from

obligations

which

are

determined

by

our

Perfect duties are actions which are required in
acting

on

fundamental

principles

(for

example,

coercion and deception) which are nonuniversalizable on logical or
conceptual

grounds.

Imperfect

duties

are

actions

which

are

required in order to avoid acting on fundamental principles

which

are

finite

nonuniversalizable

because

of

our

limited

capacities,

rationality and reliance on others to meet needs (O'Neill 1986, pp.
141 f. & pp.

159 ff.).

In an unjust and needy world,

maintains, there is greater need for fulfilment of imperfect

O'Neill
duties

such as the development of basic social and productive skills.
George's solution accords with this aspect of O'Neill's theory in that
she emphasises the need to develop the skills required to meet
basic needs.
Action which supports famine relief and development work
may often be a good way to fulfil one's imperfect obligations of
respect and beneficence, especially when needs are unmet because
of unjust political structures. O'Neill maintains that "[in] an unjust
and needy world, there is more scope and need for respect and help
to those in need and more potential for developing required skills"
(O'Neill 1986, p. 146). While principles of noncoercion and
nondeception are central to justice on O'Neill's theory, in a world
where people are vulnerable to coercion and deception, the
fostering of people's talents is very important in reducing the
weight of injustice, and so will stand high among one's imperfect
d u t i e s . 2 7 "At present, when institutional structures are far from
just, imperfect duty may often be the only, if incomplete, response
to human need. Respect and beneficence in present conditions may
often be well expressed in acting to support famine relief and
development work, especially where present political structures do
not address unmet needs" (O'Neill 1986, p. 160). O'Neill maintains
further that, in such cases, what is most urgent is the development
of basic social and productive skills and institutions that can reduce
the weight of injustice. This would include improving literacy,
health, farming and other technical skills.
27while imperfect duties are selective, arguably there will be better reasons
for sponsoring some talents than for sponsoring others. One criterion by
which one might select which talents of others to sponsor is which talents
will help to satisfy the more pressing of needs.

Even in conditions of established just institutions, on O'Neill's
account there is still a requirement to conform to such principles as
help and development, which fall under the umbrella of 'imperfect
duties'. Principles of nondevelopment are nonuniversalizable for
needy beings since needy beings require the help of others to
secure their agency (O'Neill 1986, pp. 141 & 145). While
beneficence and justice are in principle distinct, a commitment to
justice may require a commitment to beneficence. This is especially
the case when unjust social and political structures are so
entrenched that fulfilling imperfect duties is the only possible
response to human needs.
George's proposed solution conforms very much with this
aspect of O'Neill's theory. While George recognises that the
international social and political structures are unjust, she includes
in her proposal ways of empowering ordinary people in the Third
World. George's proposal includes the sponsoring of others' talents
and the promotion of help and development. Basically, the sorts of
things that George includes in her proposed solution are geared to
make people less vulnerable to injustices by sponsoring projects
which maintain (or establish) their autonomous agency. For
example, "[v]arious groups (village councils, associations of young
people, women, peasants, etc.) could apply to the fund for seed
money to undertake their own self-managed projects" (George
1989, p. 248). 'Modest' loans could be given to farmers and smallscale entrepreneurs, with priority given to women and to the
landless. Also, the promotion or creation and development of
nongovernment organisations play an important part in George's 3-

D solution, since George maintains that they have a good track
record in assisting in genuine

development.

George also maintains

that, through the initiatives of reimbursement in kind, she aims to
"strengthen

particularly

the

peasantry,

the

pastoralists

and

the

agriculture sector and thus work towards the elimination of hunger,
and the poverty on which hunger thrives" (George 1989, p. 251).
On O'Neill's theory, all these initiatives proposed by George stand
high among our imperfect duties of beneficence.

CNeill's
According

'Accessible

to O'Neill's

but

second

Critical'
standard

Requirement
for applied

ethical

reasoning, ethical and other categories need to be accessible to the
parties

concerned.

While George's solution focuses on

meeting

people's needs, her 3-D solution might be thought to be inaccessible
to some affected parties in the First World as it fails to embrace
such values as fair trade and lending and a free market system.
George's

3-D

imperialistic
certain

First

solution

might

also

be

thought

towards many in the Third World
World

values

that

democracy and gender liberalism.

they

may

not

to

be

value-

as it

enshrines

share,

such

as

Her 3-D solution might also be

open to the criticism that it is insensitive to what the relevant
parties identify as the problem

or as their

needs.

In assessing these criticisms of George's solution, however, it
is important to remember that O'Neill sets an 'accessible but critical'
requirement on applied ethical reasoning.

While the relevant grids

and categories need to be accessible to the parties concerned, they

do not need to be restricted to any established or
values.

establishment

O'Neill comments:

All complete Kantian deliberation requires the minor
premises of practical reasoning—the proposed maxim of
action—to be formulated, and then critically assessed in
terms of the Categorical Imperative.

Agents and agencies

select the minor premises of their deliberations partly by
using the grid of categories that constitutes their local
idiom and moral starting point, and partly by criticizing that
specification of problems, allocations of problems and
claims about available action in the light of wider
considerations, including ethical principles (O'Neill 1986,

p.

134).
(i) First World
It could

categories.
be argued that George's proposed

solution

to

the

Third World debt crisis does not take proper account of the grids
and categories of people in the First World, which are manifest in
the policies and strategies of the IMF.

Many people in the First

World may well see the Third World debt 'crisis' in terms of Third
World countries not repaying the money that they borrowed and so
not fulfilling their end of the bargain.

Such complainants may claim

that George's solution allows Third World countries to forgo their
end of the bargain because they are not repaying their debts in
hard currency (i.e., US dollars).^«

2 8 o f course, George's 3-D solution does include Third World countries
repaying their debt, albeit in nonconventional forms like reimbursement
kind.

in

One line of response here is that the standards and categories
that First World individuals and institutions embrace regarding fair
trade and fair lending are unlikely to apply in most instances of
Third World debt. Those who partook in the financial agreements
surrounding Third World debt are typically not those who bear the
burden of repayment. In many cases, money was borrowed for
prestige projects, which were of little or no benefit to ordinary
people in the Third World. In other cases, the money was spent on
arms, which were in turn used to oppress ordinary people in the
Third World. In some cases the money was siphoned off by power
elites in the Third World and returned to the First World in flight
capital.29
When these aspects of the history of the debt are
considered, it would be difficult to justify repayment of much of the
debt, in terms of fair trading and fair lending.
Another point, in response to the claim that Third World
countries are forgoing their end of the bargain, is that in many
cases those who borrowed the money were not democratically
elected representatives of those who bear the burden. In First
World democratic countries, on the other hand, projects for which
loans are made by governments are more likely to be reflective of
the interests of those who bear the burden of the debt. So, whereas
the burden of international debt incurred by First World countries
may justifiably fall on ordinary people in the First World (allowing
that they benefited from the borrowed money or would foreseeably
have benefited from the borrowed money), such principles of fair
lending are less likely to apply in the cases of Third World debt.
29see my Ch. 2, The Causes of Third World Debt', the section, '(ii) Capital
flight and
corruption'.

Another criticism that may be made of George's proposal is
that it fails to embrace a free market model and so goes against a
predominant First World establishment view.30 The sorts of
projects that George proposes with reimbursement in kind require
funding which would not typically come about in a free market
system. Indeed, her whole inner-directed economic approach goes
against a free market model.
Criticisms of George's 3-D solution such as the two just
outlined, namely, that it does not take fair trading and lending
seriously and that it fails to embrace a free market system are
unlikely to move O'Neill. For O'Neill is committed to the view that,
even if full repayment of Third World debt could be justified within
First World establishment categories, there is still the question of
whether the categories of First World institutions ought to be
revised. For O'Neill, it is important not to tie deliberation
permanently to some locally established categories (though it is also
important to O'Neill, in revising any ethical and other categories,
that the relevant agents or agencies find the shift accessible).
However, on O'Neill's theory, the categories which surround a free
market system do need revision as they impede the satisfaction of
people's basic needs. O'Neill even gives some illustration of how a
shift in the way of thinking about economic categories may be
possible:
30of

course, it may be argued that even in First World countries there is
nowhere in existence a free market system. Taxes and redistribution of
resources by a welfare system are typical of many First World countries. My
point here is that those in the First World often value an approximation of a
free market system and, in many ways, their own economies are run on such
an approximation.

When transfers to the hungry are described as 'gifts' they
are not seen as required by justice.
matters could

We know that these

be differently understood, because they are

differently understood within certain national states.

Even

in capitalist societies, where commercial categories

provide

one standard way of looking at the world, transfer

payments

made by processes of taxation are seldom seen either as 'aid'
or as 'gifts'.

Nor on the other hand are they seen (except by a

few libertarians) as unjust confiscations (O'Neill 1986, p. 151).
So, on O'Neill's theory, even if full repayment of Third World
debt

was

required

by

established

First

World

categories,

and

George's proposal went against establishment values such as free
market systems and fair trading and lending, that would not be
reason enough to reject George's proposed solution.

Indeed, O'Neill

thinks that, in the case of Third World debt, there are good reasons
to

be

critical

and

revisionary

of

such

establishment

grids

and

categories.
(ii) Southern

categories.

Criticisms of George.

It could be argued that George's proposal

is not accessible to certain groups in the Third World because it is
paternalistic

and

value-imperialistic.

enshrines democratic values.

For example,

the

proposal

If democracy is not embraced by a

group, then ethical deliberation which hinges on democratic values
is likely to fall short of accessibility for that group.

Such ethical

reasoning would then not meet O'Neill's second standard of practical
reasoning.

Similarly,

since

George's

proposal

focuses

on

empowering women, it may not be accessible to certain patriarchal
groups.
These criticisms of George's proposal can perhaps be put most
generally in this wayi her proposal risks being inaccessible to
certain peoples of the Third World because it risks imposing on
them 'alien' values. While it aims to satisfy the needs of people in
the Third World, it may not be sensitive to their needs and values
as they perceive them. For example, the 3-D solution emphasises a
move away from an international market economy. However,
people in the Third World may have come to identify their own
values or perceived needs in ways which involve 'Westernising' and
becoming more internationally competitive.
The most basic needs, such as food and shelter, remain the
same for everyone and are culturally nonspecific, being a function
of the fact that we are all embodied. However, other values and
perceived needs, which may be considered to be more or less basic,
may be more culturally dependent—such as the need for
communication (including telecommunication) as a means of
acquiring information, and the need for infrastructure, such as
roads, as a means of travel and of exchanging and supplying basic
goods. As cultures change, often through the influence of
Westernisation, people's values and the way people perceive their
needs can change.
It could be argued that George's proposal is not sensitive to
changes of values within cultures and so is not sensitive to the ways
in which people in Third World countries now perceive their needs.

Some may maintain that, through such strategies as reimbursement
in

kind,

values

George

is being

value-imperialistic

by

imposing

some

on people in Third World countries that they cannot

guaranteed to share now—even
Response

to criticisms

be

if they once did share such values.

of George.

It has to be conceded that

there is an element of value-imperialistic paternalism in George's 3D proposal, though it certainly seems much less paternalistic than
alternative solutions, especially the IMF solution.
the need for replacement

George respects

views to be accessible to all affected

parties, but she is convinced that democracy (for example) is an
accessible value to people in the Third World.

According to George,

once democracy has been embraced, people are unlikely to give it
up.

Her aim is to use democracy as a means to meeting people's

basic and other needs, and thus to help secure the autonomy of
ordinary people in the Third World.

However, although

George's

insistence on democracy is well-intended, it seems implausible to
suppose

that

the

only

practicable

way

to overcome

widespread

hunger and destitution in the Third World is to institute democratic
politico-economic

structures.

In

'well-ordered

hierarchical

s o c i e t i e s ' , f o r example, the fight against famine and poverty could
be

located

(with

more

respect

for

autonomy)

within

accessible, traditional, nondemocratic, politico-economic
George's

proposal

also

emphasises

the

need

structures.
to

empower

women—as among the most vulnerable of the vulnerable—in
Third World.

more

the

It seems that O'Neill likewise would reject practices

which keep women in subjection, whatever the local
See fn. 25, this chapter.

established

view is.

"The most significant features of actual situations

that

must be taken into account in judgements of justice are the security
or vulnerability that allow actual others to dissent from and to seek
change

in

variable

aspects

their lives" (O'Neill

of the

arrangements

1992, p. 73).

which

Unless they are

structure

empowered,

women will not be able to dissent from or to seek change in many
aspects of their life, and so present, disempowering
will always count as unjust on O'Neill's theory.
established

a

cultural

value

that

subjects

arrangements

No matter how

women

may

be,

on

O'Neill's theory there will be a strong imperative to revise such an
established

value.

What is required

is some

deliberation

with

alternative grids and categories that are accessible, or could become
accessible, to the relevant parties.
Consider, finally, the criticism that George's 3-D solution is
insensitive to the values and needs of people in the Third World as
they

now perceive

them and that George is perhaps even imposing

her own conception of contemporary Third World values on people
in the Third World.

At least this much can be said on George's

behalf in response to this criticism.

George is sensitive to this issue.

Part of the point of her (problematic) promotion of democracy is
that

it

would

empower

people

to

choose

for themselves

what

projects they want to pursue, in the light of what they perceive
their needs to be.

While George proposes a method by which needs

could be met, the sorts of projects she cites as "some examples of
possible payments in kind" are those she thinks ordinary people in
the

Third

World

would

agree

judgement (George 1989, p. 250).

to

under

some

considerable

Such recommendations are not

essential to George's 3-D solution.

George might very well approve

of democratically endorsed alternative proposals.

Conclusion
George's
O'Neill's theory.

proposed

3-D

solution

has

many

virtues

under

First, for O'Neill the meeting of people's basic needs

is central to meeting the requirements of justice.

George's proposal

includes a number of initiatives which are primarily focused on
meeting people's basic needs.

(The IMF strategies, by contrast,

ostensibly thwart the meeting of people's basic needs.) Second, even
if George's proposal is coercive in certain respects, in relation to
ordinary people in the Third World and the power elites in both
Worlds, it seems that such coercion mostly would count for O'Neill
as subsidiary coercion in the service of fundamental noncoercion,
and so would be permitted (and perhaps even required).

Third,

George's proposal seems to respect the conditions of free consent
with respect to ordinary people in the First World.

Fourth, George's

3-D solution offers a good way for agents and agencies to fulfil their
imperfect duties.

Fifth, George's proposal acquits itself in certain

respects in relation to O'Neill's 'accessible but critical' requirement
on applied ethical theory.
However,

George's

3-D

solution

has

an

evident

problematic feature when assessed in the light of O'Neill's theory of
justice.

The proposal

economic
requirement

structures
has

the

requires
in

the

potential

the démocratisation
Third

World.

to

fundamentally

be

of

politico-

Arguably,
coercive

this
of

certain communities in the Third World. It also limits the
accessibility of George's proposal to these communities.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

My

objective

in

this

thesis

has

been

to

assess

George's

proposed 3-D solution in the light of two competing, significant,
contemporary theories of justice that have international application.
These theories are R. M. Hare's preference utilitarianism and Onora
O'Neill's Kantian-inspired theory of justice.
Whilst, for the most part, George's 3-D solution fares well on
Hare's theory of justice, the aspect of the solution that is conditional
on démocratisation is problematic.

Hare is a preference utilitarian

who (at the intuitive level) endorses moderate egalitarianism as his
principle

of

assumptions).

substantial

justice

(given

certain

empirical

As I have argued in Chapter 4, George's proposal is

apparently egalitarian, and perhaps is even moderately

egalitarian.

The proposal is egalitarian in that it promotes greater equality in
both

economic

arrangements.

and

political

power

than

exists

under

present

However, it is difficult to determine whether the

proposal is moderately egalitarian because it is left unclear just how
much inequality George's proposal will allow.

In any event, the

central issue for Hare (at the critical level) is whether
proposal

would

best

George's

satisfy the preferences of all the affected

parties, if applied.
George's

solution

looks promising

in many

ways,

preference-utilitarian perspective, because of its egalitarian

from a
nature.

However,

George's proposed

démocratisation;

and

it

is

strategies

are tied to conditions

arguable

that

such

conditions

of
are

insensitive to certain cultural values and preferences among those
who live in currently preferred, nondemocratic societies.

George

seems to assume that if these societies were to become democratic
the present preferences for a nondemocratic

socio-political

order

would be outweighed by future preferences for a democratic sociopolitical order.

It is not at all clear that the weighing of preferences

would turn out this way.
George's

proposal

also seems promising

on several

when assessed according to O'Neill's theory of justice.
on

démocratisation

again

counts

However,

George's

insistence

raises

certain

problems.

George's proposal is promising on O'Neill's theory in the

way it aims to meet people's basic needs (a central feature of justice
for O'Neill), respects the autonomy of ordinary folk in the First
World, and provides for agents and agencies to fulfil their imperfect
duties.

Even though arguably there is a certain coercive aspect to

George's solution—such as her reliance on the neediness of ordinary
people in the Third World in order to secure their consent—I argue
in Chapter 6 that, for the most part, her solution seems to be
fundamentally

noncoercive.

However, there is a coercive aspect to George's proposal that
looks

unacceptable

when

assessed

on O'Neill's

makes the terms of her proposal conditional on
Such

a

condition

seems

fundamentally

theory.

George

démocratisation.

coercive

of

those

communities who value justice but who do not include democracy
as a value, and so apparently fails to meet a central criterion of

O'Neill's account of justice.

Furthermore, because it depends on

démocratisation, George's proposal fails to meet another important
demand that O'Neill sets on applied solutions to ethical problems—
namely, that such solutions be accessible to the affected parties.
In

all, while most

aspects

of George's proposal

requirements

of both Hare's and O'Neill's competing

justice,

problematic

one

feature

common

proposal is conditional on démocratisation.

to

both

meet

the

theories

of

is

that

her

REFERENCES

Bauer, P. 1990, The Third World Debt Crisis: Can't Pay or Won't
Pay?,

with commentaries by W. Kasper, St. Leonards, N.S.W.:

Centre for Independent

Studies.

Boyle, J. 1992, "Natural Law and International Ethics", in
Traditions

of International

Ethics, edited by T. Nardin and

D. R. Mapel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 112-35.
Donaldson, T. 1992, "Kant's Global Rationalism", in Traditions of
International

Ethics, edited by T. Nardin and D. R. Mapel,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-57.
Ellis, A. 1992, "Utilitarianism and International Ethics", in
Traditions

of International

Ethics, edited by T. Nardin and D. R.

Mapel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 158-79.
Frankfurt, H. G. 1973, "Coercion and moral responsibilfly", in
Essays on Freedom of Action, edited by T. Honderich, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 63-86.
George, S. 1989, A Fate Worse Than Debt, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books (reprinted with new Foreword, 1994).
George, S. 1992, The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt
Harms Us All, Worcester: Pluto Press.

George, S. & Sabelli, F. 1994, Faith and Credit: The World Bank's
Secular Empire, London: Penguin Books.
Gert, B. 1972, "Coercion and Freedom", Nomos, vol. 14, pp. 30-48.
Hare, R. M. 1978, "Equality and Justice", in Justice and Economic
Distribution,

edited by J. Arthur and W. Shaw, New Jersey:

Prentice Hall, pp. 116-31.
Hare, R. M. 1981, Moral Thinking, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Hardin, G. 1977, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the
Poor", in World Hunger and Moral Obligations, edited by W. H.
Aiken and H. LaFollette, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Held, V. 1972, "Coercion and Coercive Offers", Nomos, vol. 14, pp.
49-62.
Hoffmann, S. 1995, "Dreams of a Just World", in The New York
Review,

vol. 17, No. 17, pp. 52-56.

Kant, I. 1948, The Moral Law, edited and translated by H. J. Paton,
London: Hutchinson and Co.
Mackie, J. L. 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Mapel, D. R. 1992, "The Contractarian Tradition and International
Ethics", in Traditions of International Ethics, edited by T. Nardin
and D. R. Mapel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
180-200.

Mapel, D. R. and Nardin, T. 1992, "Convergence and Divergence in
International Ethics", in Traditions of International Ethics, edited
by T. Nardin and D. R. Mapel, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 297-322.
McCloskey, H. J. 1980, "Coercion: Its Nature and Significance", The
Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 18, pp. 335-51.
Mill, J. S. 1991 (1861), "Utilitarianism", in On Liberty and Other
Essays, edited by J. Gray, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nozick, R. 1969, "Coercion", in Philosophy, Science, and Method:
Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, edited by S. Morgenbesser, P.
Suppes, and M. White, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 440-472.
O'Neill, O. 1986, Faces of Hunger, London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.
O'Neill, O. 1992, "Justice, gender and international boundaries",
in International Justice and the Third World, edited by R.
Attfield and B. Wilkins, London & New York: Routledge, pp.
50-76.
Passmore, J. 1974, Man's Responsibility for Nature, 2nd edn,
London: Duckworth.

Persson, 1. 1983, "Hare on Universal Prescriptivism and
Utilitarianism", Analysis,

vol. 43, pp. 43-49.

Rawls, J. 1972, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Rawls, J. 1993, "The Law of Peoples", in On Human Rights: The
Oxford

Amnesty

Lectures,

edited by S. Shute and S. Hurley, New

York: Basic Books, pp. 41-82
Singer, P. 1977, "Famine Affluence and Morality", in World
and Moral Obligations,

Hunger

edited by W. H. Aiken and H. LaFollette,

New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Singer, P. 1979, Practical

Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.
Uniacke, S. 1989, "Killing Under Duress", Journal of Applied
Philosophy,

vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 53-69.

Vincent, R. 1992, "The Idea of Rights in International Ethics", in
Traditions

of International

Ethics, edited by T. Nardin and D. R.

Mapel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 250-69.
Wilkins, B. 1992, "Debt and underdevelopment: the case for
cancelling Third World debts", in International

Justice and the

Third World, edited by R. Attfield and B. Wilkins, London & New
York: Routledge, pp. 169-92.

D A ArreMHOi«
122 WiNDANa RD.
PBfMBee 2502
PH <042) 742229

